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FOREWORD
 
 
 The first issue of the Economic Survey: Moldova in Transition, submitted
to your attention has been conceived by its authors as a research monitoring
(analysis-forecast) publication of the national economy.
 Economic Survey is aimed at filling in the almost empty niche - between
the dispassionate materials of the Department of Statistical and Sociological
Analysis and actively emotional publications in mass-media. The idea emerged
within the UNDP/WB project Strategy for Development (Center for Strategic
Studies and Reforms, NGO), with the support of other projects, under
implementation in the country, including agencies ARIA, ARA, TACIS 
Moldovan Economic Trends, USAID  Western NIS Enterprise Fund.
The timing of the publication is at critical points of the year - at the
beginning (evaluation of the previous year, forecast for the next year); based on
the results of the first semester, during the work on the economic forecasts, and
budget for the next year; in the fall, when a good deal of the year is over and the
trend and problems requiring adjustment are mostly evident. It is not less
important the experience of other countries in transition, particularly the close
neighboring ones.
The authors of the issue: A. Cantemir (4), L. Cara”ciuc (3.4; 3.5; 6.2),
C. Ciobanu (3.2), N. Cainarean (2.1.2), A. Gudîm (1), Gh. Efros (3.1), F. Izman
(3.3), V. Moroz (3.3), Al. Munteanu (2.3), An. Munteanu (4), V. Negruþa (2.1.1),
E. Nikulina (5), J. Parks (5), O. Petru”in (2.4; 3.1), M. Prodan (5), N. Sedaghat
(2.1.2), O. “cerbaþchi (2.2), Iu. Timofti (2.1.2).
Any cooperation will be welcomed.
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CHAPTER 1. SOCIAL ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: CURRENT
SITUATION, SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK
The Republic of Moldova entered 1998 with a heavy burden of the social, economic and
financial problems. Regardless to the discreet optimism concerning the results of the previous
year (1.3% growth of GDP, 11.2% of annual rate of inflation, 0.3% devaluation of the national
currency, 5% rise of real incomes of the population, diminishing arrears for wages and
pensions), there are enough symptoms, that macrostabilization - the basic achievement of the
initial stage of reform - is still vague, being caused by the delayed structural reforms in the real
economic sector, incomplete restructure of the entire state administration system, as well as by
the impact of the non-economic factors upon the situation in the country.
It is quite possible, that 1998/99 will be an even more critical period for the country in
this decade . The sharp decline of production output and social standards of the early ‘90-s were
offset by “gobbling” previous accumulated national wealth, then, starting from 1996, the
economy of Moldova got on the path of stable depression, of depleting resources, gradual cease
of operations of the industrial production capacities, degrading raw material basis for foodstuffs
production, stagnating R&D, population aging and health state worsening, destruction of social
infrastructure as a system.
Moldova ranks among the last 1/3 of those 130 countries of the world in terms of GNP
volume (US$ 2.3-2.5 billion, including Transnistria), below the 90th place, while in Europe it
ranks together with Albania and Macedonia among countries with lowest incomes. Living
standards indicators: men’s average life (62 years) and women’s (70), as well as the energy
resources consumption per capita in Moldova is below the world average. The country’s annual
expenses for education and medicare is less than 3-5% of the GNP, as compared with expenses
volume of the most European countries (1998 World Development Indicators. World Bank,
March 1998). Nevertheless, market transformation in the Republic of Moldova is irreversible .
Of 26 countries in transition, Moldova ranks in the middle in terms of liberalization of
enterprise operations, prices and trade, privatization, inflation, legal basis and institutional
structures of the market economy (Transition Report 1997. European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development). In line with that, there is noticeable a lack of stability: the state budget
deficit, constant tax arrears, chronic salary and pension arrears, non-payments and low
profitability of most industrial enterprises, latent unemployment, state machinery corruption
and, the state power is weak in providing for public order in the country. All these problems
stem from the need to restructure the national economy, starting from enterprises up to its key
sectors – agriculture, energy, industry and social sphere. For this purpose legal basis are
required, investments, entrepreneurship and restructuring of privatized enterprises support, their
profitability and competitiveness enhancement, export promotion.
Unfortunately, after the “big leap” towards market economy, undertaken by the
Parliament and Government in 1993-1995, the pace of reforms was subsequently throttled back.
If previously the “Economist” (March, 1995) wrote: "Moldova is the model of sound reforming,
its compactness makes it a perfect laboratory of reform", afterwards, after a series of
unsuccessful investment tenders (“Tutun”, Cement Works from Rezina, “MoldTelecom”),
repeated manifestation of “special interests” and fast extension of shadow economy, the image
of the country faded away.
Already now the s h o r t f a l l s  a n d  m i s t a k e s  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r i o d  are evident: insufficient
social compensation of reforms, procrastination of Civil Code adoption and incompleteness of
legal base for reforms, non-respect of laws, low economic efficiency of state property
privatization, delayed restructuring of industrial enterprises, including bankruptcy procedure,
contradictory actions in agrarian sector (periodical cancellation of large farms’ debts, slow land
reform), energy complex monopoly, lack of state policy in employment, inadequate new
conditions of the economic basis of the local-self administration.
CHAPTER 1. SOCIAL ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: CURRENT SITUATION, SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK
© July 1998 ECONOMIC SURVEY Moldova in Transition 5
The assumed predictions of immediate economic growth “in 1.5-2 years” after realization
of macroeconomic stability did not become reality. The same failures occurred in other aspects:
cutting down state expenditures, speeded up privatization, domestic market openness, etc. Year
by year the state costs keep being “curtailed”, whereas the difficulties of budget execution are
growing. A good deal of state property has been already privatized, yet, the private sector
output in terms of taxes and budget revenues is rather modest. The openness of the domestic
market filled the country with low quality goods, including food items. The economy
liberalization released from control the actions of the enterprises’ senior management. Most
functions of the sectoral ministries have died away, while the territories (municipalities, raions)
have not been assigned due rights and resources. This is why the question arises of the role and
responsibility of the state as initiator of reforms.
The Republic of Moldova is a new state of Europe, with unconsolidated laws, institutes
and procedures of political economic and public life. And, unfortunately, amongst main reasons
of stagnation delay is the permanent political and economic uncertainty, particularly manifested
during pre- and post election periods, in conditions, when in the country the generally accepted
strategy of the social-economic development and clear definition of procedure of working out
its legal and management decisions are still missing. The interests of the country might be fully
provided through a “cycle of political stability” in 1998-2000, when the long-run cooperation
between the President, Parliament and the Government could considerably push Moldova
towards reaching its strategic targets (Republic of Moldova: Key Problems and Strategic
Priorities for National Economic Development. CISR, Chiºinãu, July 1997).
Proceeding from the real situation, t h e  m a j o r i t y  r i g h t - c e n t r i s t  w i n g  o f  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  a n d
their created Government, in May 1998, adopted a rather radical action program for 1998-
2001 , including as priority measures on financial recovering, restructuring of production sector
and social sphere.
Budget sphere recovering. For the purpose to overcome the crisis in the budget system,
the Government will focus its efforts on:
· Enhancing efficiency of tax collection to the budget, first of all by diminishing and
ceasing mutual settlements, providing primarily for cash inflows;
· Primary expenditures from the state budget are defined: payment of pensions, wages
(including arrears) and compensations to the population; serving the state indebtedness;
payment of expenditure arrears for energy resources; payment of medicines and foods for social
sphere institutions (hospitals, ambulances, special schools, and others).
Energy sector restructuring. The Government will undertake measures to prevent
financial bankruptcy of the given sector and to make it attractive for investors, through:
· Immediate adoption of legal and normative basis that regulates the activity of the
energy sector in market economy conditions;
· Demonopolization, restructuring and privatization, creating adequate conditions in the
manufacturing sector, transportation and distribution of energy resources;
· Improving the mechanisms of settlement of tariffs for electrical, thermal power and gas;
· Modification of privileges system;
· More ample collection of cash payments from companies and population for energy
resources, by excluding mutual payments and settlements in kind.
With the purpose to develop the privatization program for 1997-1998, on June 25, 1998
the new Parliament adopted the concept of energy complex enterprises restructuring.
A g r a r i a n  r e f o r m .  Considering the primary importance of the agri-industrial complex in
the national economy and the need to enhance the effectiveness of reforms in this field, the
Government will undertake measures in:
· Completion of land reform;
· Creation of land market, based on law;
· Suppression of “special interests” manifestations, that generate shadow economy,
corruption and crime.
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P r i v a t i z a t i o n .  The Government will undertake measures in removing the barriers,
constraining the implementation of law “On privatization program on 1997-1998”, setting as
cornerstone not only the budget interests, but also the emergence of the real proprietor, as well
as attraction of investments. A particular attention will be paid to suppressing any illicit
participation of state office holders in privatization process.
Social sphere reforms. Proceeding from the need to diminish the social cost of reforms
and considering the financial possibilities of the state, the Government designs to:
· Determine the minimum set of social services, guaranteed by the state, and provide
them to most needy layers of population;
· Carrying out the pensioning reform through introduction of respective amendments
into legislation;
· Introduction of alternative forms of funding social services (medicare, education and
others).
The anti-crisis measures adopted by the Government from the very first month of its
activity (June 5, 1998), joined together the actions in the fiscal-budgetary system and in
consolidating the financial basics of the social sphere.
The ground for this was a serious reason: b y  t h e  e n d  o f  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1 9 9 8 ,  t h e  s t a t e  b u d g e t
in fact broke down . Budget revenues have been collected only at 33% of the previously foreseen
collections for the first half year (of that about 60% accounted for revenues from indirect taxes),
the revenues of local budgets sharply declined, accounting for only 27% of the overall revenue
of the consolidated budget. The greatest share of budget expenditures (over 50%) have been
channeled unto three directions: current payments and paying-off salary arrears; purchase of
energy resources and state debt servicing.
On June 29, 1998, the Government approved and submitted to the Parliament for
consideration the amendments to the 1998 Budget Law, ensuring the foreseen level of revenues
on the account of tax collections, increase of excisable goods’ list, sale of state property, etc.,
and this way to reduce, in line with that, its expenditures (by US$ 7.4 million) which triggered
off a decline of budget deficit (by US$ 7.4 million). The amounts were diminished of state
guaranties for foreign loans (from US$ 35 million to US$ 9 million), capital investments,
expenses for agriculture, transport, communications and municipal economy. It was decided
also to reduce the disbursements from state budget to Social Fund by 40%, which will entail
costs reduction for compensation of electricity, heating, gas and pension transfers. As stated by
the Prime-minister I. Ciubuc, “suggested measures are a serious surgery operation, but there is
no way out.”
It is obvious that an implicit result of excises increase on gasoline and diesel, as well as
elimination of TVA exemptions for diary products and bread, will generate a general increase in
prices by about 10-15%, including by 20-25% for bread and diary products. This measure will
certainly finalize the process of price liberalization for those products, but, on the other hand,
extremely negative reactions from the population are inevitable.
Indeed, the Government has no more popular leverage, the variants of possible actions are
less and less, because most of the anti-crisis measures have not been directed to activation of
production, where from the economic growth should actually start from, but to averting the
country’s insolvency.
The social-economic policy of the Government goes through a narrow corridor, along
which most dangerous is the “debtor's prison”, built up by its predecessors. The external debt of
the country as of January 1st, 1998, amounted to about US$ 1.3 billion (65% of GDP), and after
the beginning of the year it continued to grow, basically on the account of energy resources.
That critical level of debt was reached due to ineffective usage of foreign borrowings from
abroad. Suffice it to say, that in 1994-1997 from 30 to 60% of the budget deficit was covered by
means of foreign loans and credits. They were taken with the hope, that by the time when the
state debt will reach a hazardous threshold, the economy will eventually activate, that the taxes
inflow will rise, and, respectively funds for reimbursing the loans. However, by mid 1998 none
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of the mentioned above occurred. Meantime, if during 4 recent years the debt servicing took
almost US$ 300 million, in 1998 will be required US$ 215 million, and in 1999 – US$ 235
million, under conditions of rather limited possibilities of getting assistance from abroad.
Regardless to the evident internal and external t h r e a t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y , thanks to a
highly professional approach of the National Bank (NBM), Moldova succeeded to up-keep in
general, until very recently, a stable exchange rate of the leu, sufficient volume of forex
reserves and a relatively low rate of bank credit (17% as of May 1998).
By mid 1998, however, the situation changed. Ministry of Finance borrowed “big money”
on the domestic market, which entailed their shortage with the commercial banks. In June there
was held, probably, the last credit means’ auction (refinancing rate rose to 22.5%) and the NBM
stated its intention not to hold auctions in the future and shift to purchase-sale operations of
short-run state liabilities.
Questions were also generated in relation with the securities auctions (Treasury Bills and
Bonds), held by the Ministry of Finance. In order to settle them in the first half year of 1998 the
Ministry of Finance paid incomes amounting to 57.5 million lei and, until the year end, in case
the T-bills will keep being so profitable (32% per annum), their redemption will cost about 150
million lei There is a paradox: the state securities market altered from a fund supplier for
budget deficit alleviation into an antipode – a negative balance emerged on T-bills’ payment
and sale. High profitability of T-bills, on the one hand, and “firmness” of Moldovan leu, on the
other (during January-May it devalued by less than 1%), generate uncertainties on: whether the
forthcoming settlement of state securities will be delayed or, national currency will devaluate.
So far the NBM warns against that dramatic conclusion, yet, the entrepreneurs, investors
and population require clearer guidelines concerning leu’s exchange rate position until the end
of the year.
The situation created in the financial sector has a negative impact on the formation in
Moldova of a domestic investment system , as well as on the inflow of capital from abroad.
Creating conditions for investment inflow, first of all into the real economy, is the utmost
importance long run task - it should also be taken into account in terms of its importance for
renewing technologies and exports, generation of new jobs, increasing incomes of the state and
population. The peak of direct foreign investments (US$ 64.0 million) occurred in 1995, then
followed a two year decline. In the 1st quarter of 1998 investments amounted to US$ 15.9
million; subsequent expectations are linked to the sale of “MoldTelecom”, Cement Works from
Rezina and other perspective enterprises and foreign companies’ involvement in infrastructure
restructuring – energy sector, water supply system, hotels, tourism, etc. More than 1.3 thousand
joint-ventures are registered in the country (with foreign capital worth US$ 146.0 million, or
58% of the overall), however their indicators are very modest in terms of employees (15
thousand) and export share (12%).
The situation can, and should be improved. Most important actions, that can have a positive
impact upon the investment environment in the 2nd half y ar of 1998 are: demonstration of a
political will by the Parliament and Government to move the problem from the deadlock, tender
transparency and suppression of “special interests”, support of certain regions’ (Chiºinãu, Bãlþi,
Gagauzia) and enterprises’ initiatives. Investment inflow can be opposed by some attempts to
revise and cancel privatization results, state machine’s strive to “keep under control” profitable
objects, discrepancies related to land market development, artificially maintained status of
“missing real owner” at the enterprises in the post-privatization period.
P o l i t i c a l  w i l l  of the new Parliament towards reforms will be displayed already in July, since
the President P. Lucinschi made an appeal suggesting to urgently adopt the amendments to the
state Budget Law on 1998, the law on pensions and a packet of laws on administrative-territorial
reform. Shouldn’t this occur, the Parliament and Government will hardly make the year of 1998 a
turning point, in terms of putting the country on the way of sustainable development, although
both right-centrist majority and opposition keep declaring their strive to do so.
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Even if the opposition does not count on a long “longevity” the current Government, the
Parliament cannot afford to lock itself in one year cycle governing of the country: elaboration of
the annual program, budget law adjustment in the middle of the year, and eventually – promises
to start economic growth from the next year, etc. In a series of countries, for instance, there is a
practice of budget-fiscal planning on three year basis, in connection with a forecast of economic
growth, inflation tempo, refinancing rates, and other indicators. They are adjusted on yearly
basis, in compliance with changes in the economic conjuncture, government policy, etc.
It would be arguable to consider, that the social and financial problems of the Republic of
Moldova aggravated in 1998 only because of unconditional fulfillment of IMF and WB
recommendations. In part, this is justified as regards the pace and methods of “popular/mass
privatization”, rejection of protectionism, in weakening the role of the state in managing the
transition period. One of the main reason of the created situation, is lack of long term action
plan and succession in the governments’ actions, prevalence of tactical decisions related to
“burning questions”. There were attempts to develop middle-term strategy of the social
economic development of the country, however, they haven’t been formally recognized
(S t r a t e g y  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  E c o n o m y  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  M o l d o v a  T i l l  Y e a r  2 0 0 0  (Draft). Ministry
of Economy. Chiºinãu, 1996; Strategy of Social and Economic Development of the Republic of
M o l d o v a  D u r i n g  t h e  P e r i o d  T i l l  Y e a r  2 0 0 0 ; Center for Market Problems Research, Academy of
Sciences of Moldova, and Ministry of Economy. Chiºinãu, 1996; Republic of Moldova:
Strategy for Development. Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms. Chiºinãu, January 1998).
A fundamental question is still unsettled, regarding the coordination of market liberalism and
regulatory role of the state. Particularly it is meant, the state regulatory system of strategic
development of the economy of the country. The state ownership of production means should
be substituted by the right of the state to guide the strategic development of the country.
Taking into account all these circumstances, it is high time, when 1998/99 is a critical
period for the fate of the of the country, that the Parliament and the Government undertake the
complex of actions with cumulative, long-term effect in the main fields:
real budget, fiscal stabilization and control of arrears;
p o s t - p r i v a t i z a t i o n  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  n o t  l e s s  t h a n  1 0 0 - 1 2 0  e n t e r p r i s e s  of the key industries
(financial recovering, management improvement, attraction of investments, enhancement of
competitiveness);
land reform and restructuring of agricultural enterprises - over 700 farms, land market
development and of a system of lending to infrastructure and servicing new types of agri-
businesses;
reorganization of energy sector  – privatization and decentralization of manufacturing
sector, transportation and distribution of energy (Moldenergo, Tirex Petrol, Termocom),
revision of tariffs for consumers;
enhancement of economic and social results of p r i v a t i z a t i o n ,  sale of enterprises for cash
and of land plots under privatized enterprises;
social sector  – two priorities: revision and alteration of social protection system (in favor
of needy social strata, with a view to eliminate the debts to the population from state budget);
performance of pension reform.
Besides those issues, typically discussed by the Government with IMF and WB, there at
least two more problems, requiring constructive efforts of the Presidency, Parliament and
Government, are: (i) r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  and enhancement of effectiveness of the state machinery ;
(ii) administrative territorial reform, federalization of budget and shifting to local self-
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The argument favoring the urgent solution of those issues are evident: Moldova
is a new state, the administration system is weak and ineffective, which is directly reflected in
its corruption and involvement in informal economy. In new conditions, when the economic
agents are independent and the methods of branch based management (basic in soviet economy)
have died, the role of territories should be enhanced (municipalities, raions). Without a needed
legal basis, sufficient incomes to local budgets and municipal ownership, the social and
2.1 Budget and fiscal policy
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economic reserves of the territories won’t be effectively used. And now they are also mostly
involved in shadow economy. In addition to that, only based on economic grounds and
European standards of local self-administration ultimately there can be resolved the problems of
Transnistria and Gagauzia.
Thus, judging by the results of the first half year of 1998 of the social-economic
development of Moldova, there are nor substantial positive trends. The CISR forecast (Dec.
1997) of a 3% GDP growth in the current year, according to the results of the first half-year,
probably will be adjusted to lessening. The emerged some expectations àt the beginning of the
year, related to recovering from the stagnation and turning to a positive economic trend, was not
justified. Moreover, threat emerged in the financial sector. The economy is still “hanging-on”
on the edge of “fall or rise”, and its further orientation depends on the coordination of the
President, Parliament and Government, on the political situation in the country. Its stability will
undoubtedly contribute to economic ice-braking. And conversely, continuation of political
uncertainty, particularly its aggravation, will aggravate the economic situation and living
standards of the population.
CHAPTER 2. MACROECONOMIC TENDENCIES
The year 1998 will be year of big endeavors, including tough acceptance of the simple
truths of economic realities such as: that we can not consume without paying; nobody is willing
to support or to credit someone else forever; it is impossible to continuously accumulate
external debt without having the capacity to reimburse it; market mechanisms imply revenue
distribution according to individual and group performance; unity and social solidarity are
easier to realize in a society which is doing well; in open systems performances are estimated
in relative terms (it is important not only what we are doing, but what our neighbors are
doing).
2.1 Budget and fiscal policy
2.1.1  State budget and public finance
During the last 2 years budget and fiscal policy has been in the center of social and economic
life of Moldova. Acute social and economic problems are the result of delays in structural reforms,
inefficient public finance spending, which is used only for covering current state’s expenditures
(wages, pensions and their arrears, public debt servicing). But even these positions are under
financed.
There are some internal constraints in the Republic Moldova which impede a stimulatory
fiscal policy for the productive sector of economy. This sector should become a catalyst of
economic development for the near future. These constraints are the following: political
constraint (uncertainty linked with Transnistria region, or low viability of executive bodies);
obsolete social infrastructure, having a low efficiency and high costs, which is actually waiting
for budget allocations only; external and internal state liabilities related to public debt
servicing; significant share of shadow economy which is tending to take under control the
activity of economic entities, in both private and public sectors.
The insufficiency of public finance is caused by a number of factors, the main being:
· state’s integrity problem, and non-existence of clear borders, with specific attributes
(such as customs etc.). This results in imports of goods with no excises paid;
· significant and increasing share of shadow economy as share of GDP, as well as of tax evasion;
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· limited transparency of the tax system in Moldova, having a large list of tax
exemptions applied to the main budget revenue sources;
· corporate interest for tax forgiveness;
· big number of payments in kind, as well as of netting out in the transactions between
economic entities and with the budget;
· inefficient and non transparent usage of financial sources, which are already
insufficient (especially for energy resources, medicines, subventions).
 
 In spite of achievements in 1997 regarding tax collection (the budget was realized at 110%
comparing with the approved one), the problem of budget deficit still remains quite actual.
 The budget deficit, which amounted to 692 million lei, or 8% of GDP (preliminary data),
had a trend of increasing, comparing to 1996.
 
 Dynamics of budget indicators (in million lei)
 
1995 1996 1997 I Q. 1998**
Revenue, including Social Fund 2556 2835 3473 518.4
as % of GDP 39% 37% 40%
Expenditure, includig Social Fund 2993 3418 4165 546
as % of GDP 46% 45% 48%
Deficit, including Social Fund* 437 583 692 27.6
as % of GDP 7% 8% 8%
GDP 6480 7658 8655
 * - according to Public Finance Statistics and new Budget Classification
 ** - excluding Social Fund
 
 The increase in budget revenues in 1997 was achieved mainly due to:
· huge number of netting out transactions (about 37 percent);
· non fiscal revenues, such as military equipment, which were not initially included in
the budget;
· increase of excise tax rates for petrol products;
· insignificant improvement of tax administration (due to enforcement of the Law No.
633, however the costs resulted from implementation of this Law are very high).
 
 During the 1st quarter of 1998 comparing to the same period of 1997 tax collection to
both state and local budgets is as follows:
 
  1997  1998
 1st quarter  state budget  local budgets  consolidated
budget
 state budget  local budgets  consolidated
budget
 TOTAL REVENUE  305596.5  160555  466151.5  394832.6  124112  518944.6
 1. Current revenue  302588.8  157963  460551.8  380250  119159  499409
 1.1 Fiscal revenue  222214.2  138125  360339.2  265985.2  98194  364179.2
 1.2 Non fiscal revenue  80374.6  19838  100212.6  114264.8  20965  135229.8
 2. Capital revenue  3007.7  2592  5599.7  14582.6  4953  19535.6
 
 As it is presented above, a diminishing trend in tax collection is recorded at local budgets.
These reductions are mainly coming from the income tax and property tax, which have
decreased in absolute amount.
 
 Tax burden. In spite of all achievements in tax collection in 1997, there still exists one
negative aspect. And if the said achievements are for a short term period, then the negative
aspect could have effects throughout a medium term period. The problem is the tax burden
increase in the Republic of Moldova, and this increase is quite important if comparing to the
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evolution of this indicator during 1993-1996. But if we would take into account the grown
number of tax exemptions, especially in 1996-1997, then we conclude that the tax burden is not
distributed fairly through the sectors of economy. Moreover, even within some particular
sectors the tax burden is not distributed equally between economic entities.
 
 Budget Revenue and Tax Burden
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 prel
General Consolidated Budget Revenue, mln. lei 488 1847 2556 2835 3473
As % of GDP 27% 39% 39% 37% 40%
Tax Revenue, includig Social Fund, mln. lei 450 1454 2171 2418 2857
Tax Burden, % 24.7% 30.7% 33.5% 31.6% 33.0%
GDP in currebt prices, mln. lei 1821 4737 6480 7658 8655
 Note: in 1993 the above indicators as a share of GDP are not relevant, because the volume of GDP in current prices is
much more “sensible” towards the level of inflation, comparing to budget revenue.
 
Budget Revenue and Tax Burden
as % of GDP
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 Some conclusions should be made from the above said:
 
· in spite of statistical data, indicating that private sector share in goods production and
services is increasing, the state had an expanding role in the GDP distribution in
1997. This could generate a new substitution of private sector by public sector;
· tax burden in 1997 increased by 2.4 percentage points comparing to 1996. WE refer
here to the general tax burden in the economy, but some sectoral calculations (N.
Culeabin, Institute of Economy of the Academy of Sciences) prove that in several
sectors (such as the industry) tax burden reaches almost 60 percent. Inadequate sector
distribution of tax burden was generated by a lot of tax exemptions given to some
brunches or some economic entities, by “forgiving” of some liabilities, and by
rescheduling the payables to the budget of certain economic entities etc. – all these
under the conditions of growing needs of public sector;
· the growing tax burden and/or fast extension of corruption and protectionism
generated in 1997 an increase of turnover in shadow economy, and respectively of
the tax evasions. Thus, by increasing the excise taxes on gasoline (by 3 times) and
diesel (by 2 times), a growth of income was expected at the same rate. But they were
lower, because of inefficient control over the import of such products and lack of
customs facilities at the borders with the Ukraine (or with Transnistria). The same is
the situation with tobacco products imports: according to the Law on Budget for
1998 excise taxes on cigarettes have been reduced and unified. According to
economic laws a drop in retail prices in the market was expected, but that did not
CHAPTER 2. MACROECONOMIC TENDENCIES
© July 1998 ECONOMIC SURVEY Moldova in Transition12
happen. Consequently, the cigarettes’ importers received huge profits, while the
budget is still losing on that.
 
 Analysis of the retail prices structure of the petrol products and tobacco products shows
that in Moldova the excise rates for these items are amongst lowest, compared to several
developed countries and neighboring countries.
 
 Out of  this consideration, we are supporting the increase (up to the level of 1997) of
import excises for gasoline and diesel, as well for tobacco products, no matter which their
country of origin is.
 
 It is clear, that the need for reducing budget expenditures is imperative, and there is
some room for maneuver here:
 
q reform of public administration, both central and local. It is impossible to maintain
such over-staffed state apparatus, which can be characterized as inefficient, low paid and
sometimes morally obsolete. R gretfully, the hopes that the structure of Government will be
revised, and personnel – reduced, can not be realized after the new Government structure was
approved already.
 In the GDP structure public consumption is increasing, in spite of the decreasing role of
state in the economy. This seems to be a paradox.
 
 GDP structure by consumption
 (as % of GDP)
                F i n a l  c o n s u m p t i o n  G F C F  Exports  I m p o r t s
         Private        Public       
  1990  1995  1990  1995  1990  1995  1990  1995  1990  1995
 Bulgaria  54.1  70.3  19  15.5  18.2  14.2  43.5  44.7  39.2  44.9
 Czech R.  50.6  57.8  19.4  19.5  28.6  28  …  51.1  …  56.3
 Cyprus  60.1  60.3  17.4  16.5  24.7  19.9  51.6  46.6  57.1  53.4
 Estonia  64.4  58.1  13.2  23.8  30.2  25.6  …  75.8  …  84
 Hungary  54.8  54  35.7  24  20.9  19.1  32.8  34.4  33.7  36.6
 Latvia  52  59  8.8  20.3  23  16.6  47.9  47.3  49  49.4
 Lithuania  54.9  69.5  11  19.8  28.8  21.4  54.2  53.6  63  65.4
 Moldova  40.4*  69.9**  15.5*  25.9**  15.5*  19.8**  39.6*  53.9**  51.3*  74.1**
 Poland  48.5  63.1  18.7  17.6  21  16.9  28.6  25.9  21.5  24.6
 Romania  65.9  68.6  13.3  12.2  19.8  21.9  16.7  27.8  26.2  33
 Slovakia  53.9  49.3  21.9  20.3  31.3  29.4  …  63.5  …  61.7
 Slovenia  53.2  57.9  17.4  20.2  18.8  21.2  90.8  54.2  78.5  55.5
 * - for 1993           ** - for1996           GFCF – gross fix capital formation        
 
 As it is presented above, countries which have reduced public consumption and
promoted structural reforms became more efficient (for example Hungary, Poland, Slovakia).
 
q Reform of social protection system and social benefits, which have not been
restructured yet. What is meant here is the approval of the respective legal framework and its
implementation;
q Military bodies reform;
q Implementation of a transparent mechanism of public procurements.
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 If these reforms continue to be delayed in 1998, then the period of 1999-2000 is coming,
when budget expenditures for debt servicing will be at a critical point, and nobody would know
how to “save” the country.
 
 Wages and pensions arrears. The problem of arrears on wages and pensions remains to
be the main problem of 1998, as it was in 1997. As of January 1, 1997 the arrears have been
frozen and the payment schedule was approved. Thus, population served as a Government
creditor during 1997, and the Government was a beneficiary of this “preferential” credit,
without any interest and maturity, and real sources for repaying it.
 Although by the end of 1997 the arrears were diminished down to 90 million lei, through
other loans (especially from international financial organizations and borrowing on external
markets), the arrears as of May 1, 1998 increased considerably, for pensions – up to 230 million
lei, for budget wages – up to 150 million lei.
 It is not clear where the funds for increasing wages by 30% for budget employees
(according to government’s decision No. 231, March 1998) will be taken from. It is crucially
needed to abrogate this decision, in order to avoid worsening of the situation of arrears.
 
 At the same time, for the first quarter of 1998 the budget revenue is lower comparing to
the forecast. External financing is quite limited, and internal borrowing is more expensive for
the budget, also having a negative impact on banks’ interests rates.
 One question arises: where will the government be getting the money from, or which
expenditure account should be cut down?
 It is vital to sequester budget expenditure.
 
 Budget deficit and public debt. The level of public debt and state’s capacity to service it
are very important issues in describing the financial situation of the state.
 It is clear from the very beginning that the approved level of budget deficit of 350 million
lei will be exceeded (under the conditions of revenue shortage and arrears at almost all
expenditure items) just because the infrastructure of budgetary institutions as well as their
functions remained unchanged. Anyway, in the end it is not that figure, but the primary dget
balance which is most important for an adequate policy regarding deficit and public debt
management. Primary balance shows if during the year new borrowing was or wasn’t used for
financing current expenditures.
 Based on budget indicators evolution during 1994-1997, we can see that although the
tendency for approving a positive primary balance persists, at the end of fiscal year the situation
goes vice-versa. And the authorities’ efforts to manage the public debt and to diminish total
amount of public debt will not be successful, unless during the next 5-7 years a positive primary
balance with an upward trend is not achieved.
 
 
 
 
 The evolution of budget balance (million lei)
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
approved actual approved real approved actual approved actual aprobat est
Overall balance -241.5 -280.3 -300 -374 -350 -752 -330 -666.7 -350 -550
Debt service 109 118 180 265.2 250 242.8 379 377 450 430
Primary Balance -132.5 -162.3 -120 -109 -100 -509 49 -289.7 100 -120
Note: “-” sign represents a deficit
 * - in 1994-1996 according to the methodology of the Ministry of Finance
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 With all respect towards the sustained efforts of creating and strengthening, during 1995-
1997, the internal financial market, mainly T-bills, still, it is necessary to limit the state’s
presence in the internal market. In case of Moldova the state should implement a policy of
securities’ issuance within the amount needed for repurchasing existing Treasury Bills and
Bonds. As a result of this policy, the internal debt will not increase, which according to the
Budget Law for 1998 could increase by another 320 million lei. In case when the state will not
borrow that amount – it could be available for economic entities at lower interest rates. And this
would stimulate an increase of economic activity.
 
 It is well known that external financing is cheaper  comparing to internal one, but access
to external resources depends on the credibility and country rating of Moldova on international
markets. And both of them, as well as the slow pace of reforms during the last 2 years, led to a
halt of financial assistance from international financial organizations. And their decisions are
obviously signals to other potential investors into the Moldova’s economy. It is clear, that
investment and credit risks for Moldova have increased during the beginning of 1998.
2.1.2 Transitional budget in 1993-1998: a critical review
The transition from a plan to a market economy calls for almost a wholesome reinvention
of government, as its role in production and distribution requires considerable transformation
and reduction. This has been done to various degrees, and under different conditions in various
economies undergoing transition. Although most governments’ machinery has shrunk during
the recent transitional reforms, it is not always proportionately reflected in the size of the
government budget, as discussed below.
GDP and Government Consumption as % share of GDP; 1993-1997
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997, prel
GDP (lei million - current prices) 1821.0 4736.8 6479.7 7657.9 8655.0
Government Consumption (lei million - curent prices) 282.7 1065.3 1678.4 1987.1 2242.0
Share of Government Consumption in GDP, % 15.5 22.5 25.9 25.9 25.9
GDP (lei million - constant prices 1993) 1821.0 1258.3 1234.4 1135.7 1150.4
GDP per capita (lei - current prices) 504.7 1312.5 1797.9 2127.2 2408.0
 Source: Based on the data from the Department of Statistical and Sociological Analysis
As observed from table above, the share of the government expenditure has increased
between 1993 and 1995, and remained unchanged until 1997. This is despite the fact that in real
terms, the total GDP has actually declined by 36 % over the period concerned.  Further, a
comparison between the per capita income and the per capita government consumption reveals
a much faster growth in the latter over the same period, at an increasing differential rate.
Graph below illustrates the widening gap between the income and government
consumption per head.
Graph 1.  Nominal Annual Percentage Change in GDP and Government Consumption
(1993 = 100); 1993 –1997
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Source: Based on the data from the Department of Statistical and Sociological Analysis
In Moldova the total government spending is made up of State budget, Local budgets and
Social Security budget. The combined State Budget and the Local Budgets comprise the
Consolidated Budget.
A schematic review of the public sector’s share in the GDP in the last years is presented
in the following table:
Consolidated Budget as % share of GDP; 1996-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997, ap. 1997, prel 1998, ap.
GDP (lei m illion, excl Trans.) 1821.1 4736.8 6479.7 7 317 9 100 8 655 10 100
Revenues (%) 20.4 30.4 31.4 28. 35 28. 8 34.0 29. 2
Expenditures (%) 28.0 36.3 37.3 38. 64 32. 42 41. 7 32. 7
Budget Balance (%) -7.5 -5.9 -5.9 - 10 -3.6 -7.7 -3. 50
Source: Ministry of Finance and Department of Statistical and Sociological Analysis
Here also it is noted that the share of total government expenditure has been on the
increase compared to 1993, with a record high of 42% in 1997. However, the large gap between
the government consumption and the government total expenditure poses a number of critical
issues, including the pressure for subsidies, especially for energy and loss making enterprises,
as well as bad debts and debt servicing.
Official data also show that the consolidated budget revenue share of the GDP increased
each year from 1993 - 1995, with a slight fall in 1996.  Figures for 1996 - 1998 indicate a rise in
the revenue’s share of the GDP in 1997, with an almost equally large fall in 1998 approved
budget from 34 % to 29.2 %.
Finally, figures for budget deficit show a record high for 1996, and the actual deficit for
1997 to be double as anticipated in the 1997 approved budget.
The following table provides a general picture of the changes in the consolidated budget
for 1996-1998 (excluding Transnistria).
Table 3. The composition of consolidated budget balance; current prices (lei million); 1996  1998
1996 1997, ap. 1997, rect.1997, prel 1998, ap. 01-04,1998
State Budget Revenue 1249.2 1916.5 1875.0 2119.0 2289.9 494.0
State Budget Expenditure including transfers1697.1 2246.5 2475.0 2726.1 2639.9 573.5
State Budget Balance -447.9 -330.0 -600.0 -607.1 -350.0 -79.5
Local Budgets Revenue & transfers 1050.6 984.5 1255.7 948.2 287.4
Local Budgets Expenditure 1355.4 984.5 1403.7 948.2 303.2
Local Budgets Balance -304.9 148.0
Consolidated Budget Balance -752.7 -330.0 -600.0 -666.8 -350.0 -93.2
Source:  Based on data from Ministry of Finance
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At first glance, it becomes evident that the state budget revenue grew at a remarkably high
rate of 70% in 1997 as compared to 1996. The figures for the 1998 budget suggest that there
will be an increase of 8 % for 1998, fairly higher than the earlier estimates of 5.2 %. The local
budgets’ revenue has been reduced by some 25 % for 1998, with almost half of it already
accruing in the first quarter. Again, the reduction is larger than the 16 % as originally predicted.
On the expenditure side, the approved state budget is also anticipated to have a growth of 17.5
% over the approved budget of 1997. The figures for the first four months of 1998 show a less
than proportionate deficit of 93.2 million lei, compared to the anticipated annual figure of  350
million lei.
Budget revenues in Moldova, in line with the international standards, comprise taxes,
non-tax revenues and capital operations revenues.
The table below gives a picture of the structure by source, and its changes over 1996-1998.
Table 4. Structure of consolidated budget by source of revenue as % share; 1996-1998
1996 1997, ap.1997, prel 1998, ap.01-03,1998
Revenues, total (million lei) 2074.16 2620.60 2942.40 2950.00 518.39
1. Tax revenues 79.84 82.81 78.11 79.32
   Direct taxes 34.19 28.62 23.13 23.39 21.72
 - profit tax 17.29 14.50 8.30 11.19 8.76
 - income tax from indiv. 10.56 8.78 9.55 5.42 10.36
  -land tax 5.58 4.39 4.26 5.08 1.81
  -on real estate 0.75 0.95 1.02 1.69 0.79
   Indirect taxes 43.64 52.47 50.24 55.93 45.38
  - excise taxes 9.47 16.79 13.65 20.34 14.08
  - VAT 29.60 30.53 32.26 30.51 25.35
     - taxes for external operations 4.57 5.15 4.33 5.08 5.95
2. Non-tax revenues 20.16 17.19 13.62 19.08
    - revenues from property and 
entrepreneurship activity 10.19 6.78
     -  other non-tax revenues 18.35 14.12 3.44 12.31
3. Capital operations revenues 1.82 3.08 8.24 1.59
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
% share in revenues
 Source: Based on data from Ministry of Finance
Revenues from direct taxes have been steadily decreasing their share from 34.2 % in 1996
to a predicted low of 23.4 % for 1998. In this category, only real estate tax shows slight increase
(due to revaluation of fixed assets of economic agents and real persons), with the rest falling,
especially income tax from individuals. This confirms the difficulties in identifying the income
sources of individuals, as well as the discouraging impact of tax rates on the declaration of
profits. By contrast, the relative share of indirect taxes in the revenue has b en on th  increase,
especially with regards to excise taxes. The growth of tax revenue for 1997 is explained both by the
increase in the taxable commercialized volume of products by 15-20 %, and by the increase in the
average value added tax on the volume of sold products compared to the level of 1996. These are
mainly linked to the recent structural changes in the manufacturing, raw material and consumer
goods sectors. According to the 1997 State Budget Law, there were some concessions on VAT to
certain types of producers amounting to lei 301.5m during 1997. This included tax benefits for bread
production and sale (lei 73.1m), for milk and dairy products (lei 20.3m), for plant and animal
production (lei 155.6m), for public utilities  (lei 26.6m) and for natural and liquid gas (lei 9.3m).
The double increase of excise taxes was caused by increasing the rates on some domestic
products (cognac, non fermented tobacco), undertaking some concrete measures over
controlling the excise collection by State Tax Service, Department of Financial Control and
Inspection as well as by customs authorities, and licensing the imports of gas and diesel.
In the non-tax category, incomes from privatization are likely to increase their share more
than threefold. This is not surprising given the present phase of accelerated privatization.
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However, as this should be only considered as a transitory source of revenue, a more far-sighted
view of the future budgets should consider alternative sources in its place. On the same note, it
is important to emphasize that the primary objective of privatization ought not to be raising
revenue for meeting the budget expenditures, as is believed to have been the case in a number
of CIS countries, including Moldova.
According to the information from the Ministry of Finance, in the first quarter of 1998 the
collected revenues in the consolidated budget stood at lei 518.4m or 17.6 % of the annual
planned figures. The state budget revenues constituted lei 394.3m; at a similar proportion of
17.2 % of the annual planned figures. The figures for the local budgets are lei 221.9m at 23.4 %
of the annual planned figures. The first three months of the 1998 have observed a positive
tendency in the collection of the income tax from individuals. The amount collected stood at lei
53.7m, which is about 33 % of the annual planned figures. The amount collected from the
VAT, excise taxes, and profit tax stood at around 11-14 % of the annual planned figures.
Moldova still has many unprofitable enterprises, where in a vast number of branches they are
making considerable losses. This is likely to worsen further especially owing to the increase of
the energy and other imported inputs share in the cost of production. This problem may largely
explain some of the difficulties in collecting taxes.
Because of the seasonal character of activities of the main sectors, there is a tendency for
the revenues to accrue more during the second half of the year. By way of example, in 1996 and
1997 respectively 32.0 % and 42.5% of the total revenues were collected only in the last quarter
of the year.
Looking at the structure of expenditures as provided in the following table, we observe
that the largest items of expenditure have been education and health throughout the period
concerned, although at a falling rate. Comparing the figures for approved 1997 and preliminary
(actual) figures, it is noticeable that the share of government expenditure on health care was
smaller that predicted. Health care and education are both essential development concerns, and
so far they have been rightfully held at the top of the government priorities in Moldova. The
third largest item though is the public debt service, rising at an alarming rate from 8.6 % to
14.2% over the period. This is a rate of growth of 65 % over the period and of 30 % in 1998
over 1997. Capital investment, by contrast, has remained at a stagnant, low proportion of the
public expenses.
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Table 5. Structure of expenditure in the consolidated budget by % share; 1996-1998
1996 1997, ap. 1997 1998, ap 01-03,1998
Expenditures, total (million lei) 2827.0 2950.6 3609.2 3300.0 546.0
General State Services  3.85 2.99 3.85 2.58 4.93
Foreign Activity 1.03 1.50 1.03 1.06 0.47
National Defence 2.50 2.36 2.50 1.82 2.37
Juridical Authorities 0.73 0.87 0.73 0.62 0.86
Public Order & National Security 6.30 6.96 6.30 6.10 6.28
Education 28.42 24.19 28.42 21.79 23.80
Scientific Research 1.06 1.40 1.06 0.91 0.98
Culture, Arts, Religion, Sports 2.19 2.31 2.19 2.35 2.11
Health Care 18.46 17.39 18.46 15.31 16.22
Social Security and Support 5.91 14.21 5.91 16.69 17.81
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 3.74 2.52 3.74 20.06 1.69
Environment Protection 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.23
Industry and Constructions 0.11 0.59 0.11 0.08 0.07
Transport, Road Administration, Communication & Informatics2.88 4.31 2.88 3.74 3.27
Public Utilities Administration & Use of Housing Stock 2.52 1.58 2.52 1.06 1.35
Complex for Fuel & Energy 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
Public Debt Service 8.60 12.84 8.6 13.64 13.21
       internal 6.40
       external 6.44
Completing State Reserves 0.32 0.29 0.3 0.28 0.09
Other Services Related to the Economic Activity 0.39 0.27 0.4 2.71 0.17
Other Expenditures, not included in main groups 5.05 2.23 5.0 0.78 19.98
Capital Investments 5.49 4.41 5.5 5.45 2.13
Total expenditure 100 100 100 100 100
% share in expenditures
Source: Based on data from Ministry of Finance
On the expenditure side there is a need to restructure the major items of expenditure,
especially education and health, where capital and administrative structures are not necessarily
appropriate for modern conditions. However, effective restructuring takes time to plan and then
to implement. In Moldova, as elsewhere in the CIS countries such programs are mainly at the
planning stage. Until implementation is possible, the squeeze on expenditures will affect
standards in these critically important areas of human and social capital.
In the first quarter of 1998 the consolidated budget expenditure constituted lei 546.04m or
16.5 % of the planned annual figures. The share of the state budget expenditure was 79.4 % of
the total consolidate budget expenditure, and 16.4% of the annual figures. The priorities
receiving state financing were the education sector with lei 129.9m, or 23.8% of the total
expenditure, social security and support with lei 97.3m or 17.8 %, health care with lei 88.5m or
16.2% and the public debt service with lei 72.1m lei or 13.2 % of the total state budget
expenditure in the first quarter of 1998.
On the 1st January 1998, Moldova’s external debt reached $ 1192 million, an alarming 64
% of the GDP. This is a critical level for any economy with serious limitations on export
earnings and creditworthiness, such as Moldova. Equally critical is the fact that all the external
finance is directed to the external debt service. In 1997 the external debt service was about $150
million, that is over 20 % of the total consolidated budget revenues. At the same time the new
external loans for 1997 were in fact less than the debt service paid in the year by $20 million,
standing at $130 million. Should the current trend continue over the next few years, it might
surpass being critical, as it will become impossible to sustain. In 1998 Moldova will have to
spend $215 million for the external debt service. This will make it difficult for Moldova to
borrow externally by issuing new Eurobonds.
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Financing of the budget deficit
The figures for the end of 1997 show that the budget deficit stood at 7.7 % of the GDP or
2.1 points less than in 1996.The preliminary figures for the first quarter of 1998 show that the
budget deficit stood at lei 27.7m. The deficit was covered both by internal and external
borrowing. Notably, 91% of the total deficit of the consolidated budget belongs to the State
Budget.
Internal financing is carried out by raising loans from The National Bank of Moldova and
commercial banks, and issuing state securities. The loans from the NBM represent 52 % of the
internal state debt while those from commercial banks constitute a much smaller share of 1.3
%.
During 1997 some lei 1190.8m worth of State Securities were sold; showing an increase of 68
% percent as compared to 1996.  Most profitable are the 91-day securities, the reasons being
higher profitability and a more attractive maturity period compared with other securities. The
highest interest rate here is a reflection of the adjustments to perceived risk attached to an
emerging economy’s debt following the problems in Asian markets. This can be explained by
the abolition of taxes on State Securities operations. In 1997 the Ministry of Finance allocated
lei 168.8m from the sale of governmental securities to covering of the state budget deficit.
According to the Law on the State Budget 1998, the tax on operations with State
Securities on the secondary market and the tax on revenue received from operations with State
Securities are abolished until 1999. This may considerably extend activities on the State
Securities market, especially on the secondary one. Using this financial instrument, economic
agents can more effectively use available resources. It should be emphasized that the tax on
operations with State Securities on the secondary market mostly affected operations with
securities having a 28 -day maturity period. The relatively small volume of transactions in these
securities confirms this.
The extent of the T-bills market creates certain difficulties in other potential investment
activities. The high interest rates required to finance the budget deficit diverts the flow of funds
from real investment projects, where the interest rates are lower. The recent announcement on
the 19th of May by the Ministry of Finance regarding the reduction of the nominal price of the
T-bills from 1000 lei to only 100 lei will be another step in that direction. The recent changes
aim at attracting the household resources to the T-bills market.
 As of January 1st 998, the external state debt, administrated by the Government, equaled
$709.1m (lei 3304m}. The limit approved for the external state debt in 1997 the State Budget
was set at $780m. The growth of the external debt of the state as compared to January 1st 1997
was about $60m or 9.3 %.
 The biggest share in the structure of the external state debt is related to the loans received
from the commercial creditors, including Gazprom with $ 306.6 million, followed by
multilateral loans extended by international financial bodies (World Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development etc.) with $ 255.5 million, and the loans extended by the
Governments of other countries with $ 147 million.
 
 During 1997, new credits worth $135.4 million were received. This included issuing of
Eurobonds totaling $ 75 million , the first portion of the loan granted by the World Bank for
structural adjustments under SAL-2  worth $ 35 million, investment credits by the World Bank
and The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development of $ 8.6 million.
Following the objectives of creating an active financial market in the past three years,
including a market in three-month government securities and Treasury Bill single-price auctions,
the Ministry of Finance has issued a new type of Treasury Bills with a 14-day maturity. In
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November 1997 there was a new programme launched, aiming at introducing bonds with a two-
year maturity. Moreover, the Ministry of Economy and Reforms and the National Bank of
Moldova plan to jointly examine the possibility of elaborating on a programme of medium-term
Eurobonds for Moldova, which will give permanent access to external markets. However, this plan
has witnessed a set back in November, when the Asian financial markets faced extensive turmoil.
The concern has been that the risk might prove too high for Moldova to be exposed to external
markets in the face of serious uncertainties. The Ministry of Finance has postponed negotiations
on the possible issue of Eurobonds until the second half of 1998. Issuing in the first half of the
year, it will possibly increase the expenses by 20 %. The Ministry of Finance affirms that Moldova
is not satisfied with the actual interest rate on Eurobonds, which stands at 14-15 % per annum, and
is considered too high. In the opinion of the Ministry of Finance the interest rate on Moldovan
bonds should not exceed 10-11 % per annum. However, the possibilities for Moldova to issue the
Eurobonds are very limited. This situation is caused mainly by two factors, first Moldova has
already issued $ 75 million of Eurobonds, and second, the debts to Gazprom far from showing any
signs of diminishing, have been accumulating further.
The primary goal of budget and fiscal policy for 1997 had been directed towards the
maximum mobilization of public and private sector revenues to create favorable conditions for
good governance objectives. These included in particular the implementation of a set of
measures designed to minimize the possible tensions in society by supporting the current
payments and reducing the arrears on pensions and salaries. In effect however, the priority
budget actions during 1997 turned out to be the financing of most stringent budget expenses,
especially the integral payment of the previous years debts and obligations.
In a broader context, and learning some lessons from 1997, the major areas of concern to be
taken into account for rectifying and implementing the 1998 budget can be identified as the
following:
Developing the capacity within the relevant institutions for a realistic forecast. This
should not be solely confined to forecasting the budget, but rather for the whole economy. As
stated earlier, the construction of a viable budget is closely dependent upon the ability of a
given economy to generate sufficient revenue sources. In Moldova, as elsewhere, arriving at a
balanced economy without undue, extensive cuts in the public sector’s obligations towards
development can only be possible, if and when, the whole economy improves in line with the
set objectives. At the moment, the poor forecasting capacity, combined with political
considerations, no matter how justified, result in unrealistic estimates of both revenues and
expenditures. So far, it has created additional obstacles in obtaining the goals, as repeated
rounds of revisions and negotiations have become a permanent feature.
Related to the above point, is the necessity to formulate the budget and its implementation
in the context of priorities and possibilities. In other words, the usual main focus on meeting the
financial requirements of the activities, which are already in place, should make room for a
more strategic vision.
Last but not least, the growing concern about the shadow economy needs to be reflected
in the outlining of an envisioned transformation of the economy, in more practical and focused
way, than the mere expression of concern. Within the existing or emerging new institutions,
there is ample capacity, know how and willingness to tackle this issue from different angles. It
would be timely to mobilize and encourage systematic work on this issue to provide the
necessary information and analysis into the cause and possible remedies. The ambiguity of a
growing part of the economy can in no way be dismissed any longer, specially when arriving at
realistic figures for policy making is concerned. One such immediate area is, evidently, the
formulation and implementation of realistic budget for 1998 and beyond.
2.2 Monetary policy, country’s external position, and banking system
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2.2 Monetary policy, country’s external position,
and banking system
 
 Monetary policy and its objectives are outlined, elaborated and implemented by the
National Bank of Moldova. Its main directions of activity include: issuance and control over
cash circulation, foreign exchange reserves management, compilation of state’s Balance of
Payments, auctioning of securities issued by the Ministry of Finance, observing banks’
reserves and banks’ credit servicing, supervision of commercial banks’ activity and ensuring
their safety.
 The prime target of monetary policy is maintaining the stability of Moldovan leu –
both external stability - vs. main hard currencies, and internal - stability of domestic prices
and inflation rate. At present the main instruments of monetary policy are: open market
operations, mandatory reserves requirement, buying-selling of foreign exchange.
 Monetary policy: main indicators
 During 1998, in spite of external and internal constraints, the monetary policy continued
to be oriented towards reducing of the inflation rate and maintenance of the exchange rate of
national currency.
 In 1998 inflation rate showed a significant shrink comparing to previous years. In March a
deflation of 0.1% was observed. For the period January-May 1998 rate of inflation totaled 2.5%
if compared to the level in December 1997, and the increase of prices in May 1998 over the
same period of last year was 7.6%. This evolution shows that the annual inflation rate for 1998
could stand at 7.6-8.5%, comparing to the 11.2% registered at the end of 1997. Price seasonality
shows the same tendencies as in previous years.
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 In the first quarter of 1998 the main monetary indicators showed a downward trend
(which is in fact common for the last 3 years), resulting from the implementation of a non-
expansionary monetary policy. Cash in circulation has curtailed by 4.9% at the end of first
quarter 1998, if compared with the beginning of the year. During the same period base money
has reduced with 7.4% (in the first quarter of 1997 cash shrank by 5.2% and base money – by
0.5%). By the end of May 1998 the volume of lei in circulation fell, comparing to the beginning
of the year, by about lei 70m, i.e. by 7%, as a result of NBM’s interventions in the foreign
exchange market.
CHAPTER 2. MACROECONOMIC TENDENCIES
© July 1998 ECONOMIC SURVEY Moldova in Transition22
 
Money growth vs. inflation
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Broad money M3 has shrunk during the first quarter of 1998 by 2.65%, while the level of
deposits remained steady. Already in April 1998 broad money has increased by 3.6%, and
deposits with banks – by 6.1%. And as of 1 June 1998 the growth of broad money was 2.6%
over the beginning of the year, while deposits with banks grew 12.5%. Therefore, a positive
evolution during the reported period of 1998 represents the continuous increase of the share of
deposits in monetary aggregate M3: from 49.4% at the end of last year, to 54.2% as at 1 June
1998.
Composition of broad money M3
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 Monetary policy: main instruments
 During the first half of 1998 were held 9 refinancing auctions at which there were sold lei
171m of credit resources, comparing to the lei 205m auctioned at the same period of last year,
or lei 265m sold in January-June 1996.
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NBM's credit auctions
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 NBM’s annual refinancing rate has declined slowly to 16% in May 1998, however at the
auction held on June 15 it jumped to 22.5%. This was a normal response under the
circumstance of continuous increases of interest rates on T-bills. In the chart below this
evolution is clearly shown, being compared the refinancing rate with the interest rate on 91-day
T-bills, which have the biggest transaction volume.
Refinancing rate vs. interest rate on 91-day T-Bills
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It should be mentioned, that this was the last refinancing auction, because afterwards they will
be totally replaced by open market operations – Repo agreements and Lombard facilities.
Consequently, large discrepancy between the refinancing rate and T-bills interest rates will be
cleared. This discrepancy allowed banks to buy cheap credit resources and use them for financing
state budget deficit, thus getting easy and guaranteed profits.
As the state’s agent in selling state securities, during January-June 1998 National Bank of
Moldova has sold to commercial banks at auctions T-bills amounting to lei 732m. Their
structure was the following: 91-day – 60%, 182-day – 16%, 28-day – 12%, and about 12% –
longer term securities. A positive aspect here is the continuous increase in the relatively long
term securities: in January 1997 the share of 28-day and 91-day T-bills out the total sold was
92%, in June 1997 it was 84%, and in June 1998 – 72%.
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T-Bills sold at NBM auctions
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 During the reported period of 1998 interest rates on Treasury Bills and Bonds have been
continuously growing. This is explained by state’s acute lack of financial resources. Having a
dangerous budget deficit and lack of funds for covering it, the only solution applicable by the
Government in order to attract financial resources is issuance of securities, which gets bigger
proportions with the time.
 Under these circumstances, for making them attractive, the state is continuously increasing
the interest rates on state securities, at the same time more funds are needed for servicing securities
already issued. Already now the income from the new issuance of state securities can not even
cover the amount needed for repurchasing the previously launched securities.
 It must be stressed here, that during the second half of 1996 interest rates on T-bills were
considerably higher than deposit rates in the banking system, consequently banks being
massively involved in buying state securities instead of channeling crediting resources into the
productive sector. Thus, the deposits of banks’ clients were used for covering budget deficit.
Due to the  reduction of the interest rates on T-bills, this situation improved towards the end-
1997, which is clearly shown in the chart below. However, already by the end of 1997 and
during this year the interest rates on bank deposits, which have been gradually decreasing along
with the central bank’s refinancing rate, dropped far below the interest rates on state securities,
which show a continuous upward trend.
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Exchange rate dynamics
 During 1998 the exchange rate of the national currency against US dollar follows a more
stable path comparing with previous years, undergoing a slow nominal depreciation – by 1.2%
in May 1998 upon December 1997 (average monthly rate).
 
Current month May over December last m‘94/d’93M‘95/d’94m‘96/d’95 m‘97/d’96 m‘98/d’97
Nominal appreciation (+), depreciation (-) -8.6% -5.9% -1.4% +1.8% -1.2%
Real appreciation (+), depreciation (-) +56.7% +0.7% +7.8% +7.8% +1.3%
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 Due to the reduction in inflation rate, also has lowered the real appreciation of the
national currency against US dollar (which was too high in previous years). In May 1998 real
exchange rate index shows an appreciation of Moldovan leu against dollar: by 20.9%
comparing to December 1995, by 12.4% comparing to December 1996, and by 1.3% comparing
to December 1997.
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 As regards to the real effective rate of Moldovan leu against currencies of the main
trading partners of Moldova (Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, Italy), and adjusted
to the inflation in these countries, the following is to be noted: according to CISR calculations
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in 1997 over 1996 the Moldovan leu has appreciated by 12.4% upon currencies of the main
trading partners of Moldova, which to a certain extent affected the performance of Moldovan
exports.
Evolution of NBM foreign exchange reserves
An alarming trend represent the massive sales of hard currency of the NBM at the
Moldovan Interbank Foreign Currency Exchange in 1998. In previous years NBM’s
transactions at the Interbank Foreign Currency Exchange had a stable seasonality evolution,
while during the period January-May 1998 the NBM bought zero foreign exchange, and at the
same time sold considerable amounts of hard currency – almost $33m.
NBM's net transactions at the Interbank Currency Exchange (purchasing minus 
selling) vs. exchange rate fluctuations
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 This obviously led to a reduction of NBM’s foreign exchange reserves. During the same
period of time gross reserves decreased by 9% (covering at the end of first quarter of 1998 2.8
months of imports), and net reserves – by a quarter. This reduction of NBM’s reserves is
accompanied by a slow devaluation of the national currency. For the moment the situation is
under control, but it should be mentioned that if the demand for hard currency in the market
will not decrease, then it could have a serious impact on the exchange rate, in the end causing a
bigger devaluation of the Moldovan leu.
Dynamics of NBM gross forex reserves
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Another critical aspect within the context of the official forex reserves reduction is linked
with the need to service external debt, which implies transfer of big amounts in hard currency
for the repayment of principal and interest. Here is a simple calculation: during the 1st quarte  of
1998 gross forex reserves reduced by $41m, while at the Interbank Foreign Currency Exchange
there were sold $20m. Therefore, the difference was used for external debt servicing. For the
following period of time the situation will aggravate even more, because already in 1998 the
state has to repay more than $200m for foreign debt servicing (including almost $80m to be
paid by NBM only, for the principal and interest to the IMF). And all this is happening under an
aggravating factor such as the considerable current account deficit of the balance of payments.
Foreign debt of Moldova
The numbers regarding Moldova’s foreign debt used here include the following: medium
and long term loans received by the Government, IMF loans granted to NBM, state securities,
loans received by commercial banks and private sector (including government guarantees), as well
as debt for energy resources.
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The stock of foreign debt at the end of the 1st quarter of 1998 has reached, according to
BOP data, $1306m, which is 3.0% more than as at 1 January 1998 and 19.7% more than as at 1
January 1997. In fact, the significant growth of debt during 1997 is largely owed to the second
private placement of Eurobonds through Merrill Lynch in the amount of $75m, as well as to the
equivalent of $140m of state securities issued by the Ministry of Finance for covering the
energy debt to Russia’s Gazprom. As regards to the loans from international financial
institutions, they were substantially reduced because Moldova did not follow the concluded
memorandums. Consequently, in 1997 Moldova received only one tranche of $20m from the
IMF within EFF, and a tranche of $35m out of SAL-2 from the World Bank.
In this circumstances prospects for 1998 seem to be quite modest. IMF June 1998 mission
made reference to an eventual next tranche of $20m from the EFF loan, which could be granted
in autumn 1998, only if Moldova will follow the obligations stipulated by the signed
memorandum. World Bank June 1998 mission also promised relaunching of financial support
by autumn, but it is clear that the next tranche of $35m from SAL-2 would not be granted
before the IMF tranche. And of course, the main condition here is also the execution of the
agreement concluded between the Government of Moldova and World Bank.
At the same time, during 1997 Moldova had to repay about $160m for its foreign debt
servicing. It must be noted, that for the first time the outflows for debt servicing almost
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balanced the inflows of currency out of new borrowing from international financial institutions
and private capital markets abroad. This is a very worrying sign, especially because at the end
of 1997 the current account deficit of BOP reached about $300m.
During 1998-1999 the situation could be even more aggravated, because the external
financing deficit, or deficit of hard currency inflows, will be even higher. It also obvious, that
Moldova does not have enough gold or hard currency reserves in order to resist a crisis, in the
event it happens. Only short term
country’s obligations reflected in
the BOP External Position are
already exceeding NBM’s gross
forex reserves (out of which two
thirds belong to IMF).
 The only chance, here, to
find a way out of the impasse and
for avoiding a major crisis of
country’s payment capacity is
obtaining new favorable loans
from international financial
institutions. There are no other
sources of foreign currency.
Moreover, the country’s credit
rating issued by Moody’s and IBCA will be revised, and the new rating will certainly not be
Ba2, but probably B1, i.e. 2 steps lower (or in the best case Ba3). This will limit considerably
country’s capacity to place new securities in the capital markets abroad, because as a result of
altering of the country’s image in the world the cost of servicing new Eurobonds will
considerably increase.
Thus, it is extremely important to continue the collaboration between Moldova and
international financial institutions, especially IMF and World Bank, which are also our main
creditors. However, the country could count on relaunching of the blocked tranches of EFF and
SAL-2 only in case it fulfills the engagements regarding efficient implementation of structural
reforms in the economy.
External position of the country: main indicators
According to BOP data external debt of the country (including debt to IMF) reached at
1.01.1998 about  66% of GDP.
 According to the World Bank methodology of calculating the indicators of country’s
indebtedness, the Republic of Moldova belongs to the category of countries with moderate level
of foreign debt, the ceiling here being 80% of GDP. But it should be noted, that in case of
Moldova the level of external debt of already 50% of GDP is quite dangerous, because of the
considerable BOP current account deficit.
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At the end of 1997 current account deficit reached $296m, which accounts for 15.8% of
GDP. This is a very alarming tendency, because in terms stipulated by economic theory
exceeding  4.5% must be a worrying sign, imposing the Government and Central Bank the
objective to correct the disequilibrium in a short term period. However, exceeding the 10%
mark must be considered as critical, proving the existence of serious malfunctions in the
economy, when just fiscal or monetary measures are no longer sufficient. They must be
accompanied by vigorous sectoral policies, which could correct the disequilibrium only after at
least 2-3 years of rigid implementation.
 Other indicators:
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Evolutions in the banking system
The situation in the banking system of Moldova (22 commercial banks) can be generally
assessed as positive. NBM continues to implement successfully prudential norms aligned to the
Basle standards of banking supervision. Starting 1 January 1998 has been enacted a new
minimal capital requirement for commercial banks – 8 million lei for receiving a type A license
(basic license); also, the capital adequacy ratio (total regulatory capital/risk-weighted assets)
was increased from 6 to 8 percent. Due to the fact, that in 1997 three out of four banks where
performing international operations in foreign currency (types B and C licenses), they had to
increase their total capital to the extend that it was needed according to the new requirements –
i.e. to be bigger than 16 million lei. Therefore, the total capital in the banking system grew
gradually, reaching at 1 January 1998 lei 588m, which is 35% more than at the beginning of last
year. The same trend continued this year, total banks’ capital reaching lei 643m at 1 May 1998,
which is a 9.4% growth over the beginning of year.
For the reason of simplicity, on the chart below the evolution of average capital in the
banking system is shown, calculated as a ratio between total capital in the system and number
of commercial banks.
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 Additionally, a more exact evolution of the banks’ capital and its distribution among
banks is shown in the following chart. One could clearly notice the considerable jump of the
banks’ total capital starting 1 January 1998 due to the introduction of the minimal capital
requirement of 8 million lei (the horizontal thick line at the bottom) and of the 16 million lei
requirement for performing international banking operations (upper thick line):
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 Analyzing the evolution of the capital in the banking system, attention should be drawn to
the positive aspect related to the distribution of capital among banks, or more exactly between
groups of banks. In this context in the first group large commercial banks were included, which
at 1.01.1996 had total capital bigger than the figure of 5% of total capital in banking system:
Agroindbank, Petrolbank, Banca de Economii, Moldindconbank and Banca Socialã. But in
order to avoid a possible interference in this model, the Agroindbank was excluded (since at
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1.05.1998 the share of its capital in the total capital of the banking system was 30%). In the
second group the remaining banks have been included.
The conclusion is the following: middle sized banks managed to gradually increase their
capital, thus by end of 1996 balancing the capital of large banks, and advancing it afterwards. If
at 1.01.1996 the ratio 4 large banks/small and medium banks was 1.17:1, then at 1.05.1998 it
was already 1:1.59 – and this proves a substantial consolidation of the majority of middle sized
banks, which are new commercial banks.
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 During the 1st quarter of 1998 loans granted by commercial banks have increased by 6%,
reaching at 1.04.1998 lei 1.74 billion, out of which overdue debt accounts for 9.7%.
 At the same time, the confidence of population in the banking system has increased,
expressed by the continuous growth of deposits of individuals with banks. At 1 May 1998 they
totaled lei 536m, which is 8.3% bigger than at the beginning of 1998 and 44.9% bigger than at
1 January 1997. During the same period (January-May 1998) deposits of legal entities have
reduced slightly, influenced by the factor of seasonality, reaching at 1 May 1998 the same level
as at the beginning of 1998.
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 Analyzing the structure of commercial banks’ loan portfolios and deposits in the 1st
quarter of 1998 it should be pointed out that along with the growth of total volume of loans
granted, driven by the seasonality factor, the share of loans granted for 6-12 months has
increased: from 30% in January 1998 to 49% in April. Share of loans granted for more than 1
year did not vary essentially – it stood at 6-10%, but this is in its turn clearly explained by the
structure of banks’ deposits. If in December 1997 share of deposits with the term of more than 1
year accounted for 16%, then in April 1998 it diminished to 2%. Obviously, banks can not
make long term credit investments when their clients’ deposits are mainly short term. A very
important role in this context have played the credit lines of the World Bank and EBRD for
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private sector support and directed to the economic agents through commercial banks of
Moldova.
Banks' loans structure
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 It should be noted, also, that during the 1st quarter of 1998 sight deposits in lei have
grown significantly – by 2.5 times, which shows that economic agents act successfully in the
market, gaining profits. Regarding the structure of deposits by currency, it is to be said that
during the same period the share of new deposits in foreign currency has somewhat decreased,
banks’ clients preferring placing deposits in lei.
 As regards to the interest rates in the banking system, the following negative tendency has
occurred: during the period of January-May 1998, along with the reduction of the refinancing
rate, the banks’ interest rate on deposits also gradually decreased, but at the same time banks’
rate for loans granted did not fall accordingly. Therefore the margin had actually expanded
(phenomenon also observed during 1996) from 8.2% in December 1997 up to 12.1% in May
1998.
Annual interest rates in the banking system
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The explication of this phenomenon is linked to a number of factors, out of which are
especially systemic risk and some inflation expectations by banks, and not so much the
tendency of profit maximization or lack of competition in the banking system.
Concluding remarks of this chapter:
 Positive aspects:
· inflation rate continued to drop – cumulative value for January-May 1998 was only 2.5%;
2.2 Monetary policy, country’s external position, and banking system
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· broad money has increased by 2.6% at the end of May 1998 comparing to the end of
1997, while deposits with banks grew by 12.5%;
· NBM’s refinancing auctions have been stopped starting the second half of 1998, being
replaced by open market operations;
· the share of state securities with maturity of 182 days and higher, sold by the MoF and
NBM, grew;
· exchange rate of national currency is maintained stable, showing a slow nominal
depreciation against US dollar;
· excessive real appreciation of Moldovan leu upon US dollar has diminished;
· situation in the banking system is considered to be generally positive;
· starting 1 January 1998 banks’ minimal capital requirement was raised from 8 to 16
million lei, and respectively grew the total capital in banking system;
· capital adequacy ratio (total regulatory capital/risk-weighted assets) was increased
from 6 to 8 percent;
· medium sized banks, which form the majority, are gradually strengthening;
· confidence of population in the banking system is raising, showed by the increase of
deposits with banks.
Negative aspects:
· continuous increase of interest rates on state securities, generated by state’s acute lack
of financial resources;
· inflows from sales of state securities already do not cover the amounts needed for
repayment of the previously issued securities;
· real effective exchange rate of Moldovan leu, i.e. upon currencies of Moldova’s main
trading partners, continued to appreciate in 1997, affecting to a certain extent the
performance of Moldovan exports;
· BOP current account deficit reached in 1997 an extremely dangerous level of 16% of
GDP, and BOP data for the 1st quarter of 1998 do not show any sign of improvement;
· NBM’s foreign exchange reserves are declining dramatically during first half of 1998;
· accumulation of external debt continues – it grew by 3.4% during 1st quarter of 998;
· the situation on servicing and repayment of foreign loans is aggravating, and the
outflows needed for debt payments are already bigger than state’s new external
borrowing;
· because of bad economic performance of the country the credit rating of Moldova,
assigned by Moody’s and IBCA is expected to be diminished;
· share of long term loans granted by banks is small, and this is an outcome of mostly
short term deposits in the banking system;
· during the first half of 1998 interest rates on state securities are considerably higher
than banks’ deposits rates, thus banks’ clients’ deposits being used for budget deficit
financing, instead of being channeled into the productive sector;
· the margin between average lending rate banks’ deposit rate grew, because banks kept
high the interest rate on loans granted.
 Final conclusion:
The country can not rely endlessly on the good will of external creditors without reforming
its economy and getting out of the crisis. Without a firm implementation of reforms in real sector
of the economy and reduction of critical public finances’ disbalance, the stability of the monetary
policy – of inflation rate and exchange rate of national currency – is on the way to failure.
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2.3 Investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Moldova remains sluggish, lagging well behind
successful economies in transition. This chapter describes one of the possible ways to clear up
the ground for strategic investors, namely by creating opportunities for the venture capital
business. This commentary is based on the Western NIS Enterprise Fund (WNISEF) four-year
experience in the region.
Why Moldova needs FDI
None doubts that a small economy in transition needs substantial external financial
infusions. For the government of a country like Moldova trying to survive in a difficult
economic environment, it is vitally important to encourage FDI. FDI has several obvious
advantages over the portfolio investments or lending under sovereign guarantees: 1) is less
speculative. FDI financial flows would not get reversed as easy as short speculative investments
in T-bills or commercial papers 2) FDI is usually associated with the new technologies, know-
how, training of the local staff, etc.
FDI will ultimately benefit the Moldovan infrastructure development in general,
introducing new, much higher than previously, competitive standards for Moldovan companies
and for the whole economy. This said, Moldova does not need to preserve all industries which
existed under the previous centralized economy, but only those which can be self-sustainable
and competitive by regional standards at least.
Despite energetic and sometime desperate efforts of four Moldovan governments to foster
FDI, the foreign investors are not rushing up to invest their money in Moldova. The Moody's
rating of Moldova which is still higher than one of its bigger neighbors - Romania and Ukraine,
is a weak consolation since Moldova is at a comparable level of foreign investment with other
FSU countries and well behind Baltic States, Czech, Hungary and Slovenia.
Why investors are not coming to Moldova?
There is not a clear answer to this question. Fundamentals like fiscal deficit reflected also
in the foreign debt which is piling up rapidly, the current account deficit are worrisome, and
Moody's rating is looking rather downward than upward. Altogether these phenomena are
building up negative expectations. However strategic investors are probably more interested in
the general assessment of the investment opportunities: general framework - rules of the game,
written and mostly implied or how predictable the environment is, and ultimately and most
importantly, whether there are possibilities to make money all inherent risks taken into account.
On the negative side is the rent seeking as expressed in the euphemistic World Bank language
and red tape which have become omnipresent in Moldova. On the other, positive side,
Moldova has got the best government in years. Obviously the size of the market has to do
something with this reluctance of foreign investors to shift gears. Also, the rule of thumb is the
proximity to advanced economies which would create positive spillovers and benefit bilateral
trade. Moldova's neighbors - Romania and Ukraine are not in the best economic shape to take
the lead. Shall Moldova wait until these economies improve? Just waiting would be a quite
cynical recommendation.
When a strategic investor WILL invest?
A strategic investor wants guarantees that his wealth will be preserved and expanded. He
comes to the country for a substantial period of time, especially when capital intensive
businesses are concerned. Therefore his caution is explicable. He is led by his instincts which
tell him that Moldova is not on the list of first priorities. If he decides to go for some risk, he
would be perhaps more confident if the risk is shared with someone he trusts. If he decides to
create a joint-venture in Moldova or invest in the existing company, he wants to make sure that
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the appropriate corporate management is enforced and the company is properly run, including
financial control and monitoring. There are not many companies in Moldova which comply
with these criteria.
What WILL a financial investor do?
Financial equity investors like European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the
Western NIS Enterprise Fund usually look at the much shorter time prospective than strategic
investors. A financial investor would typically invest into a prospectively well-performing
company, seek to achieve long-term appreciation of its market value and pass the stake into the
company to a strategic investor.
WNISEF case study
The Western NIS Enterprise Fund is an investment fund capitalized at $150 million by
the United States Congress via the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). $50 million have been committed to 19 companies through the Fund's early stage
venture capital operations.
WNISEF invests in the share capital of privatized or new private companies or enterprises
in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, and aiming at the strategic areas of the economic
development of these countries. The investment is the first step of the collaboration between
WNISEF and its local partner. The Fund does not require official guarantees from banks or
insurance companies, although it may require personal guarantees from the management team
and owners. In fact, the investment, although it is a time and efforts consuming procedure, is
just the first step of the partnership. The WNISEF wants to have stable, devoted and
professional partners, because after the investment is made, a tedious work starts requiring even
more efforts. The WNISEF is providing different technical assistance programs at no cost for
the company to help the management team to reach its targets.  Our portfolio companies have
found helpful especially programs in sales and marketing. We see our relationship with the
management is the cornerstone of our success and want the management to be comfortable and
constantly striving to improve because and due to the WNISEF’s participation into the
company. One of essential parts of WNISEF's value-added to  portfolio companies is the
Management Information System (MIS) which is installed at no cost for companies and ensures
financial control and monitoring. It creates the transparency over the company's financials and
helps the management to learn the modern way to manage an enterprise. WNISEF is frequently
organizing seminars and training for CEOs and other key managers. But the most important is
the WNISEF's staff personal involvement in the company's activities and strategic decisions.
WNISEF stands by the management of the company, trying to help, advise or criticize.
WNISEF's main goal is to help the company to become a leader in the region and/or in its
field. We do not ask for the payment of dividends to the shareholders, and support dividends'
recapitalization which bolsters company's development.
Example
Agriculture Distribution Center(ADC)
ADC's mission is to provide high quality agricultural equipment and services, including
custom farming, to agricultural enterprises in Moldova thereby replacing the previous state
structures of supply and improving the agricultural productivity in Moldova.
To achieve this mission, ADC has signed a dealership agreement with AGCO Massey
Ferguson giving ADC rights to sell and service AGCO Massey Ferguson equipment in
Moldova.  The custom service, equipment sales, parts, and service departments have been
established.  Key members of ADC management have been attending seminars and training
courses sponsored by WNISEF while personnel associated with the sales and service of AGCO
equipment are scheduled to receive intensive training from AGCO in the UK and Denmark.  As
a first step in marketing AGCO equipment, ADC held demonstrations of AGCO combines and
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tractors at the international exhibition MoldAgro held in Chiºinãu.  Currently, ADC is in the
process of implementing a management information system which will allow the company to
produce IAS financial statements in 1998.
The main competitor for Agriculture Distribution Center  is a company that owns 5 MDW
combines, but ADC has a competitive advantage due to the fact that MF combine productivity
and quality of services provided are superior.
In addition, in 1997 twelve Case-combines were brought to Moldova under the
governmental guarantee and were distributed between  elevators that provide farms with
harvesting services.  View non-commercial  status  of these entities, they are not able to
compete with Agriculture Distribution Center effectively.
 
 
2.4 External trade
 
 Process of globalization and integration is the most important peculiarity of today’s
economy. Most countries promote policies of economic openness consciously. Since the
beginning of 90’s, Moldova, in certain circumstances, gradually oriented to the model of “small
open economy”, being in the search of its niche in the world. The foreign economic relations
have a strategic importance for shifting to a more open economy, create premises for its
stabilization and structural restructuring. The state must provide for a political and regulatory
environment, including creation of financial and institutional infrastructure, conditions for
attracting foreign investments and supporting export-oriented businesses.
 The sectoral structure of production, the composition and quality of Moldovan outputs
gradually adapt to the market requirements – both internally and externally. However, during
1994-1997 the export index was constantly declining, whereas the average price of exports was
growing faster (during those years more than twice). As a result, the export volume was
growing from year to year, while the pace of its growth was gradually shrinking: from 32% in
1995 to 4.7% in 1997 (with the exception of the unique transaction of jets sale).
Along with the broadening economic openness of countries, many of them reached rates
of exports growth prevailing upon the
rates of GDP growth (see the graph). As
shown in the picture, during the recent
years Moldova’s ratio of export to GDP
was unsatisfactory. The situation in the
neighboring countries is as follows: in
Romania the annual rate of export growth
above GDP constituted 19% (during
1990-1997), whereas in the Ukraine,
during 1992-1996, this indicator was
tracked to be negative: - 18%.
Moldova’s development in the
transition period is characterized, on the one part, by the stagnation and dying off of production,
producing noncompetitive output, and, on the other part – by the development of export-
oriented enterprises, that required investments into new technologies. Unfortunately the delay
of enterprise restructuring did not allow to offset for the decline of production in some branches
and by a growth in another, perspective ones.
Initially, in Moldova, as well as in other transition countries, the prices of many types of
products were considerably below the world ones and that fact allowed to gain some benefits
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from the modification of trade conditions. During 1995-1997, owing to this factor, Moldova
gained additionally US$ 308 million. Other countries’ experience show, that possibility of
favorable change of trade conditions is a temporary occurrence, which is followed by particular
tension in the economy. As of the beginning of 1998 the Moldova’s reserves for export growth
through increasing prices practically exhausted.
The modification of average prices of basic types of exported products during the first 4
months of 1998, as compared with the same period of the past year, are presented in the picture.
The index of the physical volume of exports continued to decline. As a result of a low level of
grapes harvest, the demand of wine considerably grew, which conditioned the growth of its
export price by 113%. This growth considerably caused the fall of overall volume of exports,
for the red wine accounts for 37% of the exports of the country. The positive aspect in the
export of wine is, that the share of bottled wine sharply increased – from 42% to 83%. In case
there is a good harvest in the forthcoming year, the price of exported wine will most probably
decline.
In the early 90’s, due to well known events in the CIS, in Moldova, the share of re-export
within total exports was big (some 20-25%), which once with the regulation of the
identification of the country of commodities’ origin and development of partner countries’
custom systems, in 1997 declined to 4.8% (according to calculations of the Ministry of
Economy).
During the 1st quarter of 1998 the export of goods, produced in Moldova (except for re-
export), fell by 7.6% as compared with the respective period of the previous year, during 4
months the export volume stood below
that of the previous year by 2.2%. The fall
of export was also tracked in terms of all
groups of products, with the exception of
food products, alcoholic beverages,
tobacco and outputs made of them”, that
grew by 12.2%.  Thus, the export
opportunities more and more focus on
ready made products, made based of
domestic raw materials (grapes, fruits,
vegetables and sugar beet).Th  scarcity
of hard currency resources at the
economic agents and a limited demand implied a diminish of imports in the studies period. A
stabilization of the trade balance deficit is manifested, although its absolute value still remains
very big (see the picture).
The diminish of exports could be explicated by the depletion of the row material base of
the export oriented production (worsening of the state in viticulture,  horticulture, tobacco –
cultivation) and delaying of the restructuring the machine – building, light and furniture
enterprises,  which does not allow to escape from the colonial model of trade with energy and
labor consuming goods. For the transition to trade with technologically more complicated
goods the investing and producing growth of collaboration is needed. The restructuring of key
enterprises, export promotion and the stimulation of import – substituting production are
needed. As long as the amelioration of crises and restriction of the economy has a lengthy
character, Moldova will have to work on the definition of its specialization in the international
system of labor division.
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In the modern world countries pay great attention to export of services, which in the
international trade grow faster than export of goods: during the recent 15 years the average pace
of service trade growth constituted 8% as compared with 6% of export of goods. In Moldova
there haven’t been created conditions for export of services, and thus, while export of goods
grew by 15% in 1995, the export of services fell by 9%. In order to develop the export-oriented
services, considerable investments are needed, including foreign ones, however, the inactive
policy of the state in this field did not allow their attraction. Underdeveloped tourism, trade,
poor quality and costly services in transports, communications and informatics engendered a
deficit of trade balance of the
country: in 1997 - US$ 43 million,
and in the 1st quarter of 1998 - more
than US$ 20 million. That is why, it
is important to activate the policy of
attracting investments into the
service sector, oriented to export.
Comparing the share of
exports of services within the
overall Moldovan exports (13% in
1997) with those of a series of
transition countries, one can notice
the sharpness of the problem. During the last three years in Moldova comparatively faster have
developed the export of services and informatics – by 2.2-fold, however, its absolute volumes
are so far insignificant. When evaluating the export of services one should take into account,
that the Moldovan balance of payments does not reflect the provided gas transit services,
through high pressure pipeline, that should be adjusted by signing agreements with “Gasprom”
on payment for transit of gas and on
payment for gas by Moldovan
consumers.
Starting since 1996 in Moldova
the deficit of trade balance for goods
and services sharply increased, which
conditioned the growth of current
account payment balance. International
flows of capital for funding the
economy of the country and
international flows of goods and
services are 2 sides of the matter. The deficit of trade balance of goods and services, i.e.
positive balance of capital account points out the fact, that the country borrows financial
resources from other countries.
The ratio of export and import of goods and services, as well as import coverage by
exports are displayed in the picture. In 1997 the coverage level fell to 68.8%, which is less than
the average indicator for low-income countries (72%). In fact all the countries at various
periods of economic history use to either borrow capitals from abroad, or are lenders to other
countries. And this is why, the deficit of current account not always reflects an unfavorable
position of the country’s economy. All the more, the transition countries are in objective need
of inflow of capital for restructuring. Yet, the problem of Moldova does not consist in the
growth of deficit of trade balance of goods and services as it is, but rather in the effectiveness of
usage of foreign borrowings.
Given that the loans need to be remitted, by the time of loan maturity the country should
2.4 External trade
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have its niche within international trade, this is why the foreign assistance must be directed first
of all to increasing the effectiveness of exports structural and reforms of economy, as well as to
changing the import structure in order to increase the share of fund generating produce,
designed for modernization of production sector and enhancement of Moldovan output
competitiveness. As of Jan. 1, 1998 the foreign debt of Moldova amounted to US$ 1.2 billion,
which accounted for 60% of GDP, and only an insignificant part of that was channeled to real
economy sector.
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Drawbacks in corporate management of privatized enterprises, lack of real owners with
many of them, manifestation of “special interests” did not make possible so far to attract the
required foreign direct investments (FDI) into the real sector of the economy. Their share within
the overall finance inflow to Moldova is still very low. This indicator’s dynamics during the last
years is displayed in the picture. Comparison of the share of direct foreign investments in the
overall volume of loans in terms of various countries is displayed in the picture. For Moldova
this indicator during 1994-1997 accounted for 19.5%, which is much less than with most
countries in transition.
 Given that during the years of macrostabilization in this country there was not created a
basis for real sector growth, and consequently – of export potential, as well as limited the
growth of export on the account of modification of the trade conditions, these factors can lead
to a decline of exports already in 1998. Besides, there is a threat of worsening the import
structure in terms of declining the share of fund generating products and increasing the
consumer goods. That is why, urgent measures are required in order to create a favorable
investment climate in the country. To mention is, that new Government Program for 1998-2001
the priority is mentioned of foreign economic relations development and export promotion.
Settlement of these tasks may contribute to:
· speeding up of Moldova’s joining in WTO and broadening relations with other
international organizations;
· carrying out the policy of economic openness, removal of barriers hindering the flow
of goods and capitals;
· concentration of capital with a view to activate its injection into restructuring the
enterprises;
· stimulation of foreign capital attraction for setting up export oriented businesses;
· improvement of corporate management at the enterprises, improvement of legal basis
aimed at protection of ownership rights;
· enhancement of human rights resources.
A series of measures designed for improving the foreign economic activity was included
in the anti-crisis program, such as: setting up organizations for exports promotion, development
of mechanisms for supporting exports, improvement of import structure and optimization of
energy products consumption. Among them, the law “On anti-dumping, offsetting measures
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and protection of producers” and leverage to control prices of imported products for avoiding
dumping.
CHAPTER 3. ENTERPRISES’ SECTOR: STRUCTURAL REFORMS
3.1 Industrial policy and enterprise restructuring
The implementation of a new, market-oriented industrial policy and enterprise sector
restructuring is the key for the sustainability of Moldova’s economic growth, which has hitherto
heavily depended on the development of a highly volatile agricultural sector, the main sector of
the national economy. Only the reform of the enterprise sector can in the long term provide the
necessary resources for the economic and social security. Delay of enterprise sector reforming is
one of the main reasons for budget deficit, inflation and unemployment. This reform is at the
heart of the country’s transition on its way to Europe and it basically means enabling and
fostering an accelerated restructuring of enterprise sector according to its competitive
advantages in the market.
The purpose of the industrial policy is to reach a g r o w t h  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t
in terms of quality and prices and to expand the markets. Being a small open economy,
Moldova should move towards enhancing its industrial products’ competitiveness on foreign
markets, otherwise the economy has no chances to survive, and subsequently, the country is
doomed to vegetating next to more developed countries of the Central and Western Europe.
The industrial policy is part of economic policy of the state. Unfortunately, the
Government’s Concept of Industrial Policy of the Republic Moldova for 1996-2000 (Oct. 1996)
has not received due support by the Parliament (in terms of its legal basis and economic
mechanisms). Industrial development is therefore proceeding relatively in a relatively
unplanned and undirected manner.
The Program of the Government for 1998-2001 stipulates,  that the “strategic target of the
industrial policy is to form a multi-sectoral high-tech and competitive industrial complex,
which will provide for a sustainable development and economic independence of the country,
for sufficient incomes and integration of Moldova into the system of world economic
relationships”. The Government considers the restructuring and further reform of the
enterprises as mostly important process of its period in the office.  
Nevertheless by the middle of 1998 the situation in the industry is still serious. The
enterprises are facing a lot of problems related to the following factors: high rate of barter
transactions, low quality of products, high expenses per production unit, loss of traditional
markets, high stocks of final goods, low level of production capacities use, enormous accounts
receivable and payable, bank accounts blockage, high level of fixed assets depreciation after
their reevaluation, decrease of working places. Currently 40 percent of the processing
enterprises are non-profitable. The enterprise restructuring has become a necessary condition
for developing Moldovan industry, because the foreign investors rate very high the risk of
investing money in the enterprises that haven’t been restructured yet.
The analysis has proved that the following additional conditions are necessary to speed-up
and to promote successfully the restructuring process:
- to eliminate the barriers and obstacles related to the economic agents registration;
- to implement  promptly the new accounting systems;
- to simplify the assets sales procedures;
- to launch new simple procedures of industrial land sales;
3.1 Industrial policy and enterprise restructuring
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- to make rapid investments in entrepreneurial and managerial capacities through the
Marshal Plan implementation, to use efficiently the technical assistance;
- to introduce special curricula related to the entrepreneurship in the universities;
- to reduce considerably the control bodies as well as the controls at the enterprises
(nowadays there are about 60 bodies that have control functions);
- to make simpler and to solve the problems related to the access to credit resources
(collateral, guarantees, sophisticated business plans), as well as to the examination
terms for getting credits.
The stabilization of the situation in the Moldovan industry and the development of the
restructuring process and financial recovery of the enterprises are not so fast. Several
amendments to the existing laws and legal documents that create legal, social, economic and
fiscal obstacles haven’t been examined and adopted so far.
Legal
· The Civil Code – it is impossible to offer the state property as collateral and to force
the execution of contract stipulations.
· The problem of making out a collateral for a credit (as well as of other documents)
through the bodies of the Ministry of Justice.
· The delay in the implementation of the legislation on the privatization and sale of the
land under the industrial enterprises.
· The delay of local administrative bodies in implementing the Government and
Parliament decision on the transfer of social and cultural objects to the local
administration.
· The slow privatization of the state property reduces the enterprise possibility to
benefit from the World Bank credit lines that are offered to the private enterprises.
· The lack of a proper legal support in implementing management contracts.
· The procedure of motivating managers through buying a certain percent of enterprise
shares is not defined clearly.
Fiscal
· The Value Added Tax (VAT) is applied to goods that are sold at a price lower than
the production cost.
· The conditions concerning the use of 50 percent of the VAT to cover the
restructuring expenses for the enterprises under restructuring are not executed.
· The enterprises are not stimulated to initiate restructuring activities because in 1997
the Parliament abolished the penalties of some enterprise without taking into
consideration the results of their activity.
Finance and Accounting
· The assets are evaluated according to non-objective indicators. As a result the
enterprise value is over-estimated.
· The production is delivered without payment on the basis of the indications of the
respective Ministries. As a result accounts receivable are generated.
Production
· The Regulations on the Dutch Auctions do not allow commercializing the assets of
the state enterprises.
Export and Import
· The customs procedures are too complicate.
· There are import duties for some raw materials.
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Social
· The compensations in case of the personnel lay off when the enterprise is liquidated
according the Government Decision ¹  712 as of October 23, 1995 are made from the
enterprise resources, not from the Social Fund.
· The unique subventions for the personnel who are laid off (equal to 5 medium
salaries) from the resources of the Social Fund and from other sources are paid
without any taxies.
· The losses generated by offering non-justified facilities to some representative of
social groups are reduced.
In a series of branches (machine-building, light and construction materials construction
industries), Moldova inherited from planned economy big large scale enterprises, that do not
comply to market economy requirements. Small and middle enterprises are created basically in
agricultural, trade and service sectors, whereas in industrial sector this process has not reached
yet a proper level of development. For instance in Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain and
USA, the enterprises with more than 100 employees absorb about 58% of the manpower of
those countries and generate 50-62% of GDP; for Moldova these indicators respectively
account for 12 and 15%.
At first stage of restructuring process is based on the principle of large enterprise break-
up (by selling some idling assets, by dividing into viable units, which also do not affect the
technologic process (“break-ups”, “spin-offs”), leasing out and offering on tenancy of industrial
sites to private sector, with a view to set up small and middle enterprises (SMEs) and generate
new jobs.
In the beginning of 1998, the Government approved the State Program of Small Business
Support for 1998-2000, yet it still remains subject to ratification by the Parliament. Also, the
expenditures required for small business support are not stipulated in the current budget.
Business start-up, operation and liquidation are still discouraged by numerous bureaucratic
hindrances and endless directives regulating business activity and often stimulating corruption.
The need to develop small and middle enterprises is determined by a series of advantages:
receptivity to constantly changing market requirements, declining production costs,
enhancement of management effectiveness, possibility to use for technical reequipment of
enterprises relatively low volumes of cash, broadening possibilities to attract foreign
investments.
The broadening of small and middle enterprise sector will set up an environment for a
competitive market, avoiding monopolistic pricing, whereas the employees of these enterprises
create a new social group – the middle class – and to a great extent contribute to social stability
in the society.
The initial experience of large enterprise division was accumulated on the basis of joint-
stock company "Mashfrigocomplect" (Strãºeni) and joint-stock company "Alfa" (Chiºinãu). 25
private enterprises have been created on the basis of joint-stock company "Mashfrigocomplect";
the joint-stock company "Alfa" was the first major manufacturer to which the Law on
Bankruptcy was applied, on the basis of which 34 private enterprises have started operations.
The "Alfa" joint-stock company will be receiving from these activities about 2.5 million lei
annually.
A new and innovative form of small and medium-size business development is industrial
technological park. In February 1998, the Parliament enacted legislation on the creation of three
free enterprise zones - techno-parks "Vulcãneºti", "Taraclia" and "Otaci-Business", formed on
the basis of the loss-making enterprises and their infrastructures.
The Agency for Restructuring and Enterprise Assistance (ARIA) has been created to
support Government efforts in accelerating the program of structural changes in industrial and
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financial sectors. The Agency has been involved at the implementation of the following
enterprise restructuring projects: Pilot Project, Private Sector Development Project (PSD-I),
and Assistance to the Enterprise Isolation Project.
At the beginning of 1998 enterprises of the P i l o t  P r o j e c t  (Stejaur, Spectrul, Farmaco,
Nistru, Flamingo, MFC, Zorile, Piele, Moldagrotehnica, Tricon, Incomaº, Bãlþeanca) have
achieved the following performance.
The above enterprises are acting in the third year of restructuring. Positive restructuring
results have been achieved at 9 enterprises and at newly created small companies of the MFC
Industrial Park from Strãºeni. There is an improvement of all economic and financial
indicators: growth in output and sales were registered at 9 enterprises (in average by 16% and
30% consecutively). Barter transactions have been reduced (by 9%), export has increased, and
labor productivity went up by 30%. 8 of the total number of enterprises managed to
significantly decrease costs and energy consumption; stocks reduced at 7 enterprises (by 16-
38%). Enterprises are collecting outstanding accounts receivable, are selling unused assets and
fulfilling current obligations.
There has been achieved positive results and sales increase at 9 enterprises (except
“Spectrul” and “Nistru”, Soroca, which was proposed to liquidation) from the total number of
enterprises of the Pilot Project: output volume increased at 8 enterprises, and as a result
turnover indicators are better at the following enterprises:  Zorile  -  by 17%, Piele - by 35%,
Moldagrotehnica - by 49%, Incomaº - by 14%, Farmaco - by 30%, Flamingo – by 112%, Tricon
– by 17%.
Accounts receivables have been reduced by 1.2 million lei at 8 enterprises as a result of
measures for their collection. The majority of enterprises managed to reduce Accounts payable
(approximately 16 million lei in total). As a result of fixed assets optimization programs in
1997 9 enterprises sold over 9 million lei of unused assets, and generated cash for debt
repayment and working capital.
There are 15 more enterprises restructured by ARIA under PSD-I Project , out of which
10 are at a stage of the restructuring plan implementation. At “Alfa-Nistru” S.A. and “Ionel”
S.A. the implementation of Management Information System (MIS) is finalized. “Alfa” is
reorganized in Industrial Park. Economic Court has initiated a bankruptcy through liquidation
procedure against “Chiºinãu Glass Factory” S.A.,  “Speranþa” S.A., from Donduºeni is also
liquidated according to the Law on Bankruptcy. 39 new entities and 59 lease companies have
been established at the above mentioned enterprises.
The analysis has been carried out by grouping the enterprises into 3 categories: 1 s t  g r o u p
(Ionel, Alfa-Nistru, Conserve-Orhei, Dana, Intreprinderea de colectare (Donduseni), Centrul de
moda) – enterprises with substantial results; 2 n d  g r o u p  (Faprochim, ICAM, Elcas, Donduseni-
Zahar, Prut-Falesti) – enterprises meeting some difficulties in the restructuring process; 3 r d
g r o u p  (Alfa, Covoare-Ungheni, Chiºinãu Glass Factory, Speranþa-Donduºeni) – enterprises
reorganized according to the Law on Bankruptcy.
Economic activity of the enterprises and results of the implementation of the restructuring
programs after the first quarter of 1998 showed some good performance.
Growth in output and sales has been observed at the majority of enterprises: for the
enterprises from the 1st group – sales increased by 21%, 2nd group –by 1% and 3rd group – a
reduction by 75%. Output at the enterprises from the 1st group has increase in average by 32%.
Turnover increased significantly at “Dana” S.A. (2 times), “Ionel” S.A. (by 29%), “Orhei
Cannery” S.A. (by 18%), “Alfa-Nistru” S.A. (by 15%).
At the enterprises, which are registering success – new working places are being created –
the number of employees increased by 7%, which means 245 new working places (at the
enterprises from the 1st group). At the same time there was registered lay-off of about 442
persons at the enterprises that are meeting problems or liquidated.
Labor productivity at the enterprises from the group 1 increased in average by 42% and
from the group 2 by 8%. This indicator improved significantly at 9 enterprises: “Ionel” S.A. and
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Centrul de Modã - by 2 times, at “Elcas” S.A. – by 1.5 times, “Alfa-Nistru” – 1.4 times. At 90%
of the restructured companies average salaries went up. The most substantial results in this field
were achieved by “Ionel” S.A. - from 183 lei to 662 lei, “Conserve Orhei” S.A. - from 182 lei
to 597 lei.
Half of the restructured companies are accurately fulfilling current payment obligations
and the enterprises from the 1st and some from the 2nd group - repayment of old debt to the
creditors. Short term debt significantly decreased by 35 million lei in total, or by 11%,
including 2% for the 1st group and 18% for the 2nd . Companies classified in the 1st group are
registering profit, which is substantially higher than for the previous period: operational profit
accounts over 12 million lei, which mean an increase of more than 7.7 times. Net profit
registers an increase of 2.6 times compared to the results of the previous year.
8 enterprises sold during first quarter of 1998 non-utilized assets amounting to 714
thousand lei – during the previous period this indicator was 916 thousand lei. Stocks have been
reduced in average by 4%: at “Conserve-Orhei” - by 4.7 million lei,  “Elcas” S.A. - by 4.1
million lei, “Donduseni-zahãr”S.A. - by 4.6 million lei, “Prut-Fãleºti” S.A. - by 0.9 million lei.
The Project Assistance to the Enterprise Isolation Project  (financed by TACIS) at 5
enterprises: Macon, Moldcarton, Faconis, Incomlac, Agromaºina was launched on October 25,
1997. At each of these enterprises around 20 restructuring programs have been implemented.
Three companies registered success during the implementation: Macon, Moldcarton and
Incomlac. Turnover at Moldcarton has increased by 58%, at Macon – by 15%. Incomlac has
implemented a new system of cost management and an advanced network for raw material
collection.
With the purpose to improve the efficiency of enterprise management and especially their
capability to adjust to demand developments on the domestic and foreign markets, a
Competitiveness and Productivity Center has been created, within the framework of the PSD-II
Project . During the time of project preparation, 22 managers had 2 to 4-month training in UK
and Slovenia. Training of another 300-400 Moldovan managers is in the process of being
organized.
State support for enterprise restructuring is carried out through the memoranda of the
Creditors Board. Since May of 1995, the Board has developed a procedure of isolation for
implementation of the restructuring plans, with the deferral of debts, for 132 economic entities.
By April 1, 1998, memoranda have been signed with 96 enterprises (about half of them -
industrial), debts worth of 669.7 million lei deferred. This makes more than 30% of the total
debt of all enterprises and organizations to the budget and extra-budgetary funds.
One of the most baffling problems for enterprises are their long-standing debts. Their
accumulation was largely determined by inflation in 1991-1992 and errors in the state
management policy. Existing legislation now provides for the write-off of such debts, provided
the debtors effect current payments to the budget and Social Fund in a timely fashion.
Financial standing of the majority of the enterprises operating under the terms of the
memoranda has improved: the volume of sold production for cash rose and accounted for 52%
of the sales volume; more than 62% of profits (131.4 million) have been allocated to
development of production; idling assets have been sold in amount of 185.3 million lei, more
than 50% of this amount was channeled to complementing the working capital, 49% of the
frozen arrears has been paid already to creditors. With a view to release the enterprises from
functions not characteristic to them and speeding up the pay-off of their arrears, the Creditors
Board approved transition of 88 social-cultural objects, valued at lei 60.5m, to the balance-sheet
of the local authorities.
However, a number of enterprises have failed to comply with the terms of these
agreements and, since the beginning of 1998, the number of the enterprises under the
memoranda decreased to 26 units.
A tremendous qualitative change in Government’s approaches to industrial problems -
unfeasible, loss-making and debt-accumulating enterprises should undergo through the
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procedure of bankruptcy. For the first five months of 1998, the Law on Bankruptcy has already
affected some 40 enterprises. However, the shortcomings of this piece of legislation serve as
obstacles in restructuring of enterprises: there is no precise definition of the competence and
responsibilities of each of the parties involved  (e.g. government and ministry); there is no
precise regulation and mechanism of relationships between the Creditors Board, the manager
and the proprietor-debtor; nothing is said about deliberate bankruptcy and responsibility of the
manager in such an event; there is a number of discrepancies between different articles of the
Law and some articles stand in contradiction to other legislation. Unrealistically high demands
to and responsibilities of the manager and low stimuli in his/her work, the impossibility of sale
of buildings and structures without privatization of the land they are located on - all this also
interferes with implementation of bankruptcy procedures. Improvement of the mechanism of
bankruptcy processing in the shortest possible terms is at this time a key task of the
Government and Parliament.
The problem of corporate management remains a serious impediment on the way of
successful industrial development. After privatization for Patrimonial Bonds, there is a huge
number of shareholders, but not real proprietors. A significant share of privatized property is
owned by privatization/investment funds (PIFs), of which at least one third ‘lives off’ the
enterprises.
The Government should support the tendencies toward the concentration of  capital. A
positive example - PIFs "Agrofond" and "Dividend" together with the enterprises in which they
have shares, have created an association of mutual crediting in charge of capital investment.
There is a tendency, on the part of some managers, to keep the ‘outside’ shareholders
outside of running the enterprise. The mechanism of protection of the proprietors’ rights
remains to be underelaborated, which results in losses in some enterprises. The cases of
withdrawing of outsiders’ resources from the enterprise to other firms to the detriment of other
shareholders and PIFs are at the same time observed. It is necessary to create a system of
effective legal protection of the shareholders against actions of the managers that are damaging
to the enterprise and the shareholders.
For the nearest future, the main problems in the industrial sector remain to be: increasing
of competitiveness and productivity, export promotion, introduction of advanced technologies,
and management training.
3.2 Energy sector: restructuring and preparation for privatization
One of the strategic targets of the national economy is to diminish the power-
consumption within GNP and improve the energy balance. Starting from 1997, in the Republic
of Moldova a complex of measures is implemented aimed at restructuring the energy sector,
including:
1. Approving the Restructuring Plan of the energy sector (Government Decision no. 628
from 08.07.1997). The principles of reorganization of the State Company “Moldenergo”,
objectives, stages and privatization methods of these subdivisions were determined. Elaboration
and approving the Regulation of the National Agency for Energy Regulation– ANRE
(Governmental Decision no. 767 from 11.08.1997);
2. Approving the Concept of Privatization of the enterprises from the energy sector
(Governmental Decision no. 260 from 09.03.1998). The objectives, principles and mechanisms
of privatization of 8 energy companies, activities related to their preparation for privatization
(methods of patrimony evaluation, preparation of documents for the tender, evaluation and
negotiation of the offers).
 Approving the regulation of the private companies for collection of accounts receivable of
the energy sector (Decision of the Government no. 309 from 19.03.1998) and of quick
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measures for paying of debts of budget institutions to the energy enterprises (Decision of the
Government no. 1110 from 01.12.1997);
3. Approving the plan of restructuring of debts of energy sector (Decision of the
Government no. 547 from 12.06.1997). Mechanism and concrete measures were determined:
mutual payments, covering the costs and a part of historical debts based on tariffs’ increase,
conversion of the expired short-term obligations into long–term debts, decreasing the level of
barter transactions, creation of private companies for collection of the debts;
4. Increasing the tariffs for electric, thermal energy and natural gases in order to cover the
costs (Government Decisions no. 231 from 05.03.1997, no. 512 from 05.06.1997, ANRE
project from 17.04.1998 which was temporary suspended with the Governmental disposition
until determination of social protection measures);
5. Creation on the basis of State Company “Moldenergo” of 14 Joint-Stock Companies
and of the State Company “Moldtranselectro” (Decision of the Government no. 1059 from
13.11.1997). The result is the improvement in operation of the energy companies, in energy
supply and collections of payments for the consumed energy. In 1997 the ratio of collection of
payments for the energy consumption overlapped 100%. At the same time accounts receivable
decreased with 29% which is 34 million lei (this tendency in not confirmed in 1998);
6. Approving additional measures for monitoring the debts and improving the financial
situation of the companies from the energy sector (Decision of the Government no. 325 from
20.03.1998). The terms and conditions of rescheduling the debts, disconnection of the non-
payers, stimulation of the managers in order to improve the collections and reduction of the
barter operations were established. Approving the mechanisms for monitoring the preparation
of the companies for privatization – Governmental Committee (Decision of the Government no.
207 from 27.02.1998) and control on restructuring the debts of the sector – State Committee for
supervising the fulfillment of stipulations of Governmental Decision no. 547 from 12.06.1997);
7. Delimitation of the functions and responsibilities of different State bodies and
consulting companies (ARIA, Abt Associates and Hagler Bailly) of terms of implementation of
privatization project at enterprises from energy sector (Agreement of Co-operation from
02.02.1998). Open public sessions concerning issuing the licenses to the energy companies.
There were already issued licenses to 12 companies (3 production companies, 5 distribution
companies and 4 independent suppliers).
The above-mentioned activities laid the beginning of the promotion of the restructuring
project of the sector, creating legal basis, informational and regulation framework, necessary
economic and financial mechanisms. At the same time uncertainty and inconvenience of
activities of institutions from public administration, controversial approaches in the stringent
problems made, in many aspects, more difficult the process of improving the situation of these
enterprises, of their restructuring in the pre-privatization phase.
Economical and the financial situation of enterprises from energy sector. In the
financial restructuring the energy sector in May 1998 a detailed diagnostic analysis of the
economic and financial situation of 8 enterprises from this sector was done (ARIA). The main
objectives of this study were:
Determination in details of the financial and economic status of each enterprise, including
accounts receivable and accounts payable (as of January 1, 1998 and April 1, 1998), the
structure and trends of these debts and elaboration of a plan for their monitoring;
Detailed examination of the deliveries and collections in the energetic enterprises,
including the trends of the barter operations;
Examination of losses, including commercial losses and non-payments, and elaboration of
some concrete measures to diminish these losses;
Analysis of company’s costs and their trends;
Determination and analysis of the main performance indicators of the company.
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 The main problems the energy companies are facing at the moment are: drastic decrease
of the collections, high commercial losses (energy stealing), inappropriate distribution of the
historical debts, high share of barter transactions, non-payments permanently increasing. The
financial and economic analysis of the companies included in the project of restructuring of the
energetic sector revealed the following.
 
 The situation as of the beginning of 1998 can be described with the increase of the sales
volumes (exception – CET 2), accounts payable dramatically increased (+29%), increase of the
accounts receivable (+46%) due to a low percentage of payments for the supplied electricity
(see Table 3.2.1).
 
 The accounts payable of the companies for the first quarter of 1998 also have increased.
Some companies have accounts payable 3-5 times higher than accounts receivable and the
difference is enlarging (RED Nord, RED Centru, RED Sud). This tendency is alertness and if
the increasing difference is not stopped it can put in danger the entire privatization process.
 
 One of the biggest problems of the newly founded Joint Stock Companies is that after the
State Company “Moldenergo” suspended its activity all the accounts payable, which occurred
as a result of activity in the previous periods were transferred to the balance of the energetic
companies (1028 thousand lei at 01.01.1998). Such a burden does not permit to the Joint Stock
Companies to become self-sustained.
 
 The companies do not have the possibility to payback these huge historical debts which
are to be reallocated before privatization (currently ARIA together with Abt Associates and
Energy Department are working on the project of the corresponding Governmental Decision).
Because of negative profitability, companies generate additional losses from their operational
activity (see Table 3.2.2). The main reason of these losses is that the costs for 1 kWh of
delivered/recorded energy (delivered energy minus technical and commercial losses and non-
payments) are bigger than the tariff.
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 The general situation at CETs (Thermal-Power Stations) is critical too. It is influenced
by the non-payments during the heating period of 1997-1998. At the same time preparation for
the heating season of 1998-1999 need big financial resources (CET-I  - 40 million lei. CET-2 -
70 million lei and CET Nord - 40 million lei).
 
T a b l e  3 . 2 . 2  Performance indicators of the energy companies, April 1998
Indicator
RED
Chiºinãu
RED
Centru
RED
Nord
RED
Nord
Vest
RED
Sud
CET 1 CET 2 CET
Nord
Net profit/Loss,
Mil lei
1.4 - 21.0 - 22.5 - 13.7 - 18.2 - 9.4 - 9.7 - 12.7
Profitability of
Sales, %
0.35 -65.0 - 25.0 - 60.0 - 91       -
24.1
-7.0 - 72.0
Cost of 1 kWh
delivered/recorded,
bani
23.1 36.3 33.3 35.3 38.7 7.2 9.97 11.2
Tariff for1 kWh,
Bani
24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 10.3 13.37 12.6
Costs for 1 leu
recorded energy, lei
1.01 1.76 1.25 1.68 1.93 1.24 1.07 1.88
Total Losses,
(% from kWh)
14.6 43.8 41.0 40.7 46.8 - - -
Commercial losses
and non-payers, %
2.9 31.8 29.0 29.7 29.8 - - -
Tariff for 1 Gcal,
lei
- - - - - 51.0 51.0 51.0
Costs of 1 Gcal,
lei
- - - - - 72.0 78.8 93.8
 Lack of financial resources (due to a very low level of collected payments for rendered
services) does not allow to make the normative reparation and to purchase the fuel necessary for
the following autumn-winter season.
 Basic measures that have to be undertaken in order to decrease the accounts payable:
· collecting in time of the bills for the delivered energy and disconnection of all non-
payers starting with June this year;
· minimization of the volume of commercial losses (energy stealing) which influence
the costs and cannot be covered by the tariff. In order to solve this problem huge investments
are needed. They cannot be generated by the distribution companies;
· application of a common tariff for the electric power for all categories of consumers, in
parallel with elimination of privileges and compensations to privileged categories of customers
(see Chart 6) . Subventions must be nominative – paid directly from the budget to the customers
and not through energy companies, like it is done today;
· adjusting the tariff for the thermal energy. The analysis shows that the production cost
is 20-25% higher than the existent tariff. This fact causes considerable losses in production of
thermal energy, characteristic for the thermal-power stations from the republic. This situation is
also influenced by the non-payment of the customers – mediators of thermal energy (ex:
RAPDET in case of CET-1 and CET-2). It is proposed that ANRE during one month is
adjusting the tariff for the thermal energy in order to cover the expenses generated by the
production of this energy. This study was done by ANRE on April 17, 1998 and presented to
the Government, which approved a set of measures of social insurance until June 20, 1998.
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 There are measures proposed to reduce the commercial losses (ex: changing of meters and
cables) the effect of which could be the reduction of these losses, but these measures need
considerable capital investments. The same situation is with the technical losses, a big part of
which appears because the equipment is not used at its nominal capacity. It is proposed to
include the investment plans of the distribution companies in the tender documents.
 
 Basic measures related to the decrease of accounts receivable. During the activity of
newly created Joint Stock Companies in the period of the first quarter of 1998 the accounts
receivable were in a permanent increase. Reasons of this tendency are: insolvency of economic
entities, as well as of the individuals, which leads to inability of the above-mentioned to honor
their current obligations; collecting the payments for the delivered energy worsened; in spite of
the fact that the number of the disconnected consumers increases, rescheduling of the accounts
receivable, even in the case of some small amounts leads to postponing the payments for the
rescheduled debts, as well as for the current obligations; nowadays the mechanism of collecting
the debts using the private companies is used partially (at RED Nord Vest such a company
collected 98% with a commission of 4%).
 
 In order to change the current situation the following have to be undertaken:
· disconnecting of 100% of clients which does not pay their bills starting with June this
year;
· unconditioned disconnection of the customers which concluded memorandum –
agreements for rescheduling the debts to the energy companies, but do not pay the rescheduled
or current sums;
· involving in collection of the accounts receivable of the private companies applying
the method of pre-established payments for an established quote and extra payments  for the
additional collections (in accordance with the Governmental Decision no. 309 from March 19,
1998);
· initiating the bankruptcy procedure for the insolvent customers.
 
 The general trend of the barter operations is in decrease. For instance at RED Centru the
share of barter transactions went down from 71% in January to 57% in April, 1998. Average for
all 8 enterprises is the following: 65.8% in I quarter of 1998 compared to 80.9% in IV quarter
of 1997.
 Internal measures. In order to change the economic and financial situation in energy
enterprises the following additional measures are proposed:
· enforcing contracts relationships between suppliers and consumers;
· implementation of new organizational structures and of new job descriptions for the
employees, elaboration of motivation schemes for the company’s employees;
· selling of the unused assets;
· elaboration of the schedules for reduction of barter operations up to the full
elimination; elaboration and implementation of the programs for the reduction of losses;
· training of the company’s staff in new techniques for operation in the new economic
environment.
 
 Based on the suggested measures, ARIA is finalizing the restructuring plans (until June
1998), that have to be submitted for approval to the Council of Creditors.
 
 Measures in competence of Parliament, Government, concerned Ministries and
Departments. A set on measures related to amendments and additions to the legislative
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framework of financial restructuring and privatization of the enterprises from the energy sector
should be promoted until August 1998. The mechanisms for the implementation of these
measures approved by the Government Resolutions should be adjusted to the new realities. At
the same time a set of activities related to the elaboration of the Informational Memorandum for
investors, tender documents, conference with the potential investors with announcement of pre-
selection, as well as the modalities of creating and operation of new mechanisms for re-
distribution and monitoring of the debts have to be examined.
 
 In accordance with this purpose the following is proposed:
a) The Parliament has to adopt the following legislative acts:
 Law about electric energy (in second reading);
 Law about natural Gases (in second reading);
 Decision about the Privatization Concept of the enterprises from the energy sector (was
approved by the Government by Decision no. 260 from March 9, 1998);
 Decision about the reallocation of the historical accounts payable transferred from the
balance of the newly created energy companies to an institution founded under the Ministry of
Finance;
 Decision about the Individual Privatization Plan for enterprises from the energy sector.
b) The Government adopts the following decisions:
 About modifications of Legislative Acts and Presidential Decrees which granted
privileges to some groups of consumers (there were amendments included in this project and it
was passed to the Government for examination in January 1998);
 About modification of Governmental decisions related to establishment of strong
financial discipline in budget institutions and State companies  debtors of the energy
companies (Decision no. 325 from March 20, 1998);
 About approval of the statutes for the State Enterprise Moldtranselectro;
 About making official the statutes of the National Agency for Regulation in Energy Sector
(ANRE) as an independent institution, as it is stipulated in the project of the Law concerning
the electric energy (this decision could help ANRE to carry out its obligations in accordance
w i t h  i t s  S t a t u t e s  a n d  w i t h o u t  a d d i t i o n a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n .
 c) Examination by the Governmental Committee for Supervising the Privatization
Process of the companies from the energy sector (Decision of the Government no. 207 from
February 24, 1998) of the following documents:
 Strategy and modality of privatization of the enterprises from the energy sector;
 M e c h a n i s m s  f o r  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  d e c i s i o n
makers in the implementation of the plans for debts monitoring;
 Concerning reallocation of the historical accounts payable from the balance of the newly
created enterprises from the energy sector to a new founded institution under the Ministry of
Finance;
 Informational Memorandum, tender documentation and the agenda of the investment
conference.
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3.3 Land reform and farm restructuring
Transition adjustments and tendencies
Moldova’ specialization in agricultural production has been determined by favorable
weather conditions and above average fertility of agricultural land (75% of all soils are
chernozioms). Agriculture is indeed the backbone of Moldovan economy, as it holds a 38%
share in GDP, provides employment to over 42% of active labor force, and accounts for nearly
three quarters of total exports of the country. Taking also into account the size of agricultural
area (75% of total) and the high proportion of rural population, there is no doubt that successful
land reform along with a correctly determined and clearly defined agricultural policy would
lead to the well-being of the population and the overall improvement of the economic
performance of the country.
Since the transition the main macro  tendencies  observed within the agricultural sector can
be summarized as follows:
- Reduction in production and yields;
- Change in the structure of product mix, as the share of crop production continuously
increases since 1990;
- Increase of areas under labor intensive crops with guaranteed markets and low
production costs, and decrease of areas under resource intensive crops;
- Movement of production from collective to individual farming;
- Fall in consumption of main food products followed by the problem of production
surpluses;
- Clear breakdown in former collection and distribution network and persisting
difficulties in establishing new marketing channels for farm inputs and outputs;
- Low (often negative) profitability of large farm enterprises, low tax compliance and
highly exaggerated and ineffective state subsidies granted to large scale farms;
- Insufficient access to credits, as well as extension services for small private units;
- No investment in rural social services and extremely low standard of living of rural
population;
- Fall in capacity use of processing enterprises;
- Inadequate price structure when production costs exceed producer prices;
- Fall in agricultural export volumes and increased flow of imported food products.
 
 The overall decline was mainly caused by the financial crisis within the agricultural
sector, which provoked a sharp drop in the output of large farm enterprises. Thus, between
1990 and 1996 the land in corporate sector declined by 25%, while its gross product dropped by
65%.
 
 The lack of financial resources has made the agricultural enterprises to apply simplified
technologies of production and, as a result, their productivity decreased by 30-40%, the soil
fertility has reduced: in 1996 chemical fertilizer use has declined 17 times (as compared to top-
year 1985), while potassium and phosphorous based fertilizers are almost not used due to high
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cost and lack of availability. However, according to European standards, the country disposes
of a strong potential for growth in agriculture.
 
 Meanwhile, starting with 1996 the individual sector, holding a 18% share of land area,
produces more than half of total agricultural output.
 
Changes in Land and Asset Ownership
The first task of agricultural reform, which is the e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  s t a t e  m o n o p o l y  o n
o w n e r s h i p  o f  l a n d , had been given a start in 1992 and developed slowly and uncertainly until
early 1996, when most of bureaucratic and technical constraints have been removed from the
legislation. Now many fundamental changes are taking place in the sector organization,
including, first of all, the distribution of land titles (“land shares”), and, in parallel, physical
allocation of land plots to individuals and families who exit from the large farms. Thus, by
April 1998, 95%  of entitled individuals have already received provisional ownership
certificates, and 71%  of people who applied were allocated land in private ownership. An
important issue in this context is that only 27% f entitled individuals have actually applied for
physical allocation of land plots (278 thousand out of 1 million beneficiaries)1. Although the
privatization rate2 strongly differs across districts, one fact is certain: it steadily rises over time.
 Privatization Rate by Zone (%): 1996-1998
O c t o b e r
1 9 9 6
O c t o b e r
1 9 9 7
J a n u a r y
1 9 9 8
A p r i l   1 9 9 8
North 3.2 7.5 8.4 10.1
Center 24.8 30.0 30.5 33.6
South 4.9 8.9 10.8 12.2
National
average
11.2 16.1 17.0 19.2
Source: Department of D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  a n d  S o c i o l o g i c a l  A n a l y s i s
According to cadastral land balance as of January 1, 1998, individual sector in Moldova
manages about 21% of agricultural land, and the rest is controlled by various large-scale structures,
most of which are not yet restructured. However, the increase of peasant farms’ share is quite
essential (7.8%,) as compared to the one in 1994 -0.7%.
In addition to that it is necessary to mention of the development of a range of other
ownership relations:
- The state holds ownership of 17% of agricultural land (435 thousand ha out of total 2.6
million ha), of which 358 thousand ha is in a reserve fund for future needs (in fact, leased to
various producers), and only 77 thousand ha is permanently allocated to state agricultural
enterprises.
- Of 2.2 million ha in private ownership (82% of agricultural land), individuals cultivate
about 500 thousand ha (or 20%), which includes land in household plots and in independent
peasant farms.
- The remaining 61% of agricultural land is managed by large-scale farm enterprises, some of
which are still registered as traditional collective farms (387 thousand ha), while others are
organized in various new forms, which represent join-stock structures based on collective farming:
joint stock companies, agricultural cooperatives, limited liability companies, etc.
  Land Tenure 1990-1997 (percent of agricultural land)
                                          
1 This share is, however, higher than the one registered a year ago – 20% or 205 thousand applicants in April 1997.
2 P r i v a t i z a t i o n  r a t e  is the ratio of the number of individuals who received a physical plot to the total number of individuals
entitled to land shares in the district.
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1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7
State sector 32.3 26.7 25.2 31.2 30.1 16.7 17.3 17.7
     State farms 27.0 23.4 20.4 14.6 12.8 0.1 1.0 1.0
     Reserve fund 0.0 0.0 0.1 12.7 13.3 13.4 13.6 14.0
Corporate  forms 59.4 63.0 63.0 56.2 56.8 67.9 64.8 61.4
     Collectives 59.4 63.0 58.8 49.2 45.2 39.3 23.1 15.2
     New corporate forms0.0 0.0 4.2 6.2 8.9 27.6 38.9 43.0
     Farmers associations-- -- -- 0.8 2.7 1.0 2.8 3.2
Individual sector 8.3 10.3 11.7 12.6 13.2 15.3 18.0 20.9
     Peasant farms -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.7 2.4 4.8 7.8
     Household plots 8.3 10.3 11.7 12.3 12.5 12.9 13.2 13.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Source: C a d a s t r a l  l a n d  b a l a n c e s  ( end of year data)
The state farms have practically disappeared, as almost all of them transformed into
collectives and received their land in ownership from the state, and in turn many collectives
registered in new organizational forms.  Thus, in 1997 state farms have controlled nearly 1% of
agricultural land, collectives controlled 15% and the new corporate farms controlled 46% of the
agricultural overall land.
The high fragmentation of land plots is an important structural change that occurred along
with the process of division of land into small family farms, which are further subdivided into
individual plots growing different crops. This phenomenon can have a negative impact on certain
types of arable crop production, and besides, it leads to increased costs and inefficient
mechanization, especially in the conditions of Moldova where small-scale machinery available for
purchase is very limited. Encouraging consolidation of individual land plots in bigger areas under
one crop would be welcomed and this can be done through land leasing and land market
development.
The privatization of non-land assets takes place at a slower pace as compared to that of land
assets. As of April 1, 1998, 53% of individuals entitled to property shares in large-scale farms,
which are active and former rural workers, as well as pensioners, have received a certificate of
ownership and about two thirds of these certificates have been registered by local authorities. The
value of privatized assets accounts for 64% of the total assets earmarked for privatization. Up to
now the distribution has the form of paper certificates and does not yet involve division of physical
assets. The average value of an asset share in Moldova (after the 1996 revaluation of assets) is
5,300 lei, that by no means represents the real market value of assets, most of which are old, worn
out and not of much use for production.
An important component of the asset privatization program is the transfer of responsibility
for social assets and services to local authorities, which enables the large farms to concentrate on
productive business-oriented activities. This process has not progressed quickly until now: only
19% of social assets have been transferred to local authorities as of April 1, 1998. However, when
comparing all current data to those of last year, a slow but steady progress of the asset privatization
process is clearly observed.
Farm Restructuring and Private Farm Development
There are around 1,000 large-scale farms in Moldova today, a number practically similar to
that of collective and state farms prior to reform. Based on the number of members and the average
land share in Moldova (1.5-2.0 ha), the land holdings of some new organizational forms, such as
agricultural cooperatives and joint stock companies, can be estimated at 1,500-2,000 ha. Thus it
seems that traditional forms reorganize into new ones without significant downsizing and
fragmentation with a main difference that the new structures guarantee the right of their members
to exit with land and assets.
Farmers associations and limited liability companies appear to be much smaller, with 100-
200 members on average and apparently constitute a truly new intermediate form between the
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traditional large-scale farms and small peasant farms. However, only 124 farmers associations, out
of 244, are actually created by peasant farms and they combine about 13 thousand members, or
20% of the total number of registered private farms. The rest are, probably, traditional large-scale
farm that did not go beyond “changing the sign on the door”.
The privatized assets valued at over 3.5 billion lei have been transferred to the new
organizational forms, representing over 1000 large scale structures and nearly 200,000 individual
land holders, that have created independent farming units (not necessarily registered as private
farms). The transfer of assets to large-scale organizations is almost completed: they have received
on average 90% of assets represented by the entitlement shares of their members. The individual
farmers, on the other hand, have received less than 70% of their asset entitlement from the parent
farms.
 Out of a total number of 198 thousand owners of land plots as of April 1, 1998, only 96
thousand have used them to create over 68 thousand private farms. Concomitantly, the number of
individuals with no intention to register their farms continuously rises, which confirms the
tendency of rural population to lease land while holding the ownership title. So, the rest 100
thousand people are involved in subsistence farming or have leased out their land plots to the
leaders of larger farms, commercial firms, etc.
 
 L a n d  H o l d i n g s  o f  P r i v a t e  F a r m s
Jan. 97 April 1997 April 1998
Individuals who applied to receive land shares
in physical  form
168,178 204,771 277,970
Individuals allocated land in private
ownership
117,002 131,891 198,047
including
Individuals who did not register their land
plots
42,982 61,747 102,095
Number of registered peasant  farms 41,229 51,488 68,485
  Source: Department of Statistical and Sociological Analysis
The Moldovan Government announced at a meeting for farm managers and mayors on
March 14, 1998, that the Land Project is the National Program for privatization and
reorganization of agricultural enterprises in the Republic of Moldova. The Ministry of
Privatization and State Property Administration of the Republic of Moldova has been working
with two contractors of the United States Agency for International Development, Booz-Allen &
Hamilton and Center for Private Business Reform (CPBR) on completing this task.
The program is an extension of the pilot project that began in Nisporeni with “Maiak”
farm enterprise in 1996 and continued in 1997 with 72 former state and collective farms being
privatized and reorganized.  By March 1998 over 70 thousand land titles have been issued and
an impressive number of people received their land plots in kind. On the basis of experience
acquired, about 100 specialists have been trained in Chiºinãu and in 10 territorial agencies. A
manual “Methodology of the break-up of collective farms in Moldova” was prepared, adapted
to Moldovan legislation and to local social and economic conditions, which includes
recommendations for the transformation of collective farms and state farms into market-
oriented farm units and associations.
The 1998-1999 National Program will comprise 550 agricultural enterprises interested in
privatizing and reorganizing, resulting in the issuance of land title certificates and distribution
of property to entitled individuals.  By June 1998 68 large farms had been already broken up
and dismantled, but titling has not been yet done. USAID Land Project is currently working
with additional 100 farms. The physical allocation of land is scheduled for September 1998,
and the provision of land titles is expected to occur in October 1998.
Financial Crisis in Agriculture
3.3 Land reform and farm restructuring
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Since the start of reforms the agriculture has suffered the most from price liberalization.
Being an inert branch that has strong links with the biological cycles of the nature, agriculture
has lost financial means in the period 1991-1993 of high inflation. Later on the adjustment to
new economic conditions has been impeded by the difference in prices for inputs and outputs.
Unexpectedly enough, the sector considered the base of the economy has become unprofitable
and unable to cover production costs. The attempts of the state to support the large scale
unrestructured enterprises by means of granting technical credits have not been effective.
During 6 years (1992-97) the agricultural enterprises have received about 360 million lei
of state guaranteed credits from the Ministry of Finance, including technical credits for
acquisition of petrol products, spare parts, mineral fertilizers, plant protection agents, and aimed
at providing help to the agricultural producers and processors, given their scarce financial
resources.  However, over 50% of agricultural enterprises haven’t paid back the credits in time
due, and thus, a total amount of 141 million lei has not been returned. Moreover, an important
share of credits granted (over 70 million lei) have been simply cancelled by the state, fact that
transforms them into direct subsidies.
The main reasons explaining the lamentable financial situation of large-scale collective
enterprises are the low productivity of labor, land and capital, as well as the weak reaction to
changing market conditions.
As a result of their non-profitability, the agriculture enterprises do not pay taxes, thus
accumulating huge debts and requiring state support that lies as a heavy burden on the state
budget. The total tax collection rate in Moldova averaged at 80% in 1997: the tax collection
from agri-processing industry exceeded the average (85%), while the agricultural sector
registered the lowest tax collection rate in the economy – 48%3.  Moreover, the share of agri-
industrial sector in total budget arrears accounts for 60%, 48% of which belongs to agriculture.
Meanwhile, the agricultural contributions to the budget revenue constitute only 14% of the
total, which is half of sector’s share in GDP.
However, there are significant differences within the agricultural sector in this respect.
According to the results of a study on tax and subsidies4, pea ant farms pay nearly 100% of
their taxes, whereas large farms pay on average less than 35% of their tax liabilities. Moreover,
the large agricultural enterprises make most of their tax payments in kind, partly voluntarily,
and partly in the framework of government initiated campaigns (e.g. grain procurement).
Meanwhile, peasant farmers pay the tax liabilities fully in cash.
The lamentable position of the agricultural enterprises, as well as the ineffectiveness of
the current state subsidies is clearly observed when comparing two indicators: the negative
profit reached by agricultural enterprises in 1996 – 240 million lei and the non-cash support of
430 million lei used as tax/debt reduction of economic agents to the state.
According to the consolidated balance sheet, the total obligations of the large farms at the
end of 1997 were 2.2 billion lei. These are predominantly current obligations including
accounts payable to: suppliers for inputs and services (800 million lei), salary arrears (190
million lei), budget and social fund (760 million lei, or over 34% of total obligations). Bank
credits have a relatively small share of 10% of the total, including 108 million lei long-term
credit and 116 million lei short-term credit.
A positive sign is that total current obligation of large scale farms slightly decreased in
1997 (coming down from 2.3 billion lei in 1996) due to a reduction in farms’ obligations to the
budget, social fund, as well as to commercial banks (Table 12, An1). This fact indicates that the
state has tightened the tax collection system, while the responsibility of farms toward bank
                                          
3 Data of the Fiscal State Inspectorate of Moldova
4 The study on tax and subsidies system have been accomplished by ASA Institute for Sectoral Analysis (Germany)
in collaboration with Agency for Restructuring Agriculture (ARA).
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credits reimbursement has increased.  However, the payment to employees and suppliers has
worsened last year.
The total debt of agri-processing industry in amount of 0.5 billion lei appears much
smaller as compared to the one of the primary agriculture.
As of January 1, 1998, the volume of farm sales, which is actually the source of earnings
for repayment of debt, is very low in 1997 (as well as in 1996): only 2.5 billion lei as compared
to total balance of 15 billion lei. Farms have nearly 1 billion lei in salable stocks of products
and in account receivable versus current obligations of 1.8 billion lei, fact, which indicates a
low level of working capital.
The Law on Budget for 1998, adopted on December 27, 1997, makes important
stipulations regarding debt postponing of agricultural enterprises. The immediate impact of the
above law stipulations has been negative on the state budget, as agricultural enterprises chose
the ‘wait and see’ strategy and stopped paying even current taxes to the state and local budgets.
According to the data of the State Inspectorate as of 1.06.98, the tax collection rate of
enterprises pertaining to the agri-sector to the state and local budgets was about 10% and
constituted only 3.8% of 1998 state revenues.
*     *     *
Real privatization and farm restructuring is the most recommended way to improve tax
collection and, thus, raise government revenues. By increasing the share of peasant and real
private farming, which tend to be both more productive and better tax-compliant, the
government revenues would significantly grow. Besides, the functioning of the tax system is
going to be improved as soon as the payments in kind are eliminated and the vicious circle of
arrears and debt write-offs is avoided.
The farm restructuring process has to be continued according to the patterns developed in
Moldova. The National Farm Restructuring Program envisages complete restructuring of at
least 50% of large-scale agricultural enterprises by the end of 1999. While implementing the
Program the methodology developed under the pilot projects has to be used without deviations,
thus ensuring genuine reorganization based on market-oriented operation and incentive systems
that encourage individual accountability. Settlement of outstanding debts must be concluded
under the condition of general restructuring. Strict financial discipline must be enforced in all
farming units that are currently unable to operate efficiently. The application of bankruptcy
procedure, which is currently being implemented by the Ministry of Finance and ARA, will
hopefully bring positive results in the nearest future.
At the present moment the farm restructuring process is seriously constrained and slowed
down by the absence of a consistent legal framework (contradictions between the Law on
Privatization and law on Bankruptcy), as well as lack of clear political decisions concerning
expedited settlement of debt of those farms which are ready to be restructured. Thus, the further
targets on farm restructuring are likely to be met o n l y  i f  a new legislative framework backed by
strong political will toward the expedited settlements of farm debts is adopted.
 
3.4 Privatization and private sector development
 
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the development of a viable
private sector is a priority for the national economy. Since the beginning of the 90s, three
privatization programs were adopted and implemented, the first one - for Patrimonial Bons - in
1994, the second - mixed privatization for Bonds and cash - in 1995 and 1996, and, finally,
privatization for cash exclusively in 1997.  Nevertheless, the process of private sector
3.4 Privatization and private sector development
© July 1998 ECONOMIC SURVEY Moldova in Transition 59
development in the Republic of Moldova confronted many formal and informal obstacles, no
less than 50 per cent of it being embraced by the shadow economy.
Causes for delays in privatization have been multiple:
· inconsistent policies with regard to the sale of unfinished constructions and other
underdeveloped projects (oftentimes significantly overpriced);
· lack of property rights protection due to a weakly developed legal system;
· lack of interest in a truly popular privatization on the part of those who benefited
from illegal grabs of state property;
· inconsistencies in terms of payment with the nature of expenditures, which  represent
an investment for the buyers (50 per cent at the moment of signing of the contract
and 50 per cent three months later, both – in cash);
· nonpayment of rent by the companies to the local budgets and, as a result, the refusal
of local administrations to allow their sale;
· small enterprises interest for privatization the adjacent lends for investments, and
lack of interest in purchasing it for medium and big enterprises.
The mass privatization process created a bisectoral economy, a new class of owners has
been established, conditions were created conditions for the development of  stock and capital
markets, and corporate management practices were improved.
Current situation. During  1997 and the first half of 1998, the privatization occurred in
unsatisfactory pace. From 2000 of rented premises only 283 were sold to small enterprises,
which had a negative impact on investments. From 1,900 of adjacent plots only 26 in Chiºinãu
and 17 in Bãlþi were sold. From 724 joint stock companies for sale only 276 were sold at a
nominal price of lei 18.6 million and a market price – lei 7.5 million. The privatization of
enterprises attractive for foreign investors in which the state holds the control stock of shares is
taking place slowly. A series of attempts by the Ministry of Privatization to sell the control
stock of shares by means of international and local tenders were not successful, due to the
excessively high prices established and accumulated debts. The decision making process was
delayed in a couple of cases when there existed a demand from foreign agents (“Tutun”,
“Ciment”). None of the strategic enterprises (from the energy sector, “Moldotelecom”, a couple
of wine factories, former military complex etc.) were sold.
According to the Ministry of Privatization in 1996-1997, 90 state property auctions were
organized, in which offered were a total of 636 objects. 120 of these were sold for a total price
of lei 34.5m. The trade in shares of state enterprises remained after sales for Patrimonial Bons
began on the local stock market. Offered for sale were the shares of all enterprises, which
possessed unsolicited stocks, at the nominal value of lei 471.6m. At  the fifteen bidding
sessions held, stocks worth of lei 6.9m were sold. About 10,000 apartments have been
privatized, revenues amounting to lei 5.5m. Sixteen auctions of unfinished industrial projects
were organized, in which out of 56 offered for sale only 8 were sold for a total of lei 1.2m. The
first stage of reorganization of the energy sector has been completed. The formulation of the
procedure of privatization of these individual corporations has begun, subject to the approval by
the Parliament. The Ministry of Privatization started the implementation of the program
“Pãmânt” (‘Land’) for the reorganization and privatization in the agricultural sector. In 72
agricultural enterprises in some 15 counties these activities are in the final stage.
In the first quarter of 1998, state property worth of lei 31.53m was privatized, compared
to lei 15.45m in the corresponding period of
1997. There were 39 state property auctions,
at which out of 365 objects offered 38 were
sold only. Despite this fact, it is expected
that the total value of public property sold in
1998 will reach lei 200m.
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Problems and consequences of privatization in Moldova. The first and most important
consequence of privatization for Patrimonial Bons is: the productivity of enterprises privatized
f o r  P a t r i m o n i a l  B o n s  d i d  n o t  g r o w , the share of population employed in the private sector is 64
per cent, the share of private sector in GDP is about 60 per cent. Therefore, the productivity of
the private sector is even smaller than that of the state sector. This is due to multiple reasons: a
relatively easier concealment of incomes in private sector in comparison with the state sector,
lack of an efficient corporate management system,  and inefficiency of privatization for
Patrimonial Bons.
              Pluses and minuses of various forms of privatization
Better Speed andBetter ac- More Greater
corporate feasibility cess to ca-governmentfairness
governance pital, skillsrevenue
Sale to outside owners         +        -        +        +         -
Management-employee buyout          -        +        -        -         -
Equal-access voucher privatization        ?        +        ?        -        +
Spontaneous privatization         ?        ?        -        -         -
Sourse: From plan to market: World Development Report 1996
The privatization for Patrimonial Bons should have been done as soon as possible for the
transition to the privatization for money. Delaying the privatization caused a number of
problems:
· lack of a real owner , d i s p e r s i o n  of state property amongst a very large number of
proprietors unable to ensure adequate level of investment  for the re-modernization of
privatized enterprises;
· low capacity of the state to exercise control over its property , inadequate
involvement of government officials and even disinterest and lack of political will in
privatization-related decision-making;
· in the course of privatization, a great deal of capital equipment was illegally removed
from enterprises, which blocked their timely privatization;
· lack of a corporate management system, abuse of power, and lack of responsibility on
the part of the managers;
· delays  in the adoption of the State Program for supporting the small business for
1998 – 2000 and the Law of Entrepreneurial License impedes brakes the
development of private sector;
· registration of various types of property (land, buildings, etc.) is administered by
different Government agencies - a disharmonizing practice that does not appeal to
potential investors;
· a weak system of state control authorities and inadequate legislative basis that
contribute to sliding of private business into the informal sector, which, in turn,
results in difficulties in obtaining reliable economic statistics and effecting a
meaningful analysis of the economy.
Objectives for expanding the private sectorin lude: consolidation of legal and
institutional framework for private property, extending the list of enterprises subject to
privatization and diversifying the forms of their privatization, establishment of an efficient
corporate management system, consolidation of share holdings, development of the real estate
market, finalization of housing stock privatization, acceleration of reforms in the agrarian
sector.
Actions aimed at private sector development include:
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· Selling the supplementary rented entities of small scale (500 more enterprises), the
adjacent lands (about 470 parcels);
· Improvement of the terms of payment for privatized premises – 25 per cent – to be
paid immediately upon the signing of  the contract and 75 per cent over three years;
· Taking effective measures  toward making the privatized enterprises pay rent for the
land to local administrations instead of paying taxes for land, as it is now;
· Converting the deposits in the savings banks in shares remained after privatization;
launching privatization through repayment of the state debts with assets or shares of
the enterprises subjected to privatization;
· Launch of privatization of energy and telecommunications sectors involving foreign
investment in these sectors; privatization of tobacco factories, wineries located in the
Russian Federation, as well as electronics manufacturing industry;
· Acceleration of privatization of agricultural enterprises, promotion of farmers’
associations and allotment of land plots according to the  National Program
“Pãmânt”;
· Ensuring the continuation of housing stock privatization and promotion of private
housing owners’ associations;
· Supporting greater involvement of Moldovan citizenry in the domestic stock market
through measures such as Public Offers;
· Establishment of an integrated system of registration of various types of property;
· Effecting inventories of unfinished enterprises subject to privatization for their
further sale for a symbolic price;
· Compilation of a unified information database of public property to ensure its
privatization in conformity with the state program;
· Amending the existing legislation with the view to facilitate sale/purchase of state
property;
· Allocation of at least half of the revenues from privatization of public property to
restructuring and further modernization of privatized enterprises;
· Improving administration of state-owned property, including those with 100% state
capital and those of mixed ownership managed by private partners; establishment of
a State Property Fund endowed with legal personality.
Thus, by the year 2000, property reform should bring the share of private sector in
Moldova’s GDP  up to 60% to 65%.
However, the economic situation of the private sector remains unclear. An economic
data-base is absent. It is impossible to evaluate objectively the productivity of  functioning of
this sector.
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 A common characteristic for
the post-socialist countries is sliding
of the private sector as well as the
state one into the shadow economy.
In the Transition Report -1997  of
EBRD it is mentioned, that if in
countries of Eastern Europe and
Baltic states the private sector share
prevails, in NIS the share of the
underground sector predominates,
which includes in big part a
unreported  production of the private
sector.
 
3.5 Shadow economy
The shadow economy in transition countries, especially in NIS, differs  to some extend
from shadow economies in developed counties. This is manifested in the fact that the state
sector is very active in realizing shadow economic transactions, often the state property is used
for obtaining unofficial personal gains by the state employees. A clear divide between the
official and nonofficial  sectors is absent, the labor force of the underground sector includes
high skilled  professionals. The shadow economy in NIS countries grew up so substantially not
only because of the economic decline, but also as a result of involving in the privatization
process of new objects – land, assets of enterprises, etc.
It is possible that the shadow economy phenomenon has an anti-cyclic character and
grows up, even faster in countries experiencing economic decline.  Methods of estimation  of
the shadow economy’s volume of output are bound to be not fully accurate and give a very
approximate picture of the real situation. Moreover, the results will differ depending on the
method used. Therefore, for making an international analysis of the degree of presence of this
phenomenon, it is necessary to use the same methods of estimation and to take averages for
every country.  In this study a labor force market analysis on the information on  NIS countries
was used.  The specific of the method lie in underestimation of shadow economy parameters.
Thus, utilization of monetary methods would produce far graver results. Furthermore, the
utilization of the same method for the Republic of  Moldova on the basis of  the scriptic numb r
of employees instead of  employed population leads to a 7-8 per cent increase in the results.
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Starting with 1994-1995 the share of the shadow economy began to diminish in a number
of countries. This can be explained not as much by some essential regulating measures made by
the state, as due to the launch of the stabilization process in those countries resulting in
diminished share of the shadow economy in the official one. A case in point is Georgia. During
1991 – 1994, the number of employed diminished from 2.5  to 1.75 million persons (by 30 per
cent), growing up to 2.1 million persons in 1997.
 For the Republic of Moldova
the, 1997 economic relaunch (GDP
growth by 1.3 per cent) was too
small, therefore the rate of the
shadow economy in comparison to
the official one is in continuing
growth. The discrepancy between
unemployment and vacancies grows
up and, as result, the marginal
probability to find a job in the formal
sector of the economy grows up.
The situation of the employed
in the formal sector is discouraging
too. The registered revenues of less
than 3 per cent of population (5 per
cent of urban population and 1.9 per
cent of the rural one) cover the
consumer basket. The share of the
average wage in the consumer basket
(40 per cent) remains still too small
for a long run to allow the population
to survive, staying only in the formal
sector of the economy. This “pushes”
a growing share of population to the shadow sector.
The spread of the phenomenon of shadow economy is accompanied by the growth in
crime, fall of economic and financial discipline, quality of goods and services.  Thus, during the
first quarter of 1998, the number of crimes, including the economic ones, grew up by 5.3 per
cent in comparison to the last year. According to some estimates, the daily income of the drug-
business in Bãlþi amounts to about 2 million lei. Losses of power grew up from 10 per cent of
the total consumption in 1990 to more than 30 per cent in 1997, constituting daily 300 thousand
lei, according to some evaluations.
The growth of illegal export-import transactions’ volume is worrisome. Thus, according
to Romanian data (“Curierul
Naþional) the volume of Moldovan
sugar exports to Romania exceeded
by 1.8 times (450 Th. tons) the
officially recorded volume of
production of sugar on the territory
of the Republic Moldova.  Generally,
a big part of this sugar is produced in
the Ukraine, and is fraudulently
certified as originated from
Moldova,  with the aim of gaining
advantages from the trade agreement
between Romania and Moldova. The
comparison between Russian and
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Moldovan  official statistics sources indicates that the sparkling wine exports of Moldova
exceed 1.6 times the Moldovan production; more than this, after passing the border prices grow
up 2.4 times. In the Russian statistics the imports of Vermut – wine from Hungary and Bulgaria
disappeared – since, as they pass the customs, they are being registered as Moldovan wines,
thus giving the violators the advantages of the Moldo-Russian agreement. A practical absence
of a border between the right side of Moldova and the territory of Transnistria  and the
existence of two different fiscal systems on this territory implies considerable losses to the state
budget of Moldova. Thus, the absence of a value added tax on the territory of Transnistria
implies paying the custom duties on the territory of Transnistria, coming to the right side of r.
Nistru as local goods, avoiding paying the VAT (in average 20 per cent), aggravating the
situation in the budget and creating an unhealthy competition to the local goods .
Production and marketing of fake or uncertified goods s a component of the shadow
economy. It has a double negative impact: on health of population and worsening of Moldova’s
prestige in the external market. The Department for Standards, Metrology and Supervision  of
Moldova, having as its most important direction the protection of consumers rights through state
control and supervision of normative
documents, firstly, referring to the
populations health and life security, the
environment protection and growth of
goods and services quality, made a
number of controls in 1997. The results
of the department’s work indicated, that
during  2,226 checks made 1,129
violations were d tected (51 per cent -
in 1997 and 47 per cent in 1996). The
share of deviations from required
standards amounted 61 per cent ( in
1996 – 48 per cent). A regional  goods
and cervices quality differences is
observed . On average, there are
established violations (deviations of quality standards, faking, or absence of  necessary
documentation) for meat – foods in about 52 per cent, for canned vegetables and fruits – in 77
per cent of cases, alcoholic beverages – 39 per cent, electric appliances – 67 per cent, for the
commodities for children, the deviation rate reached 74 per cent, services  -63 per cent.
A worrying sign is the quality of imported goods. The Republic of Moldova, being a
small open economy, promotes a policy of liberalization of external trade. In many cases, the
imported goods create a serious competition for the local ones often easily substituting them,
and discouraging the local production. Having competitive prices, these goods often are of bad
quality and are harmful for population’s health. Thus the density of negative results for
imported goods is bigger than the average in the country and reached 79 per cent in 1997
against 86 per cent in 1996. In the case of detection of this cases of law violation, the
aforementioned Department  prohibits the trade of these goods. The mass information of the
population regarding the quality of goods, including the imported ones could offer to consumer
the possibility of choosing between price
and quality, and, possibly, could
contribute to the reviving of local
production.
Placing emphasis on the quality of
goods is an obligatory condition for a
stable economic development and the
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Anenii Noi
Cahul
Calarasi
Cimislia
Edinet
Hincesti
Ocnita
Orhei
Balti
Chisinau
Media pe tara
Density of quality standards violations detected  - 
1997
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
%
1994 1995 1996 1997 I Q. 1998
Occurrence of Violations (as a percentage of cases 
subgected to fiscal audit)
3.5 Shadow economy
© July 1998 ECONOMIC SURVEY Moldova in Transition 65
country’s prestige.  With the aim of consolidation of the country’s relation with other countries
and collaboration with different international organizations, according to the decision of the
General ISO (International Standards Organization) Assembly, the Republic of Moldova
represented by the Department for Standards, Metrology and Supervision became a correspondent
member of ISO in 1997. Agreements of collaboration in the field of standardization with Lithuania,
the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan were signed. The preparation for the entrance of the
Republic of Moldova  into the WTO was completed.  For the Republic of Moldova, it is
important that these kinds of agreements be signed with the basic partners in export-import
transactions.
Year 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 were marked by a decline in the economic and
financial discipline. The data of the Department for Revision and Control show that the density
of violations  in the total number of  control continues to grow, the prejudice per economic
unity grew up from 3.3 thousand lei in 1997 till 6.9 thousand lei in the first quarter of 1998,
almost doubled. According to our estimation, in 1998 it is expected the total prejudice to reach
about lei 90 millions in 1998. According to the information of the Main State Fiscal Inspection,
in 1997, 17,541 ( I quarter 1998 – 4614) units from 219,180 (respectively, 234,025) were
exposed to fiscal control, in 9,233 (I
quarter 1998 – 2,601) cases violations were
detected. Additional payments were
calculated in the volume of  lei 290.3
million ( in I quarter 1998 – 44.8),
including fines lei 163.7 (22.5) million. In
the course of the analyzed period, a
practical leveling in the density of
violations among legal entities and
individuals took place.
The evaluation of the proportions of
tax evasion in the Republic of Moldova in
1997 – I quarter of 1998 was done on the basis of the information contained in “The Report
regarding the results of control activity of the respecting the legislation and other payments” of
the Main State Fiscal Inspection, depending on the share of checked taxpayers and the detected
sum of  evasions (see following tables). The calculations showed a slow down of the tax
evasion process in the first quarter 1998. In the structure of tax evasion, LTDs, stock companies
and cooperatives of all kinds predominate.
The compensation of losses detected by the inspectors of the Main State Fiscal Inspection
occurs in very slow pace. Thus, while in 1996 there was collected 19.09 per cent of the
established sum, in 1997 – only 13.7%, and in the first quarter 1998 - 15.6%.
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Fight against tax evasion as a way to ameliorate the budget deficit problem.
At present, one of the main state problems is the budget deficit. The study of traditional
macroeconomic theories regarding budget deficit allows us to make a conclusion. Budget
deficit implies shrinking of savings and investments, diminishing of capital stocks, which, in its
turn, slows down economic development. In the long run this implies a rapid growth of the
external debt, and current account balance deficit. According to these theories the state debt
presents an additional burden for next generations, but for the Republic of Moldova – even for
the current generation.
According to the Ricardian macroeconomic theory (less traditional), the state budget
deficit is just a substitution of current debts by future growing taxes. The adherents of this
theory consider the negative effects of  the budget deficit on the country’s economic
development would not be essential. With regard to the Republic of Moldova, it is clear that the
socio-economic condition will not allow the population to make these savings. Therefore the
conclusions of the Ricardian theory will not be valid in the case of Moldova.
It is clear that the amelioration of this situation becomes more difficult and it is necessary
to elaborate concrete measures. Amongst the most traditional ways of amelioration in this
situation at least five could be used:
· financing  the budget deficit out of supplementary  credits;
· seignorage, or gains from money emission;
· tax growth;
· reduction of state expenditure;
· fight against tax evasion.
Unfortunately, the first way, that one of financing  the budget deficit out of supplementary
credits  was overutilised during the last years, and as a result the external debt of the country
grew up to 64 per cent of GDP in 1997. The continuation of this practice could be too
dangerous for the economic stability of the country.
The seignorage  or gaining
revenues from the emission of
additional sums of money is also
problematic. The data of the National
Bank of Moldova show that since the
introduction the national currency, the
money aggregate MO grew up more
than 8 times achieving a sum of
972.06 million lei at the end of 1997.
The “pressing” of this process could
cause an inflation growth with all
negative consciences.
Obtaining a growth in the budget
revenues r a i s i n g  t a x e s  will be doubtful
too. First, our calculations show that
the increase of the fiscal burden by
one per cent will result in a 2-3 per
cent growth of tax evasion. Secondly, the traditional macroeconomic models show that this will
shrink the production and GDP.  That is why this measure could be unacceptable for the
condition of Moldova.
The reduction of the Government expenditure can be partially used in the short run to
ameliorate the budget deficit problem, but it is a difficult way, from both social considerations
and economic ones. The traditional macroeconomic models show that that the diminishing of
Government expenditures will cause the fall of GDP, or this measure could solve the problem
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for a short time, but could be discouraging the economic growth.
Another way of solving the problem is t h e  f i g h t  a g a i n s t   t a x  e v a s i o n .  Being prevalent in
the society, the phenomenon of tax evasion presents a considerable reserve, a potential source
of additional incomes for the budget. For a country like the Republic of Moldova a partial
fighting against tax evasion could be
the most efficient way of solving the
budget deficit problem, but the
diminishing of the tax evasion in
bigger proportions could create
possibilities to ease the tax burden and
stimulate the production.
Among the causes of tax evasion
phenomenon, a heavy and nonuniform
tax burden, weakness of control
institutions, and the existence of  an
overdriven system of fiscal facilities
could be mentioned.
Even if the formal tax burden in
the Republic of Moldova fluctuates
during the last years in limits of 3—33
per cent, this figure is formed due to the
fact that the tax burden for one part of
economic agents exceeds 50 per cent,
but the other part does not pay taxes.
Probably, one of the causes of tax
evasion’s phenomenon spread is lack of
interest of the local authorities in
fighting it. The ratio “budget
expenditures / payments into the
budget” varies substantially from one
locality to another other (from 0.43 in
Chiºinãu till 2.72 in Cantemir county).
On one hand, the possibility to cover the
local needs with finances from the state
budget does not stimulate local
administration to maximize tax
collection. On the other hand, the
realization by the local authorities of the
fact that a big share of  tax collection on
the territory will be spent in other
regions creates indifference to tax
collection and facilitates other kind of
agreements between local authorities
and taxpayers.
Another cause of  tax evasion
spread is the weak activity of fiscal
institutions. Thus, the share of
economic agents subjected to fiscal
audits diminished from 32.3 per cent in 1994 to 8 per cent in 1997, and 1.9 per cent in the first
quarter of 1998, which facilitates  evasions.
In this study a basic  model of tax evasion  was examined. The following assumptions lie
at the base of the model: the taxpayer is an amoral person and evades paying taxes when this is
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economically advantageous; the tax inspector is an absolutely honest person who objectively
records all the violations of the fiscal legislation in his reports; the inflation rate is zero. The
condition when tax evasion is considered  to be economically advantageous means that the gain
from tax evasion exceeds the expected losses in the case of  detection by the fiscal auditors. In
this case the gain from tax evasion is the tax evasion sum itself. The expected losses from tax
evasion are the sum of tax evasion which will need to be reimbursed and penalty (fine) in the
case of being caught corrected to the probability of being caught in tax evasion. The total net
benefit from tax evasion was calculated being equal to the difference between the gains and
expected losses.
The calculation made by the Main State Fiscal Inspection showed that for the majority of
the taxpayers’ categories the benefit from tax evasion is positive, which means that there exist
favorable conditions for tax evasion and the phenomenon will grow. In 1997, only state
enterprises, budget institutions and kolkhozes were exceptions. The net benefit for legal entities
amounted  lei 103.5 million in 1997 and lei 21.2 million in the first quarter 1998. The net
benefit of individuals - lei 3.4 million in 1997, lei 0.6 million in the first quarter 1998, and the
total for  the Republic of Moldova  estimated at lei 107 million in 1997 and lei 22 million in the
first quarter 1998.
For the numerical evaluation of
the degree of tax evasion advantage a
notion of “tax evasion efficiency”
was defined as a ratio of the net
benefit to expected losses. The
calculation showed that this indicator
grew up extremely fast during the
last years and reached in 1998 a level
of 1000 per cent for legal entities.
To fight this phenomenon, it is
necessary to create the conditions
that would reduce the economic
efficacy of tax evasion to zero and
would make the taxpayers indifferent
to tax evasions. These conditions
could be created by manipulating
with the penalty rate and the
probability of being caught in tax
evasions (density of controls).  The
calculations allowed to obtain the
curve of indifference to tax evasions .
It presents the multitude of
combinations between the penalty
rate and the density of fiscal controls,
which discourages the tax evasion,
for which the efficacy of tax evasion is equal to zero.
We can see that the sensibility of these indicators is very strong. The surface under the
indifference curve presents the multitude of combinations of penalty rates and densities of
controls for which the tax evasion is efficient (the efficacy is positive). For the reduction of the
phenomenon of tax evasion, the choice of the kind of control regime is important. The
calculation showed that the efficacy of tax evasion does not depend on the their volume. In
space the dependence between penalty rate, density of controls and the efficacy of tax evasions
forms a hyperboloid. The multitude of combinations under the zero level describes control
regimes of fiscal inspections which discourages the tax evasion.
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The analysis of the real information regarding the penalty rates and densities of  fiscal
audits corresponded to the sector where the evasions are efficient.  Thus, for the density of
audits created in 1997 amounting 8 per cent the penalty rate needed to be not 100 – 130 per
cent, as it really was, but 1,150 per cent (!). And conversely, if the penalty varied in limits of
100-130%, then the density of fiscal controls had to be 43-50 per cent of all taxpayers.  Besides,
given the fact that collection of
penalties is going very hard, it is
necessary to make other
measures to fight tax evasion.
 First suggestion in this
direction is the need to develop
an ample study of the
phenomenon. This study should
include economic, sociological,
juridical and psychological
aspects. The problem is that the
social - economic conditions
created in the ex -socialist zone
facilitate the avoiding of paying
taxes. There exist economic
models in the world practice
which prove the fact that as long
as the person realize that the tax evasion is widespread and he lives in an dishonest ambiance,
he concludes that his tax evasion will not change a lot the general situation, and essentially –
his own benefits. As a result, he will decide to hide a part of his incomes.
 There are studies that prove the fact that the bigger is the income, the more he will be
subject to tax evasion. The population having big incomes, who should, in principle, contribute
the most of  the budget revenue, will evade paying taxes in bigger proportions. In c o u n t r i e s  w i t h
a dishonest ambiance, the progressive tax system does not work efficiently. Formation of a
state with a big share of medium size income population is the base of tax collection stability.
 Another aspect of tax evasion. Studies of the psychological aspect of the tax evasion show
that independent of the real dimension of  incomes, persons who complain about small
incomes, about unfairness in evaluation of their work and aptitudes are more disposed to evade
paying taxes, taking advantages from the state services to all population. That is why
insufficient informing of the population regarding real incomes in society  predispose to
supplementary evasions. The information of the population regarding the buying capacity of the
average wage, including various kinds of  services and education in various countries could be
beneficial.
As a solution for the creation of a more favorable ambiance and amelioration of financial
discipline, sociologists and psychologists propose the creation of various educational programs
of tax honesty . According to the authors of these programs, education and moral appeal could
have, probably, a better effect than high penalties.
Rise of the state authority in the public opinion can serve as a cheaper way of fighting tax
evasion. Such educational programs could work more efficiently  if being promoted by non 
Government organization, and financed by the state. They need to maximize the utilization of
mass media and include the explanation of the following aspects:
· the tax system, in principle, is not bad and differs little from similar systems in the
developed countries;
· the majority of taxpayers nevertheless pay their taxes;
· a convincing description of main directions of expenditures and explanation of their
importance;
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· description of possible consequences of tax evasion, including the personal risk and
institutional consequences of an excessive punishment from the state;
· promoting a negative attitude to tax evasion, explanation of the fact that any tax
evasion results simply in the tax burden’s growth, and harms the rest of population.
Regretfully, especially in the countries having lower fiscal discipline, this educational
work is not practiced at all.
Another aspect of tax evasion is that the maturity of tax evasion reimbursement  is too
long.  Basically, the tax debts form a dead burden, which pushes more and more to the  shadow
economy not only the small businessmen, but also big enterprises, which resort to different
manipulations with foreign accounts “run away” from this burden. Some studies of this
phenomenon show that for easing this burden of taxes, which will never be paid anyway, a tax
amnesty could be declared. Negative and positive aspects of tax amnesty could be
distinguished.
The positive effects of the declaration of a tax amnesty  include the following:
· amnesty could offer a possibility to collect a part of tax debts, which in other case
could not be collected;
· the amnesty encourages honest declaration of incomes;
· amnesty makes the society more able to control its future, because the possibility of
getting out from the shadow economy and entering the official one appears;
· amnesty makes possible to declare that a mistake was made, but now conditions for
changing the behavior are created;
· amnesty can serve as  transition to a new, softer tax regime, because when the
Government fails systematically in promoting its tax policy, this could signify about a too
heavy  tax burden;
The negative effects are summarized in the fact that if this kind of amnesty is repeating,
the population gets used to the fact that in any case they will be forgiven for breaking the low,
this could undermine the authority of the Government and diminish the financial even more.
With regard to the Republic of Moldova, the utilization of different forms of tax
amnesties becomes a too often used practice. In general, the population expects regular debt
forgiveness, that is why it is necessary to examine carefully the possibility to continue this
practice, or to declare clear that this amnesty is the last one and later the control work will be
done with greater severity.
Fighting tax evasion needs to be done by all ways: economic, legal, administrative and
educational.
The economic measures could include:
· increased fines and frequent inspections by fiscal institutions to such an extent  that to
make tax evasion unprofitable;
· wider and more active use of bankruptcy legislation;
· freezing enterprises’ debts, deblocking of bank accounts and finding ways of cutting
debts by taking into account the non-objective ways of their formation;
· diminishing the tax burden (the last one to be done only after accomplishing the
others);
Legal measures  would include:
· development of a legal system to promote economic measures;
· simplification of  enterprise “shut-down” procedures for those that cannot prove their
being in operation over an established period of time;
· implementation of the management  law and means of its enforcing, providing
management administrative and penal responsibility for not paying taxes and other payments due
to the state;
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Administrative measures  would include:
· creation of a  body endowed with functions and powers sufficient enough to fight tax
evasion, including the right for investigation and application of administrative sanctions, to
promote a single policy with regard to the investigation, discovering and penalizing people
breaching the financial discipline;
· strict delimitation of functions of control institutions;
· building the prestige, quality and  incentives of fiscal control institutions;
· ensuring transparency and free access of large parts of the population to the decisions
made by state authorities, which might be an efficient measure of fighting corruption.
Educational measures:
· development of an awareness raising  program explaining the implications of tax evasion
on people’s welfare,  educating a negative attitude towards this phenomenon. This program is
likely to be more efficient if conducted by non-governmental organizations and financed by the
state;
· psychological education of economic agents with regard to the increase of severity on the
part of fiscal control institutions via all available information channels (mass-media), explaining
the positive effects of  such measures, including  eventual lightening of the tax burden.
Implementation of these measures could serve as first steps in fighting the parasitical
phenomenon of tax evasion and could permit solving the problem  of budget deficit, external
debts, transition of the economy to a more civilized, stable,  attractive for the international
organizations and investors stage.
 
CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Analysis of the current situation
Recent evolution of the social sphere (in 1997 and the 1st quarter of 1998) confirm the trend
of a dramatic worsening of this sector. Anti-crisis measures of the Government and the correction
of 1998 budget (July 1998) will certainly have a dramatic impact on population’s living standards.
The galloping growth of pensions and salaries’ arrears, accompanied by the erosion of real
incomes of the population and enhancement of latent unemployment, amplifies the poverty and
lack of people’ confidence in the days to come, entailing a considerable increase of the social
costs’ burden. Although maintenance of macroeconomic stability (the major objective of the
Government for the period under review) had a positive impact on the monetary policies, the
precarious state of the public funds had a negative effect on the programs of the social protection
of the population. Facing severe fiscal constraints, the Government did not succeed to provide for
a proper financial coverage of the social costs. As a result, the discrepancy between the financial
possibilities of the state and its social commitments has considerably broadened. By mid 1998 the
social funds were in a sharp crisis, which endangers the fate of the social sphere in the future.
Besides, the universal nature of the social protection schemes and wide spread of social benefits
have considerably devalued their real value. Due to this, the social program efficiency is
miserable, and the vulnerability risk extremely threatening.
Being treated as a secondary derivation of the economy, the reform of the social sector has
been unwillingly delayed . The structure of social benefits and eligibility conditions, in most
cases, remain to be those inherited from the old economic system. In addition to that, the legal
framework is antiquated, frustrating the activity of the social employees. The performed
modifications during the recent 7 years are perfunctory and often are at variance with the market
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economy requirements. This is why, the social programs' solvency is low, badly impacting the
public expenses. And that entails considerable worsening of principal social parameters, such as:
living standards, health state, demographic composition and employment.
Life quality, as exponent of the social sphere performance, has considerably diminished
during the period under review. The joint effects of the living standards decline are manifested in
extension of poverty. In macroeconomic terms this is reflected in the small value of GDP per
capita. According to an estimate of the World Bank, the average income of inhabitant of the
Republic of Moldova amount to $115 (adjusted to the Purchase Power Parity). This is one of
smallest indicators registered in those 28 states in transition. Only Kirgizia ranks the last in the
rating, by $75 per capita. In microeconomic terms, the poverty is expressed through dramatic
worsening of personal (family) budget’s viability to cover the vital necessities. Although there is
no formal quantification of the poverty line in the republic, nevertheless as preliminary scale,
there may be the estimates attained from the household budget survey. According to that, almost
1/5 of the population has average monthly incomes below 64 lei, (which is regarded as poverty
line). During 1997 the poverty line rose by about 13%, encompassing new social groups. From
the viewpoint of the macroeconomic policies, these illustrate the need to budget means reallocate
budget means to fighting
poverty, which are estimated
at about 7% of GDP.
Poverty profile has
peculiarities specific to
Moldova and derives from
the insolvency of the public
funds. The empiric evidences
show that the individuals
from the rural localities,
families with many children,
unqualified workers and
solitary elder are the groups mostly endangered by poverty. All these social groups outrun to a
great extent the republican average of poverty (19.6%). Particularly, it has been proved that
availability of children is mostly correlated with the probability to be affected by poverty. Thus,
each 3rd family with children is in poverty, whereas the families without children have a poverty
rate of 13.5%. The estimates show also, that the poverty is even deeper and more severe in rural
localities, with unqualified workers and young under the age of 20. As a result we can conclude,
that poverty will extend even more amongst vulnerable groups mentioned above, forming so
called “poverty pockets”. This trend will exercise severe impacts upon social assistance policies,
requiring on behalf of the government urgent measures, with a view to localize and alleviate this
phenomenon.
A derivation of the poverty is also the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t e r m s  o f  i n c o m e s .  The
g i n i  coefficient, which estimates the degree of population income distribution, is 0.44. This index
suggests that the incomes and expenditures of the population are distributed very uneven. The span
of welfare differentiation is extremely large and constitutes 1 to 11.5. A mere extrapolation of the
situation reveals the trend of concentration of wealth by a relatively small number of population. As
confirmation there can be the results of the household budget survey, which demonstrates, that half
of the overall income of the population is maintained by 1/5 of the population. Mostly poor stratum
(20% of the population) gains only 4.3 of incomes. A thorough analysis of the social stratification
shows, that the level of incomes varies pretty much, depending on the place of residence. By mid
1998 the discrepancy between the townspeople’s incomes and those of villagers accounted for 62%,
increasing almost twice in comparison with previous year. To mention is, that the gap between the
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incomes is wider with the persons ranking in the lower part of the welfare rating, and is more uneven
with the groups who have higher incomes.
Modification of incomes occurred under the influence of the consistent diminution of “cash”
component and deepening the social stratification of the population. This fact reflects the crisis of public
funds as a whole and of the remuneration system, in particular. Subsequently, the differentiation of labor
remuneration deepened, in terms of branches and payments in kind. This is why the incomes of the
population constitute at present only 60% of those registered at the moment of introduction of national
currency – in 1993.
The composition of population
incomes reveals the diminishing trend
of salary share within the overall
income of the population: from 74.5%
on the moment of national currency
introduction, in 1993, to 33.1% by the
mid May 1998. These changes partially
reflect the problem related to salary
arrears and accuracy of provided data.
However it is true, that a good deal of
salaries are paid in kind and typically are not recorded in books. Besides, the performed estimates
cannot “catch” the structure of incomes gained in the informal sector and shadow economy. In
this regard one can conclude, that the share of salary is somehow underestimated, yet, this does
not change the picture of incomes as a whole. The configuration of incomes shows, that the
private sources of income get a more importance in building up personal welfare. Thus, the
incomes from real estate and financial transactions, including those in foreign exchange and
intermediary activities, account for more than 1/3 of the gross income. This is a positive sign in
the evolution of personal incomes; yet, at the same time it points the attention to the requirement
of their formal bookkeeping. Although social transfers (indemnities, pensions and compensations)
constitute an insignificant share in the families’ budget (14.8%), nevertheless, they are important
for the urban population. For
this category of population, the
benefits from social benefits
rank 3rd in the overall structure
of the personal welfare.
Relatively small are the
incomes deriving from private
and entrepreneurship activities,
that account for only 5.5%. This
fact proves the underestimation
(hiding) of real incomes, as well
as the existent barriers
hindering this type of activity.
The disturbances taking place in the structure of personal incomes are conditioned basically
by the incidence of the following two factors: non-payment of salaries in due course and big share
of payments in kind. The problem of salary arrears reflects the overall financial instability in the
economy and is directly correlated with the extremely poor solvency of the economic agents.
Delayed salaries by 3-4 months and their partial payment created a difficult problem of “chronic”
debts, which have poor chances to be settled in the near future. This is why, during 1997 and 1998
the salary arrears have considerably increased, exceeding the current payments. As of May 1st,
1998, the overall amount of arrears constituted 413.251 million lei. Only within one month (April
’98) the salary arrears increased by 22 million The critical situation in this regard, particularly
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worsened in agriculture, industry, education and medicare, where the salaries were paid some 4-5
months ago. The perspective of paying-off salaries is ambiguous and depends in a great extent on
the performance of the economic agents and financial management as a whole. Yet, this fact
constitutes a guideline for a long run outlook. For short run there might be applied some
untraditional measures. We mean first of all the possibility of the enterprises in collection of
additional funds by privatizing, selling or leasing out some fixed assets. Besides, the state might
issue 1-2 years treasury bonds in order to purchase the salary arrears to the employees of the
budget sphere and public sector.
A derivation of big salary arrears - the share of incomes in kind -  continues to grow. Thus
the result of the household budget survey shows, that about 1/3 of the gross income is paid in
kind. In rural localities this indicator accounts for 45.5%. The big share of incomes in kind is
characterized to the states with low velocity of cash. Payment of a share of salaries, pensions and
other transfers in kind can provoke severe distortions in cash circulation of a state and amplify tax
evasion. This is why, urgent measures are required that would cease practicing payments in kind.
For this purpose there might be used efficiently the fiscal leverage – lending for working capital.
Another quite controversial aspect of the living quality is the parity of average salary within
consumer price index. Although during the 1st quarter of 1998 there was noticed a slight increase
of the average salary’s share within the consumer price index, caused by the deflation (+3.4%),
the discrepancy is still very large. In comparison with Dec. 1997, the ratio of average salary to
consumer price index declined by 25%, currently constituting about 50%. Of course is disputable
the validity of data and methodology of consumer price calculation, yet, even if these preliminary
estimates denote the imperfections persisting in payment of labor. In this regard it is necessary to
adjust the techniques and methodology aimed at real appreciation of those figures. 
Practical implications of the ratio of the consumer price index to the average salary might be
used in elaboration of social programs designed for poverty alleviation and granting social
protection for vulnerable strata. Making this procedure operational requires the adoption of a
respective legal framework, which would stipulate the minimal quantum of social benefits and
their eligibility conditions.
The c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n
represents probably most painful point in
the amelioration of the living standards of
the population. The analysis of the
statistical data and household budget
survey discloses the poor content of
consumption, characteristic to transition
period. The big share of the food items in
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the overall consumption volume demonstrates the low level of population and high social costs
that they incur. To mention is that recently there’s been noticed a trend of exceeding growth of
expenditures on foodstuffs. If in 1994 the population of the republic used to expend on average
some 45.5% from the personal budget for purchasing food items, in 1997 this figure went up to
68.8%. The shares of food items vary considerably depending on the locality and material state of
the person. Thus, the persons living in rural localities expend on foodstuffs 74% of their budgets,
whereas those from urban localities – 63%. In addition to that, the expenditures for food grow
exceptionally once with the rising of poverty level: the more material state is worse – the bigger
are the food costs. For ex. the population of the first quintile (the poorest) pay 87.1% of the
budget on foodstuffs, whereas the population of the 5th quin il  (the richest) pay for that only
63.4% of the budget.
It is significant the breakdown of the food costs in terms of the form they are incurred.
About 27% of them are expenses in kind that characterizes the deplorable situation of the labor
payment; as well the pretty imposing role of the land plots in the overall consumption of the
population. The share of expenses for food items made in kind is even more noticed in the rural
localities. Only 20.4% are paid in cash, the other 79.7% representing expenses in kind.
Low incomes and delayed payment of salaries makes the population limit only to
consumption of strictly necessary goods and services, such as communal services, public
transport, heating, electric power. They rank 2nd in the structure of the consumption of the
population and account for some 17%. The share of expenses for medicare, education and cultural
activities has a constantly decreasing trend, which demonstrates the high price and difficult access
of population to those services.
The labor market  has a crucial impact on the living standards of the population. By offering
varied possibilities of getting jobs and a high degree of job stability, this way the labor market
constitutes to consolidation of population welfare. And conversely, the evolution of the recent
situation demonstrates, that the labor market continues to face severe distortions, which
destabilizes the reformatory processes as a whole. This fact is reflected first of all in the low
capacity of the economy to absorb the available manpower. The investment activity of the
economic units to create new jobs is still relatively poor. This is why we witness a considerable
shrinkage of manpower demand. Only in the first quarter of 1998 the number of employees of the
economic units decreased by 6%, constituting as of today 1.065 million individuals.
Staff was dismissed practically in all
the spheres of the national economy.
Dismissals occurred mostly in the agrarian
and industrial sectors, registering an
approximate fall of about 10%. In the
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agrarian sector it occurred due to the problems regarding the brake up of large farms into smaller
ones and a multitude of private undertakings that are not registered yet. In the industrial sector
dismissal of man power occurred basically due to decline of industrial output and financial
blockage of the industrial businesses and their restructuring, which obviously, require less man
power. It is surprising, that the medicare, education and social assistance spheres registered a
growth of manpower, although the salaries are mostly modest within the national economy,
whereas capital investments have been for a long time in a profound decline. This unusual
phenomenon, at first sight, may be explained by a relative stability of jobs in these branches, as
compared with other sectors of the national economy (industry, transport, agriculture, etc.), as
well as by the possibility to gain additionally from the individual (informal) activities.
The other aspect of
manpower dismissal is
unemployment . Although the
officially reported employment rate
continues to be extremely low –
2.3% (39.1 thousand individuals in
the 1st quarter of 1998), in reality
the situation is totally different. The
data of the household budget
survey denotes that only 41.5% of
the questioned stated that are
officially registered as employees with any of enterprises. This is a very alarming signal, which
can have hard consequences on the labor market. There is a growing trend of the unpaid leaves.
The statistical data proves, that the share of people on such leaves accounts for only about 8% of
the overall manpower. The shares of unpaid leaves vary from one sector to another. The largest
share is in industry – 54%, and in agriculture – 13%. The medicare, education and social
assistance suffered less of this problem – only 4% of employees have been forced on unpaid
leaves. A more veritable picture on the labor market we get by making a comparable analysis of
the employees, according to the staff and employees included in the pay-rolls. The difference
between them shows us the really available manpower at the enterprises. Thus, the figures reveal,
that the number of employees non-included in the lists (i.e., who really do not work), but who are
formally registered in the pay rolls of the enterprises, as of March 1998, account for about 26.3%.
This figure is 1.5-fold more than in 1995 and has a constant growing trend. This phenomenon is
more noticeable in agriculture and industry.
Being disappointed in finding a job within the national economy, more and more persons
leave for work abroad. Thus, l a b o r  m i g r a t i o n  rises. To mention is that this phenomenon is semi-
organized, often without assuring even the minimal social protection. From this point of view, the
risk probability is very high. According to a study performed by the National Bank of Moldova it
has been revealed, that the number of persons working temporarily abroad is about 20 thousand
individuals. Most of them are worker professions, such as constructors, waiters and housekeepers.
Higher education specialists are not desired abroad. The estimates of some independent experts
report this figure amounts to 45-50 thousand individuals. We believe the second figure is closer to
reality, because in both reports the average annual income attained by the migrants stands at 80
million lei. The geography of manpower migration comprises many states (Israel, Germany,
Greece, and USA), yet; the bulk of the flow is oriented to Russia and other parts of the CIS
(67%). Although labor migration offers additional opportunities to work and earn money, its
adverse effects can have long run negative impact on the local labor market. Given that
particularly the young (20-29 years), experience labor migration the losses (even temporary) of
this segment can amplify the problems related to adjustment of qualified man power. Besides, the
issue of undeclared (or under-estimated) incomes intensifies.
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The cumulative effect of the social costs is reflected in the dramatic diminution of the
demographic parameters of the population. Although recently a slight stabilization has been
noticed in live expectancy, the demographic processes that occurred at the initial phase of
transition, made the life expectancy in Moldova be one of the shortest in the CIS (70 years for
women and 63 for men). The analysis of the demographic parameters show, that the trends that
are manifested in this field impact negatively upon the composition of the population and
structure of genetic fund in general. First of all the fall of the natural growth of the population (0.8
promiles in 1997), directly leads to absolute reduction of the population of the republic. During
1997 the intensification of this phenomenon accounted for 2%. This fall has been speeded up
particularly under the impact of two factors: decline of birth rate and rise of mortality. In
comparison with 1990 the birth rate fell by 1.5 times, whereas the overall mortality rate grew 1.2-
fold. To mention is, that in 23 raions of the republic the mortality rate outpaces that of birth rate,
and that is why the natural growth of the population is negative. Thus, the depopulation
phenomenon extends, especially in rural localities. Simultaneously, there’s observed an erosion of
the family status. During 1997 the number of marriages diminished by 20%. The rate of infantile
death keeps high (20 promiles), as well as that of the overall death rate. The latter increased
during the last year by 12%, being mostly registered with the men of working age (18%), due to
sicknesses of respiratory, digestive organs and cardiac-vascular system. Consequently the
modifications that take place in the demographic composition of the population have an evident
trend of aging. The decline of population segment under 15 and simultaneous growth of the one
above 60 displays the aging trend of the population of the republic. Thus the rate of demographic
dependence constitutes at present 61.4% in comparison with 51.2% in 1990. The modification
that takes place in the demographic structure will impact negatively the social policies. In
financial terms, this indicates a redistribution of the financial means within the social sphere in
compliance with some priorities. In terms of social programs, this fact signals about the erosion of
the public health and pressures, which will grow on behalf of the inactive population (elder,
invalid, and numerous families). In this regard, implementation of sectoral social programs seems
to be the opportune solution in the created situation.
Financial position of the social sphere
The evolution of recent events marks a considerable worsening of the social funds’ trend.
The flow of incomes does not comply with the effected expenses. The failures in collection of
social payments and galloping growth of arrears amplify the public domestic debt. The
discrepancy between the incomes and expenditures provoke hard distortions in the structure of the
public expenses. Having no sufficient funds, a good deal of services transform simply in hardly
realizable quasi-commitments. By mid 1998 the social liabilities’ deficit (difference between the
promises and current incomes) reached the figure of 43% of the GDP. Thus diminution of the
social funds might seriously jeopardize the reforms progress.
Moreover, the universal nature of the social services and loose eligibility conditions impose
the economic agents and budget to incur high financial costs. As attested by statistical data, the
social expenses account for a considerable part of the GDP- circa 36%. In quantitative terms, this
figure is comparable even with that of some western countries. However, in quantitative terms,
their usage is net inferior even for transition countries. The efficiency of the public expenses is
extremely low and contradicts the market economy requirements.
The structure of the social costs shows, that the biggest share account for pensions, (15%),
then education (9.7%) and medicare (almost 6%). The other branches of the social sphere
(culture, social assistance and sports) commonly account for slightly less than 6% of the GDP.
The content of the social costs shows, that they are adjustable and are oriented mostly to ad-hoc
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funding of social programs. The funds are typically allocated to those objects and programs that
are in emergency state. Thus, there’s an attempt to withhold further aggravation of the adverse
phenomena and to localize them within that area. Yet, the effect of this model is for a short time
and cannot resolve the problem essentially.
In line with the ad-hoc  model, funding of the current social expenses is practiced, which in
fact do not differ considerably. The explanation is, that in this case the cash is earmarked for
funding the stringent current needs aimed at a superficial “repair” (improvement) of the situation.
In both cases the volume of allocated funds is net inferior to the real needs. For ex. the education
and medicare have been financed in volume of 45% of the required, education and science even
less – only 1/3. Besides this functional structure of the social expenses shows, that at least 1/3 of
them are expenses on the assets side (machinery, training stuff, professional training), the
remainder being liabilities related expenses (salaries, taxes, capital repairs of buildings). Talking
about the social expenses in macroeconomic terms, it should be mentioned that they are still
public expenses (funded basically from the state budget and managed entirely by the state). The
non-budget and non-state sources are still very insignificant. According to preliminary estimates,
their share does not exceed 5% of the total volume of the social costs. Slightly more are the
private resources aimed at funding the first medical aid and higher education. Of course, all these
data are regarded partially as underestimates (given that many informal private activities in the
social sphere are not book-kept), yet, in principle the situation is like this.
Maintaining the social funds only of public nature engenders serious discrepancies in the
implementation of the social programs, essentially reducing their efficiency. This phenomenon’s
behavior can be easily illustrated by the example of the social fund. The monthly based data
regarding the incomes and expenses show that the financial situation of the social fund is critical.
The poor solvency of the public
pensioning system is significantly
caused by the galloping growth of
the pension arrears. Although
during 1997 a reduction was
reached of historical pension
arrears by 90% (basically through
payments in kind and netting), the
problem continues to be a
destabilizing factor of the public
finance. The aggregate arrears
reached the figure of 232.1 million lei, considerably increasing during the 1st qua ter of 1998.
Braking down the structure of arrears shows, that the payment of the old arrears is made in small
amounts. For example for May 1998 the old arrears were paid in amount of 25.6 million lei,
whereas the new arrears grew by 40 million lei. This is why, the overall amount of the pension
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debts grows considerably as a result of outpacing accrual of the new arrears as compared with the
settlement of historical debts.
Insufficiency of cash imposed the social assistance bodies to practice the method of
payment in kind. The span of this type of settlement varied from 49.5% (1st quarter of 1997) to
22.8% (4th quarter of 1997). In 1997, on average, each 3rd p nsion was paid in kind. Though in
smaller size (22.8%), settlement of pensions in kind still continues. Partially this is linked to the
considerable reduction of the volume of goods and products conveyed to the social fund by the
economic agents as social contributions. Yet, the main reason consists in the refusal of the elder
to accept the pension in kind (even partially) instead of that in cash. The prices of pension
settlement in kind are too unfair.
The analysis of the funding sources of the social fund budget shows, that the perspective of
the amelioration of the situation is very ambiguous. The statistical data confirm that the decline of
social contributions’ collection is deepening. If during 1997 the disbursements of the social
contributions accounted for 51.8%, then in the 1st quart r of the current year their collection
decreased to 35%. Non-payment in due course of the social contributions by the economic agents
derives from the financial blockage they face. According to preliminary data, the accounts payable
of the enterprises during the 1st quarter of 1998 grew by 43%. The fact is significant, that circa 2/3
of them constitute the debts to the social fund and labor remuneration. In these conditions it
would be erroneous to believe, that the disbursements to social fund will be made entirely. As
confirmation to those mentioned above, could be the statistical data, which prove, that only during
June 1998 the debts of the economic agents to the social fund grew by about 65 million lei,
amounting to an overall amount of 482.2 million lei.
The enormous discrepancy between the inflows (incomes) and outflows (expenses) confirm
the assumption that the social sphere funds are on the edge of the crisis. The enormous fiscal
burden borne by the economic agents and the antiquated manner of social disbursements can
cause serious impediments to the financial system as a whole. Bearing in mind, that the critical
situation of the budget system and the big commitments of the government to serve the public
(and external) debt, we can conclude, that the amelioration of the social funds (at least during the
recent 10 months) is mostly improbable. In this regard, the social fund budget for 1998 seems to
be unreal. The reasons for a pessimistic scenario may be the aggravation of the decline of sources
to compete the social fund and unjustified increase of various social privileges (facilities). The
preliminary estimates show, that even if we keep the collection of contributions in cash equal to
that the level of April 1998 (35 million lei – one of the highest indicators during the recent 2
years), the total amount of the disbursements for the remained period until the current year might
hardly reach the figure of 400 million lei. At the same time, the payments to the social fund in
kind decreased considerably: from 43% on average in 1997 to 18% in May 1998). From this
viewpoint, we can forecast that incomes deriving from disbursements in kind will not exceed the
amount of 80 million lei. Thus, the overall incomes into the social fund for 1998 will amount to
only 500 million lei, which accounts for much less than the officially reported amount in the
budget (1369.7 million lei). On the background of the small and pessimistic incomes, the expense
part seems to be a banal joke. Forecasting a series of increases (of minimal pensions, special
deserved pensions, for military, etc.), are just quasi-commitments without any financial
background. Taking into account the enormous debts the government has to pensioners (232
million lei), we may conclude, that the burden of the social fund exceeds its real possibilities. All
these together indicate that the social fund deficit can reach the amount of 630 million lei (7.8%
of GDP).
Thus the estimates pointed above confirm the imminence of social funds adjustment to new
realities. In this regard, urgent measures are required aimed at reforming both the inflows
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(incomes) and outflows (expenses) of the social fund. It is particularly necessary, that the social
fund budget reflects more realistically the collection of incomes and reduces unjustified expenses.
Besides, the financial management of the social fund should be strengthened, by specifying
clearly the distinction between the pensions and allowances. It is important to determine the
functions and obligations of the state budget and of the social fund in covering the social costs.
We consider, that the budget should limit only to granting benefits pertaining to social assistance
(family allowances, for children, to the poor, etc.), whereas the social fund – to payment of
pensions and unemployment programs.
Problems related to development of social sphere basic branches
Education occupies a specific place in human potential development. Providing various
educational services and by developing the human intellectual faculties, educational institutions
contribute this way to affirmation of civic positive position and formation of highly qualified
manpower. From this viewpoint, the education is considered as precondition for deepening the
economic reforms.
As many other branches of the social sphere, the education faces big difficulties that
adversely effects the efficiency and quality of rendered services. These are financial, structural
and managerial problems. For ex, although the GDP share earmarked for education exceeds 9%
(indicator comparable with those of many western states), in reality expenses for education are
extremely small. Calculations per pupil constitute only 684 lei, which is similar only to the
developing countries. In 1997 from the state budget there were allocated 184 million lei, which
constitutes less than half of the funds required by the training institutions. This is why, 10% of the
total number of schools are in emergency state, and each 3rd – eeds capital repair. A major
problem continues to be the insufficiency of rooms for studies and the excessive number of pupils
in a class. Thus, during the last year about 10% of the schoolchildren were going to school in the
2nd shift, in the urban localities this indicator is even higher – 17%. The normal capacity of classes
is overburdened, often consisting of 35-40 children. In these conditions the quality of teaching is
essentially suffering.
The private sector is still very timid and incoherent.  Of those 3243 training institutions of
the republic, only 25 are private. The share of students attending colleges and higher education
institutions constitutes 15% of the overall. This figure is even smaller among the secondary
general schools –only 0.26%. In these circumstances, obviously, the non-budget funds’
contribution to financing the educational costs is symbolic – about 7% of the total amount
necessary for this purpose.
In addition to the financial difficulties, the education has to overcome many problems
related to the content and structure of education. They include the methods and antiquated
techniques of teaching with most of the training institutions, curricula that do not fit to the actual
requirements, incoherence in pupils’ results assessment, insufficiency of manuals and modern
teaching materials, poor motivation of teachers to perform efficient activities and others. As a
result, so far no training institution of Moldova has been adjusted to the European standards. In
addition to that, to mention is the situation of anarchy and lack of coordination that prevails in
relation to entrance exams at the higher institutions. For ex. last year circa 40% of the school-
leavers were registered at the economic specialties (banks, finance and bourses). This
disproportion will create hard distortions on the market in the near future.
All together, the problems mentioned above can provoke serious disturbances in the activity
of the educational system in Moldova. This is why, measures are required to avoid further
diminution of the situation, that would facilitate the deepening of the reforms in this strategic
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sector of the social sphere. In this context we consider opportune to focus the activities on the
following two p r i o r i t i e s : rationalization of budget expenditures and diversification of the non-
state funding sources; adjustment of the programs and training techniques to the current
requirement; consolidation of stimulants in teachers’ activity. In operational aspect (in terms of
programs) the realization of the above objectives can be reached in the following packets of
activities :
· Revision of all curricula and their adjustment to date requirements;
· Priority funding and stimulation of commercial (private) activity of publishing manuals
and training materials;
· Rationalization of budgeting and diversification of non-budget (non-state) sources of
funding for public education;
· Acceleration of evaluation activity and accrediting of higher training institutions
through European standards;
· Modification of current experience of teachers’ remuneration and stimulation, making it
flexible and in compliance to work performance;
· Elaboration of macro-national scenarios regarding the estimation of demand in
preparing high quality specialists.
The precarious state of the medical assistance amplifies the negative demographic process
and ruins the public health. The situation of the national medicare system is characterized by poor
performance, insufficient funding and poor management. During 1997-1998 the dynamics of
medicare indicators diminished considerably, dramatically nearing to a critical limit. The increase
of infectious and socially contagious illnesses (tuberculosis, HIV, cancer, etc.) constitutes an
alarming signal for the human genetic fund of the republic, which can affect seriously the
demographic situation as a whole. The state of the adolescents’ health state continues to worsen:
circa 1/3 of recruited to the national army have severely affected health. At the same time the
number increased of psychological deviations increased with the children, broadening the extent
of the population invalidization. On the background of the general morbidity increases the
pathology incidence of confined women and at delivery. Thus, as of the end of 1997 the maternal
morbidity rate reached the figure of 48.3 promiles. Assessing the trend of the public health during
the recent 2 years, to mention is that it was characterized to a large extent by the unstable sanitary-
epidemiological situation and pathology chronicity.
Facing tough fiscal constraints, the Government is compelled to allocate less and less funds
for health care. Thus, during 1997 the allocations from the overall budget shrunk by 3%,
amounting to only 145 lei per capita. In macroeconomic terms, they constitute less than 45% of
the required resources required in the field. At the same time, the structure of expenses remains to
be irrational, which considerably reduces the efficiency of funds. Of the overall amount allocated
to medicare, only 1/5 constitutes active expenses (procurement of medicines, medical equipment,
personal training), the remainder (4/5) account for the communal services, labor payment and
capital repairs of buildings. Distribution of funds between the two domains of medicare is
inadequate too - only 18% ale allocated for primary medical assistance (outpatient services and
pre-illness diagnostics), whereas the funding of hospitals consumed 82% of the overall funds. Of
course, this disproportion in distribution of financial resources is far from contributing in making
the active-preventive measures more efficient.
Is pretty low the development of private sector in the field of medicare. The statistical data
shows that the paid medical services rendered to the population in 1997 made up only 1/10 of the
overall expense. Per capita they make up only 3.18 lei, which is slightly more in the urban
localities (Chiºinãu – 5.65 lei and Bãlþi – 6.85 lei). Obviously, in these conditions the budget
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necessary to both rationalize the public funds earmarked for medicare, as well as the branch as a
whole.
Taking into account, that the macroeconomic environment in which the medicare performs
its activity in Moldova, as well as the trends manifested recently in this domain, we can conclude,
that the perspective of the amelioration of the situation, based entirely on the support of the state,
is pretty ambiguous. The viability of the branch depends to a great extent on the pace and degree
of reforms. From this point of view, we consider opportune to speed up the reforming actions,
focusing on the following priorities:
· Modification of public costs’ structure, by increasing the share of allocations for
primary health care (preventive diagnosis, prophylactics and out-patient services);
· Enforcement of law regarding the obligatory medical assistance of citizens;
· Development of a minimal packet of medical services guaranteed by the state and
funded from public budget;
· Stimulation (encouragement) of private sector development and competitive behavior in
rendering medical-curative services;
· Decentralization of medicare net, by granting real autonomy to medical units;
· Elaboration of national sectoral programs aimed at fighting the socially contagious
sicknesses (cancer, HIV, diabetes, environment hygiene, etc.).
S o c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  besides the macroeconomic difficulties, faced by the
whole economy, has to overcome atavisms inherited from the old system of the social benefits.
Preserving the public nature of the social funds means to expose the social sphere to certain
hazardous, long run disturbances. This is why, the structure of social costs needs to be
rationalized and eligibility criteria revised. The social protection needs to gradually shift from the
principle of universal distribution of benefits to that of individual accumulation. It is important,
that the burden of social expenses be evenly borne by all individuals, economic units and state. In
this regard, a closer correlation will be provided between the beneficiaries and taxpayers.
Social protection reform will run in conditions of tight f i s c a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s . They
will be noticed pretty much in the immediately forthcoming period (1998-1999), as a result of the
external debt of the republic and amplification of budget deficit. The vulnerable point in the
activity of the social protection system constitutes its financial viability, which is almost
collapsed. The designed transformations need to be implemented in line with the measures aimed
at improving the consolidated state budget. The immediate aim is to offset the incomes with
expenses, based on the enhancement of budget accumulations and reduction of unjustified
financing. For this purpose it is important to provide for financing of current social payments for
pensions and salaries, by suspending the plans (intentions) to rise wages or other indemnities.
Although the strategic objective in the pensioning filed envisages a gradual shift from the
current universal system to three-dimensional one, p r i o r i t y  should have measures of
rationalization of current pensioning fund budgeting. In terms of urgent policies , the actions
should be channeled to the following directions:
· Freezing up any increase of pensions until the pension arrears are not entirely paid off;
· Ceasing for a longer term the payment of particular-deserve-pensions and those granted
in privileged conditions;
· Reduction of pensions and compensations to working pensioners;
· Elimination of compensations for gas and electric power, by shifting the social
assistance to vulnerable social groups;
CHAPTER 5. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE OF TRANSNISTRIA
© July 1998 ECONOMIC SURVEY Moldova in Transition84
· Banning netting with the social fund;
· Ceasing the experience of paying the pensions in kind;
· Restructuring the debts of the social fund to pensions and indemnities;
· Strengthening the financial management regarding the accumulation and distribution of
social contributions.
In order to make the targeted measures operational, it is necessary to establish an adequate
legal framework. It is necessary to update certain legal acts and develop some new, such as the
laws: regarding state pensions, operationalization of private pension funds, social fund, state
social insurance, private social insurance, etc.
As regards social assistance , it will play an important role in amortizing the social costs.
Proceeding from the budgetary constraints that the social fund is going to face during the
forthcoming months, it is necessary, that the funds be channeled mostly to p r o t e c t i o n  o f  m o s t
needy strata and those easily vulnerable to risks. For this purpose, the results of the household
budget survey may be used, for identifying the vulnerable groups and determining the social
assistance quantum. As proved by the poverty profile in Moldova, mostly affected category
comprises families with children (76% of the total number of poor account for the families who
have at least a child under 15). This is why, the children should be placed in the focus of the
social assistance efforts. We consider opportune to substitute the multitude of family allocations
(for children) with one single – poverty allowance. This will exclude incoherence and will be
more explicit for beneficiaries. It will be granted only to vulnerable individuals, based on the
means testing.
Given that the social funds will be extremely limited in continuation, the social transfers
need to be distributed to a high extent in terms of concrete addresses. For this purpose it is
necessary to make tougher the current eligibility conditions, by reducing essentially the list of
recipients. The size of indemnities (social allowances) should be as flexible as possible and vary
depending on the category of beneficiaries and degree of their need. At the same time, the social
costs should be maintained at a prudence level, in order to avoid a potential deepening of budget
deficit.
Assessment of current situation and development of eventual scenarios shows, that besides
the measures aimed at speeding up the social reforms, urgent actions are needed to recover the
social finances. Social budget’s adjustment to reality might make public expenses more efficient
and facilitate promotion of their reform as a whole.
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE OF TRANSNISTRIA
The Program of Activity of the new Moldova’s Government, approved by the Parliament in
May 1998, among priorities includes “r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y ,  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a  s o l e
viable economic complex, in conditions of market economy ”. Following after well-known events of
1992, the economy of Transnistria has been developing in is particular conditions, differing from
those of other regions of the country, a fact which should be taken into consideration both while
running the territorial-administrative reform in Moldova, and while implementing the European
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norms of local self-administration in compliance with the European Charter of Local Self-
Government , ratified by the Parliament of Moldova in July  1997.
One of the tasks of the new Parliament is to generate a national legislation in line with the
Charter, including the laws “On Territorial-Administrative Organization”, “On Local Self-
Government” and “On Elections of Local Administration Offices”, the drafts of the above having
been submitted to the commissions of the Parliament for almost an year.
Europe operates today in the context of a new juridical, political and social-economic
reality: r e g i o n a l i s m  is manifesting itself in increasing the rights and responsibilities of regions in
some countries (Germany, Spain, Austria, etc.), and developing cooperation among regions,
across national borders.
In the case of Transnistria, as for regions in other countries, the key problems are: (i) how to
distribute responsibilities between the central and regional governments in the best possible way
for the country and the region; and (ii) how to ensure that the process of decentralization does not
undermine the national state.
S o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  r e l a t e d  t o  T r a n s n i s t r i a  w i l l  n o t  b e  e a s y ,  w a y s  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  s o u g h t ,
i n c l u d i n g  t h r o u g h  p r o v i d i n g  w i t h  a n a l y s i s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n .  B e l o w ,  t h e r e  i s  a digest of the Report
“Republic of Moldova: Economic Review of the Transnistrian Region” (World Bank, Chiº i n ãu,
June 1998).
*    *    *
Since 1992, the Transnistria region, an economically important part of the Republic of
Moldova located on the east bank of the Nistru river, has suffered self-imposed isolation from the
rest of the country and, for the most part, from the world at large. This isolation arose as a
consequence of unsettled conflict in which ethnic and language factors exacerbated the marked
differences in approach to economic reform.
In Soviet times, Transnistria was considered the most economically developed region of the
Moldovan Soviet Republic. According to rough calculations, it accounted for more than a quarter
of the republic's gross domestic product (GDP). It produced more than a third of total industrial
output, including about 90 percent of electricity, all steel and rolled metal, and most heavy
industrial equipment, construction materials, and light industrial products. Transnistria's
contribution to agricultural output was less important (about 10-15 percent), but agriculture was
more productive compared with that of the rest of the republic. Due to its geographic location, the
region has always been a natural hub for Moldova's trade with the east in respect to both land
transportation and energy pipeline connections.
The Transnistrian conflict has considerably complicated Moldova's transition to a market
economy. Disintegration of the internal market has weakened the economic potential of the
country. Already extremely high dependence on energy imports has deepened. Competitiveness of
exports has suffered as use of the most convenient transport routes to major export markets has
been blocked for the majority of economic agents. De facto separation and lack of structural
reforms in the Transnistria region have provided a large window for opportunity for various forms
of shadow economic activities. Moldovan authorities have repeatedly expressed concern about
governance problems arising from the Transnistria situation, including numerous cases of
unrecorded foreign trade, tax evasion, and smuggling resulting from the lack of effective control
over the eastern border with Ukraine. Compounding the tangible economic damage has been the
negative effect of the conflict on the image of Moldova in the eyes of the international community;
this has hurt its chances of competing for new markets, making new trading partners, and
attracting foreign investors.
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Transnistria's move towards isolation was manifested in a number of radical steps taken in
1992-93 to establish separate economic institutions. The Transnistrian Republican Bank (or the
Transnistrian central bank, TRB) issued a separate currency that is not recognized outside the
region. Fiscal policy is also managed independently from the rest of the country. The region has
established its own customs service and maintains a distinct trade regime. Trade with the west
bank territory of Moldova is treated as foreign trade. Although division of the energy sector, which
is crucial for the whole country due to its dependence on imported energy resources proved to be
impossible, coordination between the two parts of the country is limited. The fundamental legal
framework for market economy adopted by Moldova in recent years has not been accepted by the
Transnistrian authorities and does not function in the region. No statistical data have been
provided officially from the Transnistria region to Moldovan authorities since 1992.
It would be wrong to say that the central planning system has remained unmodified in the
Transnistria region. Although no official program of market reforms has been implemented in
Transnistria, the regional authorities did not cancel liberalization measures already undertaken in
Moldova before separation. Furthermore, they have attempted to introduce some new, select
elements of a market economy while maintaining many aspects of the old Soviet style economic
system. In addition, in several areas de facto liberalization took place during the initial period of
economic chaos and lack of supervision by regional authorities. The majority of prices are now
free of controls and the foreign exchange market is developing. Commercial banks operate
actively and new private firms have begun to emerge. The actual trade regime is much more liberal
than the one proclaimed officially as a consequence of weak customs controls and the unsolved
problem of regulating trade relations between the east and west bank territories.
Selective liberalization measures were not supported by macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reform, which resulted in a severe economic crisis. For several years, monetary policy in
the Transnistria region was characterized by chaotic developments and the absence of any real
control mechanisms. Budgetary and credit policy remained largely a tool of politicians, who used
it without regard to economic consequences. Few, if any, structural reforms have been
implemented in Transnistria. Executive and legislative authorities have failed to achieve
consensus on the main principles of reform, including the role of private property and the
functions of the state in the economy. As a result, the public sector dominates production and
distribution, and the private sector is relegated to a minor role. This stands in sharp contrast with
the rest of Moldova.
Starting in late 1995, the Transnistrian authorities appeared to make more concerted efforts
to respond to the deteriorating economic situation. Measures were taken to keep the monetary and
financial crisis from deepening further. The role of the TRB was strengthened, and a concerted
effort was made to establish its control over the monetary and credit situation in the region. A
tougher stance was taken in issuing new currency. The TRB refinance rate began to be adjusted to
inflation and it replaced the symbolic interest rates fixed by the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet (or
regional Parliament, TSS). The TRB began to intervene more actively in the foreign exchange
market. Parallel measures were undertaken to reduce the fiscal deficit and to find nonmonetary
sources for its financing. However, budgetary policies remained contradictory, as soft budget
constraints persisted and the Soviet-type pattern of public expenditures essentially remained the
same. Supervision over commercial banks was strengthened through the introduction of prudential
standards and the gradual increase in required minimum statutory capital. Some steps were taken
to reanimate the process of privatization. The basic legal framework for expansion of nonstate
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forms of ownership in the region was approved by the TSS. However, the legislators' inability to
reach consensus on the implementation mechanisms resulted in the failure of most of the laws to
work in practice. The authorities made visible efforts to attract foreign investors to the region.
Various forms of cooperation between the Transnistrian enterprises and foreign partners were
encouraged, with some modest results.
Internal measures aimed at redressing the crisis were accompanied by a number of partial
steps in the direction of economic reintegration with the rest of Moldova. In 1995-97, several
important economic agreements were signed between the Government of Moldova and the
Transnistrian authorities, which were aimed at eliminating some of the most distortionary
inconsistencies in economic regulation between the two territories. These agreements, which
include, inter-alia, measures to simplify foreign exchange and trade relations, could form a
substantial basis for future economic reintegration in case of their full implementation. An
agreement on the relations between the monetary and credit systems was signed in mid-1995. In
particular it envisaged official introduction of the parallel circulation of the Moldovan leu as legal
tender for noncash transactions in the territory of Transnistria. The National Bank of Moldova
subsequently opened a branch office in Tiraspol, which functions as a settlement center for
transactions between the commercial banks of the two territories. However, Transnistrian
commercial banks prefer to maintain direct correspondent relations with the banks in Chiºinãu,
and the level of transactions channeled through the settlement center remains insignificant. A
customs agreement was signed at the beginning of 1996, which envisaged the Transnistrian
authorities taking some important measures to adapt their foreign trade regime and eliminate most
differences with the national trade regime. Although import tariff rates for nonfood products,
tobacco, and beverages have been increased to the national levels, the greatest part of the customs
agreement remains to be implemented. These agreements were followed by the signing in May
1997 of a memorandum on the principles for settlement of the conflict. The memorandum
envisages a final status that would accord Transnistria a substantial amount of economic autonomy
within a unified national framework. However, the timetable for reaching a final settlement
remains uncertain.
Although the recent efforts of the Transnistrian authorities to stop the deepening of the crisis
and to upgrade economic ties with the west bank have brought partial results, the measures
undertaken have not been sufficient to stabilize the economy. The deliberate policy of isolation,
combined with the lack of comprehensive macroeconomic stabilization efforts and a reluctance to
carry out structural reform, has resulted in major economic difficulties in the Transnistria region.
Measured by most comparators, these difficulties are considerably greater than those faced by the
rest of the country. After a period of accelerated deterioration in economic conditions, which
reached a peak in 1995, some relative improvement occurred in 1996-97. Nevertheless, the
region's economy is mired in a deep recession, and living standards have dropped sharply.
The monetary and financial situation remains very unstable. The region continues to suffer
from high inflation, although price growth significantly decelerated in 1997. The average monthly
inflation rate was below four percent in 1997, compared to more than 50 percent in 1995. In step
with the inflation rate, depreciation of the Transnistrian ruble (TR) slowed down, but has not yet
stopped, even with active TRB interventions. Indeed, the local ruble fell sharply in March 1998.
Local economic agents generally substitute foreign currencies for the local currency. After a near
collapse of the regional budget in 1995, some rehabilitation of the budgetary system has taken
place, but the overall financial situation remains extremely fragile. Payment arrears have become
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chronic. The largest and most acute financial problem is the huge amount of accumulated external
arrears to Russia for energy resources, which makes up about half the energy debt of the whole
country. These arrears have become, in fact, a massive subsidy to the economy of the region and a
major liability for the future.
Both industrial and agricultural outputs continue to decline. In 1997, industrial output was
about 70 percent below the 1990 level. According to rough estimates, the relative share of the
region in the Moldova's total industrial output has fallen by about 7 percentage points due to
higher rates of decline compared to the west bank territory. However, at the micro level, the
situation is differentiated. Amid the continuing decline in physical output of most industrial
products, there are some exceptions. More favorable trends in the production of a number of
products (e.g., steel, rolled metal, slate, cement) are associated with more effective management
policies at a few leading enterprises. In general, these firms had better starting conditions in terms
of internal organization, management and labor skills, and competitiveness. They managed to
adjust more quickly when the command economy was dismantled de facto. Agricultural output has
also been declining at a faster pace than in the rest of the country. The fall in agricultural output
has been accompanied by a decline in yields relative to the rest of Moldova. This has resulted in a
loss of a comparative advantage for many important agricultural products (cereals, sunflower,
vegetables) which Transnistria used to enjoy in the Soviet times.
Recession in the main productive sectors has generated high levels of hidden unemployment
in the form of forced underemployment in the public sector. Even though a large part of those
underemployed succeed in finding alternative jobs, the underlying unemployment rate is estimated
to be at least 7 percent of the labor force.
Poor economic policies followed by a long-lasting economic crisis in the region has led to a
sharp fall in living standards. In 1995-96, average wages were about 20 percent below the average
for the rest of the country. In comparison, at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union,
Transnistria had better starting conditions in terms of wage levels than the west bank territory. In
1997, however, the difference in wage level practically disappeared. This is probably a temporary
phenomenon, since it is primarily a consequence of administrative increases in wages decreed by
the regional authorities. Indeed, the Transnistrian ruble depreciated sharply in mid-March 1998,
from TR 650,000 to TR 1,200,000 per US dollar, implying a potentially important erosion in real
wages. Total household revenues on average do not exceed US$35 per capita. The urban majority
of the Transnistrian population appears to be significantly poorer than the rural minority and the
urban population of the west bank territory. The two major factors that probably prevented
household revenues from an even deeper fall are (a) populist social policies of the Transnistrian
authorities conducted at the expense of financing the economy through the accumulation of
external arrears, and (b) the availability of alternative revenue sources, including a large share of
revenue earned from household agricultural production.
It is clear that the policies followed by the Transnistrian authorities of isolation and
piecemeal reforms combined with heavy reliance on external subsidies are associated with high
risks and are inadequate to create internal conditions for stabilization and economic growth in the
region. It is true that, despite all the difficulties, the region's economy has avoided collapse so far.
The following three factors are probably the major determinants behind this phenomenon: (a) de
facto liberalization in a number of areas, which in many cases took place spontaneously; (b)
massive external subsidy to the whole economy; and (c) partial reforms undertaken by the
authorities under the danger of full economic collapse. The first two of these factors are not under
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the control of the regional authorities and could exert destabilizing influences in the future. Only
the last factor can really contribute to the conditions for stabilization and growth in the longer
term. Partial efforts to reform some elements of the economic system should be developed into a
comprehensive market reform program. To achieve this, much greater effort is needed on the part
of the Transnistrian authorities, particularly in the areas of macroeconomic stabilization,
privatization, external trade liberalization, and general reform of the legal framework, in order to
create conditions for stability, growth, and economic reintegration. Most elements of this reform
program exist within the national framework already adopted by the west bank of Moldova. In
practice, this framework could be readily expanded to include Transnistria while making the
adjustments required to take into account the specific characteristics of the region.
Economic benefits of reintegration for both parts of the country are clear. Only through
economic reintegration can Moldova realize its full internal economic potential and maximize
external competitiveness. For the Transnistria region, reintegration would precipitate accelerated
economic reform and provide stable economic linkages with the rest of the country and the outside
world, without which its tiny economy would be unlikely to survive and prosper in the long term.
However, economic reintegration cannot be expected to happen by itself. The prospects depend on
achieving a final political settlement of the conflict which is a great challenge facing the Moldovan
Government and Transnistrian authorities. There are obviously many social, ethnic and linguistic
factors to be taken into account. A strong will, as well as great effort are needed from both sides to
reverse the process of separation which has developed over the last five years.
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6.1 Selective indicators of countries in transition
For the Republic of Moldova the experience of other countries in transition is quite
important. The following comparative analysis provide a picture of Moldova within other
countries in transition from Central and Eastern Europe. Table 6.1.3 ranks these countries
according to a selection of indicators for reform, while Table 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 give a more
specific picture of the GDP growth performance and inflation over the recent years.
Table 6.1.1 Selected group of Countries in Transition: Real growth of GDP: 1990-97
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
percentage change 
Albania -10.0 -27.7 -7.2 9.6 9.4 8.9 9.1 -7.0
Bulgaria -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -2.4 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -7.4
Croatia -6.9 -19.8 -11.1 -0.9 0.6 1.7 4.3 6.3
Czech Republic -1.2 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 2.7 5.9 4.1 1.2
Hungary -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.0
Moldova - - - -1.2 -30.9 -1.9 -8.0 1.3
Poland -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9
Romania -5.6 -12.9 -8.7 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.6
Slovak Republic -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.8 7.0 5.7
Slovenia -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.1 3.7
Ukraine -4.0 -8.7 -9.9 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.2
   Source: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s , IMF and T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t , EBRD
Table 6.1.2 Inflation in Eastern Europe
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
                                 (change in the year-end retail/consumer price level, in per cent) 
Albania 104 237 31 16 6 12.7 32.1
Bulgaria 339 79 64 122 33 123 1,089
Croatia 250 938 1,149 -3 4 3.5 3.6
Czech Republic 52 13 18 10 8 8.8 8.4
Hungary 32 22 21 21 28 23.5 18.3
Moldova - 424.3 393.6 76.1 21.7 15.1 11.2
Poland 60 44 38 29 22 19.9 15
Romania 223 199 296 62 28 38.8 154.8
Slovak Republic 58 9 25 12 7 5.8 6.2
Slovenia 247 93 23 18 9 9.7 9.1
Ukraine 161 2,730 10,155 401 182 80.2 15.9
  Source: Based on EBRD, T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t  1 9 9 7
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Table 6.1.3 Progress in transition by countries
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Albania 3.2 75 2 4 2 3 4 2 2 2-
Bulgaria 8.4 50 3 3 2+ 3 4 2 3- 2
Croatia 4.8 55 3 4+ 3- 3 4 2 3- 2+
Czech Republic 10.3 75 4 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 3 3
Hungary 10.3 75 4 4+ 3 3+ 4+ 3 4 3+
Moldova 4.4 45 3 3 2 3 4 2 2 2
Poland 38.5 65 3+ 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 3 3+
Romania 22.7 60 3- 3 2 3 4 2 3- 2
Slovenia 2 50 3+ 4+ 3- 3 4+ 2 3 3
Ukraine 51.9 50 3- 3+ 2 3 3 2 2 2
Enterprises Markets and trade Financial institutions
       Source: Based on EBRD, T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t  1 9 9 7
The classification system for transition indicators has the 1-4 scale indicating the scale
from the worst category 1 (little progress) to the standards and performance of advanced
industrial economies (4).
The “private sector” of GDP represents rough EBRD estimates, based on available
statistics from both official (government) sources and unofficial sources. The underlying concept
of private sector value added includes income generated by the activity of private registered
companies as well as by private entities engaged in informal activity in those cases where
reliable information on informal activity is available. Here the term “private companies” refers
to all enterprises in which a majority of the shares are owned by private individuals or entities.
The roughness of the EBRD estimates reflects data limitations, particularly with respect to the
scale of informal activity. The EBRD estimates may in some cases differ markedly from
available data from official sources on the contribution to GDP made by the “private sector” or
by the “non-state sector”. This is in most cases because the definition of the EBRD concept
differs from that of the official estimates. Specifically for the CIS countries, official data in most
cases refer to value added in the “non-state sector” – broad concept, which incorporates
collective farms as well as companies in which only a minority stake has been privatized.
In recent years, most of the East European countries have registered a growing trade
deficit and a continued deterioration of their current accounts.
Table 6.1.4 Current account and trade balances in Eastern Europe
Current account      
balance
Marchandise 
trade balance
Current account 
balance
Marchandise 
trade balance
Change in current 
account balance
Change in 
marchandise trade 
1996 1996 1996 1996 1995-96 1995-96
(in million  US dollars) (in per centof GDP) (Change in GDP sharein per cent)
Albania -123 -692 -4.7 -26.7 2.7 -7.1
Bulgaria 117 209 1.3 2.4 1.8 1.5
Czech Republic -4,476 -5,972 -8.1 -10.9 -5.3 -3.4
Macedonia -288 -317 -7.8 -8.6 -1.7 -2.4
Hungary -1,700 -2,600 -3.8 -5.8 1.9 -0.4
Moldova* -188 (-295) -252 (-344) -11.3 (-15.8) -15.1 (-18.4) -2.8 (-4.5) -11.9 (-3.3) 
Poland -1,352 -8,154 -1.0 -6.1 -5.7 -4.6
Romania -2,336 -2,130 -5.9 -4.6 -1.0 -0.1
Slovak Republic -1,941 -2,106 -10.2 -11.1 -8.0 -9.8
Slovenia 47 -853 0.3 -4.6 -1.7 -3.1
Ukraine -1,184 -4,296 -7.9 -6.8 1.5 -3.5
           Source: Based on EBRD, T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t  1 9 9 7
* Data for 1996 are revised by MET. Data in brackets are for 1997.
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Graph 6.1.1  Current account and trade balance, percentage share of GDP; 1996
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In general, foreign direct investment has continued to flow into the region at a rapid pace. It
has to be mentioned that several large infrastructure privatization’s in Hungary (power sector)
and the Czech Republic (telecom) taking place in December 1995 distort the annual comparison.
In 1996 Poland replaced Hungary as the leader recipient of FDI. Concerning Moldova, the flow
of FDI are registering one of the lowest value in CIS countries and Eastern Europe.
Table 6.1.5 Foreign direct investment for selected countries; 1994-96
FDI inflow FDI inflows as  
1994 1995 1996 per capita % share of GDP
Countries 1996 1996
              (in m illion of US dollars)   (US dollars)
Albania 53 70 90 28 3
Bulgaria 105 82 100 12 1
Croatia 98 81 349 73 2
Czech Republic 1,024 2,720 1,264 123 2
Hungary 1,097 4,410 1,986 195 4
Moldova 18 64 24 (60)* 13 (17)* 2
Poland 542 1,134 2,741 71 2
Romania 347 404 210 9 1
Slovak Republic 178 134 177 33 1
Slovenia 131 170 180 90 1
Ukraine 100 300 500 10 1
 Source: Based on EBRD, T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t  1 9 9 7
 * Data for 1996 are revised by MET. Data in brackets are for 1997.
Foreign trade
 Table 6.1.5 presents an overview of trade specialization in transition economies by major
products categories. Notably, the largest differences are between resources-reach economies
with a very high share of raw materials and fuel exports and the rest. A high share of machinery
and transport equipment in total exports is registered in exports of more developed East
European countries, such as: The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. The lowest shares of
machinery and transport equipment are in export of CIS countries. The main items of Moldovan
exports remain agricultural products, chemicals and intermediaries.
The structure of imports is relatively uniform across the countries. Most of the countries
remain net importers of food and agricultural products. The basic items imported in the region
are chemicals, machinery and transport equipment.
6.1 Selective indicators of countries in transition
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Table 6.1.6 Structure of export, percentage share in total exports; 1995
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          Source: Based on EBRD, T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t  1 9 9 7
 
Graph 6.1.2  Structure of export, 1995
    Source: Based on EBRD, T r a n s i t i o n  r e p o r t  1 9 9 7
 
Table 6.1.7 Structure of imports, percentage share in total imports; 1995
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Graph 6.3  Structure of import, 1995
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6.2 Neighboring countries: Romania and Ukraine
Romania: the social-economic evolution in 1997-19985
Romania – one of the transition countries ranks the twenty-ninth place among the
European countries according to the economic freedom index6.
Romania’s transition process to the market economy has its particularities and is
occurring in a relatively slight economic decline. Thus, according to the information of the
National Statistics Committee, in 1997 the GDP reached lei 249,750.2 billion (US$ 33.5
billion, coming to 87.1 per cent of the 1990th  level (for the comparison, in Republic of
                                          
5 Sources: Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Romania’s social-economic evolution in 1997;
  Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania;   Social-economic objectives of the Radu Vasile Government’s
Program till 2000.
6  1998 Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation Annual Report (USA)
Index of economic freedom, 1997
Trade TaxationGovern. MonetaryForeign BankingWages /PropertyRegula- Black
sistem intervent.policy investm. prices rights tions market
Estonia 1 3.5 2 4 1 2 2 2 2 2
Czech Republic 2 4 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3
Latvia 2 2.5 3 5 2 2 2 3 3 4
Hungary 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 3
Poland 2 3.5 3 5 2 3 3 2 3 3
Lithuania 1 3 3 5 2 3 3 3 3 4
Slovac Republic 3 4.5 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Slovenia 4 4 3 5 2 2 3 2 3 3
Romania 2 5 3 5 2 3 2 4 4 3
Moldova 3 3.5 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 4
Armenia 2 3.5 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 4
Russia 4 3.5 3 5 3 2 3 3 4 4
Bulgaria 4 4.5 3 5 3 3 3 3 4 4
Georgia 3 2.5 2 5 3 4 4 4 4 5
Ukraine 4 4 3 5 3 4 3 4 4 4
Belarus 4 4.5 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 5
Azerbaijan 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4
6.2 Neighboring countries: Romania and Ukraine
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Moldova this indicator amounts 36 per cent) and marking a 6.6 percent drop in comparison
with 1996. Industry and  services , contributing
almost 70 per cent to the GDP, diminished in
comparison with 1996, by 5 and 11.2 per cent
respectively (by about 10 per cent -in the first
quarter 1998 in comparison with the same
period of 1997) .  The situation of agriculture
was characterized by two tendencies: a growth
in plant cultivation by 10 per cent and
livestock production diminishing by 7.1 per
cent. Capital construction  dropped in 1997 by
22 per cent in real terms.
This decline caused a reduction
in the domestic demand by 8.5 per
cent in comparison with last year and
the a of the final consumption by 6.4
per cent. Activity of the r e t a i l
enterprises during 1997 was
developing under the direct influence
of  consumers’ behavior and savings
of the population, determined, on one
hand, by the evolution of the buying
capacity of incomes, and on the other
hand, by the dynamics of interest rates
for bank deposits.  The total turnover
of the sector diminished by 28 per cent
in comparison  with 1996. About 70
per cent of the total retail trade
belongs to the private sector.  As a
consequence of these phenomena a
stocking process enlarged in the economy. By the end of the 1997 the s t o c k s  o f  f i n a l  p r o d u c t s
amounted 58.5 per cent from the total output in December. Trade Services diminished in real
terms by 19 per cent, the share of the private sector in services amounting to 67.1 per cent.
Foreign trade .  In 1997, exports of goods amounted US$ 8,428.9 million ( 4.3 per cent
more than in 1996), which corresponds to  a monthly average level of  US$ 702.4 million, over
US$ 673.7 million in 1996. The share of private sector in total exports amounted in 1997  to
54.8 per cent and grew up by 11.2 per cent over the 1996 (in the first quarter 1998 it diminished
 EXPORT  -FO B  ($ m il.)IMPORT -  C IF ($ m il.)
1996 1997 1996 1997
Agro-food products 706.9 594.8 869.9 694.4
M ineral products 692.1 637.9 2688.7 2408.4
Chem ical 881.7 745.4 1433.9 1383.8
Textiles, confections, leather, shoes 2291.6 2551.3 1730.1 1998.2
W ood and papir industry 838.6 848.3 383.8 360.2
Construction m a terials, glass 150.3 151.4 144.5 142.9
Metal goods 1268.7 1556.4 715.3 669.9
Mashin building, electronics 1136.3 1209.6 3160.1 3234.1
Total 8084.5 8428.9 11435.3 11275.4
by 1.2 per cent). In the geographical structure of exports 56.8 per cent belong to the European
Union. Imports constituted US$ 11,275,4 million  in 1997, or 1.4 per cent more than in 1996 (in
the first quarter of 1998 it diminished by 8.3 per cent). The share of private sector in total
imports comes to US$ 5,520.7 million, or  48.3 per cent of the total import  in 1996. In total
imports, 52.1 per cent fall on the European Union. The Republic of Moldova is placed on the
  Evolution of real GDP (%)
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twenty – first place according to the total volume of commercial exchange of Romania, the
fifteenth place on exports side and the thirtieth place on the imports side. The total volume of
exchange diminished  in 1997 by  5.9 per cent, from which  +27.8 per cent - exports and  – 21.8
– imports.
P r i v a t i z a t i o n  o f  s t a t e  p r o p e r t y  is underway. The degree of privatization (according to the
criteria of the social capital) reached 100 per cent in 1997 in textiles, 90 per cent – food
packaging, 89 per cent processing of plastic materials, 86 per cent – construction materials, 80
per cent – cement. The dynamic of privatization in industry and agriculture, traditionally
considered to be problematic sectors for privatization, exceeded the dynamic of privatization in
tourism and trade, branches normally more attractive for private investors. This change marks a
movement of the private capital  toward  the productive sectors, which has a more durable
profitability in time.
Investment in 1997 grew up to lei 38,364.9 billion, dropping in real terms by 19 per cent
in comparison with 1996 (I quarter 1998 it diminished by 2.1 per cent).  Private sector
investments constituted lei 15,410.5 billion. More than a half of the total volume of investments
was concentrated in a couple of  activities: 11.9 per cent – transactions with the real estate,
11.2 per cent - agriculture, petrol and gas extraction – 9.6 per cent, food and beverage industries
– 8.5 per cent,  power, electric and thermal energy, gas and hot water production, transportation
and distribution – 96.4 per cent, mail and telecommunications – 6.3 per cent. The fall of
investments was caused, on one hand, by the deterioration of financial situation of the
economic agents and, on the other hand,
a restrictive monetary policy. Only 7.5
per cent of  investments were financed
through credits, own sources and those
non-banking attracted (population’s
funds, extra-budget or allocated by the
state property fund, foreign capital),
continuing to be preponderant.
A situation more favorable than in
the Republic of Moldova was created in
the domain of the state budget
execution , the revenues amounting to
43,863.6, but expenditures  - lei 52,933.7 billion, the deficit coming to 3.6 per cent of GDP.
External debt in 1997 reached 24 per cent of GDP (for comparison, in the Republic of
Moldova  – 64 per cent).
Monetary policy.  The loosening of
the control over the banking reserves,
seasonal factors and measures made in
the sphere of incomes, according to the
official opinion, were the most important
determinants of the monetary indicators’
growth in the second half of 1997.
During the whole year broad money (M2)
grew by more than 60 per cent, cash – by
75 per cent. This had its impact on the
nominal exchange rate  (from 4 thousand
lei per  US$1 at the beginning of the year
till  8 - at the end and 8.2 at the end of first quarter 1998) and inflation (i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  in 1997
reached 151.4 per cent,  and a monthly average – 8 per cent, compare to over 3.8 per cent in
1996). Food consumer prices  grew up 1.46 times, prices for nonfood goods – 1.42 times, and
services – 2 times. The average interest rate used by the National Bank of Romania at the end of
the year stood at 52.6 per cent for credits and 15 per cent for deposits.
Budget deficit and external debt (% of GDP)
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The number of the employed diminished in 1997 by 507 Thos. persons, the
unemployment rate rising from 6.6 per cent in 1996 to 8.8 per cent in 1997 (9.3 per cent in I
quarter 1998). In December 1997, the average nominal wage reached lei 1,265,671 (US$ 170),
marking a growth in nominal terms by 116.9 per cent in compared to 1996 which constituted
39.2 per cent in the total household’s revenues. The buying capacity diminished to 86.3 per cent
of the level of December 1996 and 64.4 per cent of 1990.
The forecast for 1998 is the drop in inflation rate to 37 per cent. Revenues of the public
budget will amount 29.5 per cent of GDP, expenditures – 33.5 per cent of GDP, and the state
budget deficit - 3.6 per cent of GDP. This level of expenditure from the public national budget
is expected due to the realization of radical changes in the allocation of budget resources,
among which are increased capital expenditures, the utilization of sources obtained from
privatization for development programs,  including the concrete projects, such as export
promotion, the development of small and medium business, regional development.
Among the social-economic objectives of the Government  are
- defining the state’s role in the allocation of resources in case of the market failure,
creation of an integrated system of markets;
- acceleration of the structural adjustment of the economy;
- reaching and consolidation of a macroeconomic stability, creation of conditions for the
durable economic development;
- compensation of delays in the domain of social-economic changes necessary for the
entrance in the European Union;
- regional and local development, growth of  social unity;
- amelioration of adverse social consequences of economic reforms;
- re-launching of the social, interethnic, and i terprofessional dialog at local and central
levels, as well as supporting of the civil structure of the society, and participation of citizens
and communities in the management and control of public affairs;
- improving of the image of Romania, growth in the attractiveness of the economy for
foreign capital and re-launching of the efficient dialog with financial institutions, through the
growth of  public administration capacity in elaborating and implementing policies in all
domains.
Ukraine at crossroads7
Five years behind the Central Europe
Ukraine is in a difficult economic situation. The expected economic growth in 1997 did
not occur. Starting from 1991 the economy experienced a dramatic decline, the tempo of
economic growth in 1997 having been by 55% less than in 1991.
The country is a t  c r o s s r o a d s : either it chooses a way to a proper sound development and
becomes competitive, or, continues to operate within an ambiguous legal framework and
receive assistance from abroad, which is not going to last very long.
Ukraine, according to western analysts, lacks 5 years behind  the Central European
countries and 2 years behind Russia, as regards economic reform.
Should the structural and legal reforms be applied, the Ukraine could register a 1.5%
economic growth in 1998 and even 2% in 1999. A good management and capital are required.
Vacillating privatization
                                          
7 M. Bratu. Ucraina la rãscruce de drumuri. Tribuna Economicã, 1998, nr. 26
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Until 1997, t h e  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  w a s  v a c i l l a t i n g . The process of mass privatization launched
in 1992 and relaunched in 1995 was based on coupons (vouchers). Half of state enterprises,
including the small and middle ones, have been privatized.
However, these enterprises are lacking capital and adequate management . The big
companies are still in state ownership, and need the same recipe of capital injection and
management.
The Ukraine has no legal framework that could attract foreign investors . They are
countered by the decisions of the authorities from Kiev. This happened with the American
telecommunications concern Motorola that was hampered to extend in the Ukraine.
The result of the vacillating privatization in the Ukraine shows that this country attained
less than 1/3 of the planned incomes from the privatization process , that were supposed to
come into the state budget. Of the planned incomes in amount of US$ 500 million, about US$
150 million were obtained.
The direct sales of enterprises this year will amount to about US$ 1 billion, i.e.  circa half
of the total direct foreign investments in the Ukraine.
Foreign investors hesitate
The biggest foreign investor in the Ukraine is the South Korean Daewoo, which signed a
joint-venture contract worth US$ 1.3 billion, with Avtozaz - the largest car manufacture in the
Ukraine. Also, the English-Dutch giant Shell invested more than US$ 1 billion in the pipeline
supply through the Ukrainian territory of oil and natural gas from Russia.
Ukraine might become attractive for foreign investors. With a market of over 50 million
inhabitants and possibilities to invest in energy sector, chemistry, air transport and
telecommunications, Ukraine might attain almost US$ 10 billion from direct foreign
investments, according to western analysts.
The major drawbacks that the Ukrainian economy faces are its lacking behind in the
reforming process, ambiguous legal framework and tough taxation system.
The taxes and duties should be diminished,  and government expenditures should be
drastically curtailed. Some steps in this regard have been made through the law on profit tax
and VAT introduction. Yet, this is the beginning and only the beginning.
The banking financial sector  is fragile. The capital market is necessary and needs to be
supported. For this purpose, and for economic growth as a whole, much money is needed. This
money can originate from foreign investment of capital. This is the chance of Ukraine.
Ukraine needs to become out of a large potential market and of a potential remarkable
economy an existing one.
The undercapitalized economic potential
Reality shows that the market potential of Ukraine is so large, that in commercial terms it
is possible to do a good job in this part of Europe. The export towards Western Europe account
for almost 16% of the overall Ukrainian exports.
The car manufacturer Avtozaz plans to export about 250.000 pieces per annum,
particularly in Russia.
The Ukraine upkeeps close economic ties with Russia, venturing to lose some western markets.
Anyway, it can afford neither to lose the western markets , being in urgent need of capital nor
lose economic links with Russia, being dependent of the natural resources from this country.
The Ukraine needs to gain trust of the western investors and creditors, both of those from
London Club and Paris Club.
